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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV -13-03004 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE AND 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
DISREGARD AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY 
OF KEN EDMONDS, JAY CLARK, 
ROBERT F. BENNETT AND JAMES C. 
HILLIARD 
COMES NOW the above-named Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, 
LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, and submits the 
following objections to evidence and Memorandum in Support of Defendant/Counterclaimant's 
Motion to Strike and Disregard Affidavit Testimony of Ken Edmonds, Jay Clark, Robert F. 
Bennett and James C. Hilliard. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S OBJECTIONS 
TO EVIDENCE AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISREGARD AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY 
OF KEN EDMONDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT F. BENNETT AND JAMES C. HILLIARD - 1 
45522.0004.6253286. I 
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I. 
LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The standard of admissibility in a summary judgment proceeding is governed by Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which provides that: 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Supporting or opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein .... 
Rule 56(e) is clear that affidavits presented in opposition to motions for summary 
judgment must contain admissible evidence. See Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 
122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 ( 1992). In Hecla Mining, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that affidavits which consist only of conjecture, conclusory allegations as to ultimate facts, 
or conclusions of law are to be disregarded. ld. Conclusory statements, statements based on 
hearsay, statements that lack adequate fow1dation, and statements not made on personal 
knowledge are insufficient. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partners, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 
899 P.2d 977,981 (1995). Last, "a sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony 
may be disregarded on a summary judgment motion." Keeven v. Estate of Keeven (in Re Estate 
of Keeven), 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994). 
When an objection is made, the trial Court should make a preliminary determination 
whether the foundational requirements have been satisfied in the affidavits and depositions 
which have been submitted in support of a motion before the Court can consider the merits of a 
motion. See, e.g., Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1992) (concerning 
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for summary judgment). If an affidavit contains some inadmissible matter, the whole 
affidavit need not be stricken or disregarded, a court may strike or disregard the inadmissible part 
and consider the rest of the affidavit. See Marty v. State, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P.2d 1384, 
1387 (1992). 
II. 
LEGAL OBJECTIONS 
On November 29, 2013, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants James and Barbara Hilliard (the 
"Hilliards") filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Hilliards' Opposition is supported by the Affidavits of Ken Edmonds, Jay Clark, Robert F. 
Bennett and James C. Hilliard which contain inadmissible testimony. The below chart sets forth 
the objections to evidence that should be stricken from the proffered affidavits. 
A. Affidavit of Ken Edmonds. 
CITE STATEMENT OBJECTION 
9I 2 I have been retained as an expert by Ken Edmonds has not demonstrated 
the Plaintiffs in this case. adequate factual foundation for this 
statement nor for his qualifications as an 
expert to testify in this case. 
LR.C.P. 56(e), IRE 602, IRE 702, 705. 
9[ 3 Attached hereto and made a part The attachment to Mr. Edmonds' 
hereof is a summary analysis by me affidavit is inadmissible hearsay. 
of the claim of Mr. Tiegs as set out IRE 801(c), 802. Mr. Edmonds has 
in his affidavit. failed to lay adequate foundation to offer 
expert opinion testimony. IRE 702 and 
705. 
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B. Affidavit of Jay Clark. 
CITE I STATEMENT OBJECTION 
<j[ 6 I have read the Affidavit of Frank The statement is conclusory and Mr. 
Tiegs in Support of Murphy Land Clark's beliefs are in-elevant and 
Company, LLC's Motion for inadmissible. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho 
Summary Judgment ("Tiegs at 782; Shama Resources Ltd., 127 Idaho 
Affidavit"). I find several at 271; IRE 602. 
misstatement of facts as I know 
them. 
9I 6(a) Murphy Land may not have This statement lacks adequate factual 
commenced operation on the farm foundation, is conclusory, and is 
until May 2012; however, Lance irrelevant. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 
Funk either for himself or for 782; IRE 402, 602. 
Owyhee Farming Company of 
which he and Mr. Tiegs are the 
members did grow crops on the 
farm in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
9I 6(b) Contrary to Tiegs affidavit in This statement lacks adequate factual 
paragraph 11, ground had been foundation, is conclusory, and is 
prepared for the planting of crops in irrelevant. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 
2011 and Lance Funk or Owyhee 782; IRE 402,602. 
Farming Co. did grow potatoes on 
the farm in 2011 (approximately 
458 acres). Mr. Tiegs indicated that 
he would have grown 451.3 acres of 
Norkotah potatoes in 2011 
(paragraph 19(a)). I 
~[ 6(b) Mr. Funk grew Shepod y potatoes on This statement lacks adequate factual 
the farm in 2011. The choice of that foundation, is conclusory, and is 
kind of potato to grow was his irrelevant. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 
choice and the choice of Owyhee 782; IRE 402, 602. 
Farming Co., not mine. There was 
nothing to stop Mr. Funk and/or 
Owyhee Farming Co. from growing 
Norkotah potatoes on the farm in 
2011 rather than Shepody. 
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CITE ST ATE1\1ENT I OBJECTION I 
g[ 6(c) I do not believe, based on my many I Mr. Clark's beliefs are irrelevant, his 
years of experience on the farm, that statements are conclusory, lack adequate 
Mr. Tiegs' estimate of yields for factual foundation to establish relevance, 
D&S wheat (paragraph 19(b)) are and are inadmissible attempted expert 
historically accurate. That opinion testimony. Shama Resources, 
overstates the damages claimed. 127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402, 403, 602, 
Those are high yields and this farm 702,705. 
was not traditionally producing I yields of those amounts. 
Cj[ 6(d) I also believe based on my many Mr. Clark's beliefs are irrelevant, his 
years of experience on the farm that statements are conclusory, lack adequate 
Mr. Tiegs' estimates of costs are factual foundation to establish relevance, 
unrealistic. Total costs for the farm and are inadmissible attempted expert 
have historically been greater than opinion testimony. Shama Resources, 
what Mr. Tiegs set out in his 127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402,403,602, 
affidavit. And many costs, for 702, 705. 
example, maintenance and repairs to 
a forty ( 40) year old water system 
are omitted. They would be 
significant. 
<ff 6(e) I also believe based on my many Mr. Clark's beliefs are irrelevant, his 
years of experience on the farm that statements are conclusory, lack adequate 
Mr. Tiegs' estimates of what crops factual foundation to establish relevance, 
would have sold for is unrealistic. and are inadmissible attempted expert 
For example, his assertion that 2011 opinion testimony. Shama Resources, 
Norkotah potatoes would have sold 127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402, 403, 602, 
for $16 per 100 is high. That would 702, 705. 
have been near the high point of the 
market for such potatoes in 2011. 
1[ 7 I also believe that Mr. Tiegs' Mr. Clark's beliefs are iITelevant, his 
projections for the year 2012 to be statements are conclusory, lack adequate 
similarly wrong in regard to yields, factual foundation to establish relevance, 
costs and sales prices. Indeed, Mr. and are inadmissible attempted expert 
Tiegs' 2012 actual results in his opinion testimony. Shama Resources, 
affidavit understates the number of 127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402, 403, 602, 
acres actually farmed by Murphy in 702,705. 
2012. 
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CITE STATEMENT OBJECTION 
1[ 8 Also in regard to Mr. Tiegs' 2012 I The statement is conclusory and 
projections I did nothing to stop irrelevant. See Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho 
them from growing what, and how at 782; IRE 402. 
many acres, they wanted that year. 
1[9 In 2012 when Murphy took The statement lacks adequate factual 
possession of the farm I had foundation for relevance and is 
approximately $600,000 in hard conclusory. See Hecla Mining, 122 
costs in preparing the ground and Idaho at 782; IRE 402, 602. 
planting crops for the year 2012. 
Murphy did not reimburse me for 
those costs and Mr. Tiegs does not 
refer to that "windfall" of avoided 
costs to Murphy in his calculation of 
"damages." 
119[sic] Most importantly, it should be noted The statement lacks adequate factual 
that in both 2011 and 2012 I was foundation for relevance, is conclusory, 
I ready, willing and able to allow Mr. and references inadmissible hearsay. See I 
I Tiegs, Mr. Funk, Murphy Land Co. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 782; IRE 
, 
and Owyhee Farming Co. to lease 402,602, 80l(c), 802. 
any of the fields on the farm if they 
had paid a rent to do so. They could 
have farmed what they wanted, 
when they wanted. All they had to 
do was ask. I thought I had a right 
to the farm; however, I was never 
asked to lease all of it to them. 
They leased in 2011 and 2012 all of 
the farm they wanted for the 
growing of the crops they selected 
in those years. They did not ask for 
more ground. Thus, the argument 
Mr. Tiegs makes that Murphy 
would have grown 910 acres of 
potatoes in 2011 if they had 
possession of the fann is inc01Tect; 
they could have grown that many 
acres of potatoes had they wished to 
do so. Indeed, I asked Lance Funk 
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CITE STATEMENT 
I 
I how many acres he wanted to lease. 
I 
He only wished to lease 458 or so 
acres not 910 acres. 
C. Affidavit of Robert F. Bennett. 
CITE STATEI\1ENT 
(1[4 I learned that Lance Funk had been 
a tenant on that farm during the 
2010 growing season and so I 
approached Mr. Funk to see whether 
he would be interested in purchasing 
that fann. 
~[ 5 Mr. Funk expressed his interest in 
purchasing that farm, and on 
November 1, 2010 he sent me a 
letter of intent setting forth the 
terms upon which he offered to 
make that purchase. 
9I 6 During my discussions with Mr. 
Funk he expressed interest in 
closing the transaction before the 
year end, 2010 in order to take 
advantage of a Tax Deferred 
Exchange pursuant to Section 1031 
of the Internal Revenue Code. 
ens Due to clerical error, the box for 
Seller was inadvertently checked. It 
was Buyer, not Seller, who 
expressed the intention to do a 1031 
Tax Defe1Ted Exchange. 
CJ{9 Before November 5, 2010 each 
party to the purchase and sale 
agreement had become aware that 
there were clouds on the Billiards 
OBJECTION 
OBJECTION 
Statement lacks adequate factuai 
foundation for relevance. IRE 402 and 
602. 
Statement Jacks adequate foundation for 
relevance and admissibility and presents 
inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402,602 and 
801(c), 802. 
Statement lacks adequate foundation for 
relevance and admissibility and presents 
inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402, 602 and 
801(c), 802. 
Statement lacks adequate foundation for 
relevance and admissibility and presents 
inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402, 602 and 
801(c), 802. 
Statement is conclusory and lacks 
adequate factual foundation for relevance 
and admissibility. IRE 402, 602. 
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I ! CITE I STATEMENT I OBJECTION I I 
I title to Crystal Springs Ranch I I caused by the recording by J.P. Clark of a lease thereof titled "Crop 
Share Lease 2010," and by John W. 
Clark who recorded a 
"Memorandum of Ownership 
Interest in Real Prope1ty." 
9( 11 Just before Christmas, I told Statement lacks adequate factual 
Buyer's representative, Tim Tippett, foundation for relevance and i 
with whom I had extensive dealings admissibility and contains inadmissible 
in negotiating the sale/purchase of hearsay. IRE 402,602 and 801(c), 802. 
the farm, that if Buyer would not 
accept J.P. Clark's lease, the 1 
Hilliards would just have to send the 
eamest money back. Mr. Tippett 
replied "Oh no, we can't do that," 
because of Buyer's desire to 
complete the sale before the year 
end, 2010 in order to talce advantage 
of the 1031 Tax Deferred Exchange. 
<JI 13 I spoke to Sheryl Reyment at The statements lack adequate factual 
Guaranty Title, Inc. in Mountain foundation for relevance and 
Home, Idaho. She said the $3 admissibility; contains inadmissible 
million holdback was an amount hearsay, and Mr. Bennett's beliefs are 
just more than the combined claims in-elevant and inadmissible, and presents 
of J.P. Clark and John W. Clark inadmissible parole evidence. Shama 
which was an amount which would Resources, 127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402, 
satisfy their claims. Thus, I believe 403, 602, 801(c), 802, and Parole 
the intention of the parties was to Evidence Rule. 
satisfy the claims of the Clarks. 
D. Affidavit of James C. Hilliard. 
CITE STATE:MENT OBJECTION 
~[ 14 The wrong box was checked on the The statements are conclusory and lack 
Form. It was Buyer, not my wife or adequate factual foundation for relevance 
me, that intended to do the 1031 and admissibility. The final statement 
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CITE ! STATEMENT OBJECTION 
Tax Deferred Exchange. contains inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402, 
Accordingly, the wrong box was 403, 602 and 80l(c), 802. 
checked. The box in front of Buyer 
should have been checked. Further, 
Buyer informed that in order to take 
advantage of the Tax Deferred 
Exchange Buyer was required to 
close the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement before the end of the 
2010 calendar year . 
91 17 . . . Although I disputed both claims, Statement is conclusory and lacks 
I was aware that, if we proceeded adequate factual foundation for relevance 
with the sale, with the worst and admissibility. Hecla Mining, 122 
possible outcome for my wife and Idaho at 782; IRE 402,403 and 602. 
me, we could transfer clear title to 
the Buyer of Crystal Springs Farm 
by paying the Clarks a total of 
$2,950,000. 
9[ 18 When I learned that Jay P. Clark The statements lack adequate factual 
had ignored the notice to quit, I foundation for relevance and 
instructed my real estate agent, Bob admissibility and contain multiple 
Bennett, to tell Buyer's agent, Tim inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402, 602 and 
Tippett, that we would just have to 801(c), 802. 
refund the earnest money Buyer had 
deposited. Mr. Bennett later 
informed me that Mr. Tippett 
! replied that Buyer could not do that 
because of Buyer's desire to close 
the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
before year end 2010 in order for 
Buyer to take advantage of the 1031 
Tax Deferred Exchange. 
9[ 20 Thereafter, because we were The Hilliards con cl usory be] iefs are 
unavailable to sign documents, and irrelevant and inadmissible. Shama 
we believed that our sole obligations Resources, 127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402. 
I 
to Buyers were to provide clear, 
unencumbered title to Crystal 
Springs Farm and collect rent from 
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CITE STATEMENT I OBJECTION I 
the existing tenant, my wife and I l 
I 
provided our son, James W. I 
Hilliard, with a Power of Attorney 
to sign Re - 11 Addendum No. 4. 
q[ 22 My understanding of the $3 million Mr. Hilliard's beliefs are inelevant and 
holdback was to resolve the claims inadmissible; the statements are 
of the Clarks and to deliver clear conclusory; paragraph 37 of the Purchase 
title. I did not then, do not now, and Sale Agreement ( entire Agreement) 
' understand the language of estabiishes that the Purchase and Sale 
Addendum 4 to require my wife and Agreement and any addendums, 
me to indemnify the Buyer against including Addendum No. 4, is a fully 
all alleged crop loss, loss of profit, integrated agreement and its terms cannot 
and attorney fees that Buyer claims be altered, varied, contradicted or 
to have incuITed. Re - 11 modified by Parole Evidence; Mr. 
Addendum No. 4 contains no Hilliards' "understanding" is 
language calling for indemnity. It is inadmissible Parole Evidence - - the 
devoid of tenns such as "hold language in Addendum No. 4 is clear and 
harmless" or Seller "insuring" unambiguous. Shama Resources, 127 
Buyer against "loss of profit" or Idaho at 271; IRE 402, and 602; Parole 
"crop loss" or "atton1ey fees" or Evidence Rule. 
"cost of litigation." Indeed, there 
was never a discussion between 
Seller and Buyer about Seller 
providing Buyer with indemnity or 
insurance against its now claimed 
losses and expenses. My 
understanding of the language of 
Re-11 Addendum No. 4 is that my 
wife and I were obligated to do 
everything necessary to remove 
exceptions 32 and 33 to the Buyer's 
Title Insurance Policy, which we 
succeeded in doing. But I did not 
believe then, nor do I believe now, 
that the language of Re-11 
Addendum No. 4 required us to 
indemnify Buyer for (or insure it 
against) its alleged lost profits, crop 
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CITE STATEMENT OBJECTION 
I loss or attorney fees which Buyer is 
I now claiming. 
9[ 23 My wife and I as Sellers received no Statements are conclusory, constitute 
consideration for the obligation to inadmissible legal conclusions, lack 
deposit $3 million of the $9,500,000 adequate factual foundation for relevance 
purchase price with Guaranty Title. and inadmissibility as to the statements 
I 
The Buyer paid nothing for that about the Buyer and are speculative. 
deposit. And, because the Buyer Shama Resources, 127 Idaho at 271; 
was required to close the Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 782, IRE 
purchase/sale before the year end 402, and 602. 
2010 in order to take advantage of 
the 1031 Tax Defened Exchange, it 
incuned no detriment by closing the 
deal. Thus, absolutely no new 
consideration was given for the new 
Re-11 Addendum No. 4. 
9[ 26 ... Thus, my wife and I had fulfilled The statement is conclusory, 
our obligation to remove the inadmissible legal conclusion, and is 
described exceptions to Buyer's irrelevant. Hecla Mining. 122 Idaho at 
policy of title insurance, thereby 782; Shama Resources, 127 Idaho at 271; 
delivering to Buyer clear title to IRE 402. 
I Crystal Springs' farm. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon each of the foregoing objections, the above-identified testimony and 
purported evidence should be stricken and disregarded by the Court from the affidavits in 
deciding Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT' S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS 
AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF JAY CLARK 
COMES NOW the above-named Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, 
LLC ("Murphy Land'') by and through its undersigned counsel of record, and respectfully moves 
the Court to strike and exclude the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds dated November 27, 2013, and 
portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark dated November 29, 2013, which have been submitted by 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK - 1 
45522.0004.6253235. l 
I\D,..L Vll 1 V.i.. U.i.. ..L.U. 
Plamtiffs/Counter-Defendants James and Barbara Hilliard (the "Hilliards") in opposition to 
Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Murphy Land's Motion to Strike and Exclude the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds and P.6(c, 
d, e) and 7 should be granted: (1) for the procedural reason that the Court's Order for Scheduling 
and Planning dated October 11, 2013 ordered that the last day for Plaintiff to disclose expert 
witnesses, together with their opinions and reports was October 11, 2013. The Hilliards have 
never made any disclosure of expert witnesses to Murphy Land, nor ever even responded to 
Murphy Land's Interrogatory No. 3 requesting information under IRCP Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)l. 
Further, the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds, together with the "attachment", is inadmissible as 
expert opinion testimony pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), and Idaho Rules of 
Evidence 702 and Rule 705, and also because the attachment is inadmissible hearsay IRE 80l(c), 
802. 
The attempted expert opinion testimony of Jay Clark is inadmissible as well pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), and Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 and 705. 
Neither Mr. Edmunds nor Mr. Clark were disclosed as experts in this case, there has been 
no identification of the underlying factual basis supporting either Mr. Edmunds' nor Mr. Clark's 
opinions, the purported opinions are based upon unverified and unsupported assumptions and 
such opinions are thereby conclusory, speculative and inadmissible under applicable law 
applying Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. See Coombs v. Curnow, MD, 148 Idaho 129,219 P.3d 
l The Hilliards response to Interrogatory No. 3 served on October l, 2013 was: "not yet decided." See Affidavit of 
Steven F. Schossberger filed concurrently herewith. 
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464-65 (2009) (Citing Daubert v. Merrell Dahl Pharm., 
2786, 2795 (1993)). 
, 509 US 579, 589, 113 S.CL 
This Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 
and the Affidavit of Steven F. Schossberger filed concmTently herewith. 
DATED THIS 5 day of December, 2013. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
Attorneys for Def end ant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD. ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
I. 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT' S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE 
THE AFFIDAVIT KEN EDMUNDS AND 
PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
JAY CLARK 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") respectfully 
submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Strike and Exclude the Affidavit 
of Ken Edmunds, together with the attached purported expert "summary analysis", and the 
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Affidavit of Jay Clark, 'll'![ 6(c), (d), (e) and and to exclude the purported expe1t opinions 
proffered therein. Mr. Edmunds and Mr. Clark's affidavits should be stricken and excluded 
because the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants have never disclosed either to be an expert witness in 
this case, and to date have not provided the information required in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)4 as requested in Murphy Land's Interrogatory No. 3 propounded to the 
Hilliards. 
The affidavits and attempted expert witness testimony should also be stricken and 
excluded because neither Mr. Edmunds nor Mr. Clark have been qualified as an expert witness to 
testify in opposition to the expert testimony offered by Mr. Tiegs regarding the damages suffered 
by Murphy Land in the years 2011 and 2012 due to the delay and loss of possession of its 
property. Moreover, both affidavits constitute inadmissible expert opinion evidence under 
LR.C.P Rule 56(e) and Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 and 705. 
II. 
LEGAL ST AND ARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY 
In deciding whether to strike and exclude the Hilliards attempted offering of expert 
witness testimony from Ken Edmunds and Jay Clark in opposition to Murphy Land's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Court should follow the standard of admissibility required pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which provides that: 
Supporting or opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
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Rule 56(e) is clear that affidavits must contain admissible evidence. See Hecla Mining 
Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992). In Hecla Mining, 
the Idaho Supreme Court held that affidavits which consist only of conjecture, conclusory 
allegations as to ultimate facts, or conclusions of law are to be disregarded. Id. Furthermore, 
conclusory statements, statements based on hearsay, statements that lack adequate foundation, 
and statements not made on personal knowledge are insufficient. See State v. Shama Resources 
Ltd. Partners, 127 Idaho 267,271,899 P.2d 977 (1995). In Shama Resources, the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of statements made by an affiant regarding the 
knowledge or beliefs of persons other than the affiant. 127 Idaho at 271. 
Further, in Sprinkler Irrig. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 691, 85 P.3d 667 
(2004), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's action striking plaintiffs expert's 
affidavit wherein the affidavit was filled with rambling, nonspecific, inaccurate and unsupported 
statements, numerous counts of speculation, unfounded facts and hearsay statements. Id. at 697. 
The Idaho Supreme Court provided that the district court properly concluded that the expert's 
affidavit degenerated into an argumentative diatribe against the defendant and often lacked the 
specificity required by Rule 56(e). Specifically, the court stated, "It is intermittently generaiized, 
conclusory, speculative and argumentative. The affidavit includes a significant number of 
factual assertions that would not be admissible in evidence, often lacking foundation by failing to 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify regarding the factual allegations." Id.; 
see Oates v. Nissan Motor Corp., 126 Idaho 162, 166, 879 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1994) (plaintiff's 
expert opinion was excluded under I.R.C.P. 56(e) and Id. R. Evid. 702 as it was wholly 
conclusory, merely repeated allegations contained in plaintiffs complaint, and did not set forth 
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specific facts to support his conclusion as required by LR.C.P. 56(e)); see also Corbridge v. 
Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986) (affidavit which does not set 
forth specific facts but is only conclusory in nature and merely repeats allegations of complaint is 
precisely the type of flawed affidavit contemplated by LR.C.P. 56(e)) (emphasis added). 
Aside from the fact that the Hilliards never disclosed either Ken Edmunds or Jay Clark as 
an expert witness in compliance with the Court's Scheduling Order, or in response to Murphy 
Land's Interrogatory No. 3 requesting the information provided in Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(4), the Hilliards have failed to file an affidavit from Mr. Edmunds or Mr. Clark 
which would qualify either of them as an expert witness under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, i.e., 
laying the proper foundation for Mr. Edmunds or Mr. Clark's qualifications to testify as an 
expert witness on the subject matter of this case, laying the proper foundation of the facts and 
data or other information considered by Mr. Edmunds or Mr. Clark in forming either of their 
opinions, stating the basis and reasons for the opinions, and setting forth the actual opinions held 
by the purported experts. 
A. Mr. Edmunds' and Mr. Clark's purported expert opinions are untimely and 
submitted in violation of the Court's Scheduling Order. 
Pursuant to the Court's Scheduling Order filed October 1, 2013, the Hilliards were 
required to disclose their expert witnesses no later than October 1, 2013. Moreover, on October 
2, 2013, the Hilliards served their response to Murphy Land's Intenogatory No. 3, requesting full 
disclosure of any expert witnesses, by stating "not yet decided." The Hilliards have never 
supplemented said response. Therefore, the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds (with the attachment), 
and the portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark attempting to off er expert witness opinions and 
testimony should be stricken a.11d excluded by the Court. 
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B. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Idaho Rules of Evidence 702, 
705, and 802, the Affidavits of Ken Edmunds and Jay Clark must be stricken 
and excluded by the Court. 
With respect to the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds, the attachment is being relied upon and or 
will be argued in opposition to Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment for the truth of 
the matter asserted in an attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary 
judgment. The attachment to Mr. Edmunds affidavit is hearsay (l.R.E. 801(c)), and is 
inadmissible as evidence in the summary judgment proceeding. (LR .E. 802; IRCP 56(e)). 
Furthermore, expert opinion testimony is only admissible when "the expert is a qualified 
expert in the field, the evidence will be of assistance to the trier of fact, experts in the particular 
field would reasonably rely upon the same type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his 
opinion. and the probative value of the opinion testimony is not substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect." Coombs v. Curnow, M.D., 148 Idaho 129, 140 (2009) (quoting Ryan v. 
Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844 P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. App. 1992)); see also Id. R. Evid. 702, 703 and 
403 
"Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the 
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." 
Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46-47; Id. R. Evid. 702. Testimony is speculative when it "theorizes about a 
matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Coombs v. Curnow, M.D., 
148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464-65 (2009) (quoting Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 
565, 97 P.3d 428, 432 (2004)). To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. An expert opinion that is 
speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it would not 
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assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact that is at issue. 
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68 (2003); see 
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999). (Emphasis added). This Rule provides 
the appropriate test for measuring the reliability of evidence. Id.; see Weekes v. Eastern Idaho 
Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 
962 P.2d 1026 (1998). 
Because the trial court has the discretion to determine whether a proper foundation has 
been laid for the admission of expert testimony (Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Med. Ctr., 
134 Idaho 46,995 P.2d 816 (2000); Id. R. Evid. 104(a)), the trial court has discretion to 
determine both whether the expert is qualified as an expert in the field and whether there is a 
scientific basis for the expert's opinion. 138 Idaho at 593. Expert opinion which is speculative, 
conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering 
its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible as evidence under Id. R. Evict. 702. Ryan v. Beisner, 
123 Idaho 42, 46 844 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1992). Additionally, expert opinion that merely 
suggests possibilities would only invite conjecture and may be property excluded. Bromley 
v. Ga,y, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) (excluding testimony of shotgun repair expert 
concerning possible causes of misfiring where expert never performed an internal examination of 
the weapon and only speculated about possible causes was not en-or). 
In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a court must evaluate "the 
expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those principles to the 
formulation of his or her opinion." Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46. Admissibility, therefore, depends on 
the validity of the expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than his or her ultimate 
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conclusion. Id. Relevant considerations in determining whether the basis of an expert's opinion 
is scientifically valid include "whether the theory can be tested and whether it has been subjected 
to peer-review and publication." Coombs, supra, 148 Idaho at 141 (quoting Weekes, 143 Idaho 
at 838; Coombs citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786 
(1993)). 
As noted above, both the Affidavits of Ken Edmunds and Jay Clark lack the requisite 
foundation to qualify either as an expert witness, or to offer admissible expert testimony, to rebut 
the expert testimony and opinions offered by Frank Tiegs in support Murphy Land's Motion for 
Summary Judgmenl. Accordingly, the Court should strike and exclude the attachment to Mr. 
Edmunds' affidavit, and the Clark affidavit, qrJl6(c), (d), (e) and 7. 
Furthermore, under Rule 702, the attachment of Mr. Edmunds, and the beliefs of Mr. 
Clark presented in 9I<Jl6(c), (d), (e) and 7 of his affidavit, are speculative and unsubstantiated by 
facts and therefore inadmissible as expert testimony. See Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47 (Ct. 
App. 1992); See Coombs v. Curnow, M.D., 148 Idaho 129, 140 (2009). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court is tasked with serving as a "the gate keeper" for expert opinion testimony. The 
Comt's rule here is clear because the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds, with its attachment, and the 
Affidavit of Jay Clark, 1[q[6(c), (d), (e) and 7, constitute inadmissible expert testimony and 
hearsay, are also untimely and in violation of the Court's Scheduling Order, and completely 
inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) and Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 and 
705. 
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Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Murphy Land respectfully requests that the Court 
grant its Motion to Strike and exclude the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds (with attachment), and the 
identified p01tions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 8_ day of December, 2013. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By ---R--il----"u..q~-L-~.L....;:E.:.:,::;.;::=..s,~==--~~~~ 
S even F. Schossberger, I 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
AFFIDA VrT OF STEVEN F. 
SCHOSSBERGER RE 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS 
AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF JAY CLARK 
Steven F. Schossberger, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am counsel of record for Defendant Murphy Land Company, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, in the above-entitled action. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER RE 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK - 1 
45522.0004,625399 I, I 
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2. I make this affidavit based own knowledge and am 
to testify hereto if called upon to do so. 
3. A true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs' /Counterdefendants' Response to 
Defendant's/Counterclaimant's First Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 3, served on 
October 2, 2013, is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. 
4. To date, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants have not provided the 
Page 3 
Defendant/Counterclaimant with a written disclosure of expert witnesses, and have not answered 
Interrogatory No. 3 with the information required by I.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(4). 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER RE 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK - 2 
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OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this .§ih day of December, 2013. 
Notary Public for IdahM. 
Residing at ,t9#t~ ttAv 
My commission expires 6 -/8'-.2:t:J/ 7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .h_ day of December, 2013, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER RE 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE THE 
AFFIDAVIT of KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF IA Y CLARK 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
[Attorneys for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attomey at Law 
17 Alvemo Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
l)t..u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 E-mail 
0 Telecopy: 208-343-3282 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com 
0 Telecopy: 650-298-8097 
Steven F. SZhossberger 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER RE 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK - 4 
1£/0/LVlJ L'.10:~t PM 
24 08 M Karl Shurtliff 
M. KARL SHURTLIFFJ 
Attorney at Law 
W Ba..n_nock, Suite 2.00 
P.O. 1652 
Boise. Idaho 83 702 
Telephone (208) 343-29PO 
Fax (208) 343~3282 ! 
Attornev for the Plaint1's 
Karen roruria 208-954-5215 
20 282 
IN THE DitTRlCT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
I 
FOR THE ST 1TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES AND BARB~ I-HLLIARD, 
I 
Plaintiffs, Case No. CV I3 03004 
Page 6 
p3 
vs. 
i 
MURPHY LAND co~ ANY, LLC, 
DefendanJ. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO FIRST SET 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION, AND REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION TO PLAINTIFF 
INTERROGATORIES 
allegations in the Compl nt and your defenses to the Counterclaim, by identifying such persons, 
I 
I 
contact information, and tivc a general description of their knowledge regarding this case. 
RESPONSE TQ rirrERROOATOR Y NO. l: 
I 
James C. Hilliard,J5 Alvero Court, Redwood City, California knows of the circumstances 
surrounding the executio of the November 5, 2010 Purchase and Sale Agreement and Re-11, 
Addendum No. 1 through 4 and the intention of the parties therto; James W, Hilliard, 2100 Park 
Central, Suite 100, Pomp;µio Beach, Florida knows of the circumstances surrolU1ding the 
I 
\ 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE Td FIRST SET OF lNTERROGATORJES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, AND 
REQUESTS FOR ADMlSSCOl'ji • l 
2401 
1\.u..1. v11 rv.1 u.c ..l.l1 
M Karl Shurtliff 
I 
ZUij-l:j::}q-~,:'. 15 
20e 2s2 
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p.4 
of the Novemper 5, Purchase and sSa1e Agreement and Re-11 Addendum No. I 
i 
through 4, the inten~ion thereto; Bennett, 225 E. 66h l\1ounta:in Home, 
I 
Idaho, know of the circt4'nstances surrouudjng the execution of the November 5, 2010 Purchase 
! [ 
I 
and Sale Agreement and\ Re-11 Addend urns No. l through 4, and the intention of the parties 
thereto and Sheryl Re~6t, 206 S. 3rd E, Mountain Home, Idaho knows of the circumstances 
surrounding the executior of the November 5, 2010 Purchase and Sale Agreement and Re-11 
Addendums No. 1 throu~ 4, and the intention of the part..ies thereto. In addition, persons on the 
Counterclaimants side w!10se contact is weU known to Counterclaimant are: Lance Flirlk; Frank 
Tiegs, and Tim Tippet 
INTERROGA TqR Y N0.2: Please identify all ·witnesses you intend to call at the trial of 
this matter and the subje~t matter and substance of the facts to which they will testify. 
) 
I 
I 
RESPONSE TO LTERROGA TORY N0.2: 
I Not knov.rn. yet. i 
! 
NTERROGA 1DRY NO .3: Please identify each person you may call as an expert 
witness at the trial of this Ltter; state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to 
testify; state the substanc of tbe opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; state the 
underlying facts and data pon which the expert opinions are based; identify all documents upon 
which your expert may re~ to express any opinions in this matter; and identify all individuals 
! 
that your expert may rely (lpon to express any opinion in this matter. 
RESPONSE TO $ERROGATORY N0.3: 
Not yet decided. I 
PLAfNTfFf'S RESPONSE TO!FlRST SET Of INTERROOATOJ<JES, FPQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, AND 
-----RE_Q_U-ES~ ro-~~!SSIO[ _________ .----·----· 
/· 
•:,, 
J...L.# VI L..ViV L., , .1.U, .JJ r'l'J l\d.I vii r Ul ' Uil.d ZUts-~o'l-oZl~ 
20f 82 M':'ly 24 01 08 :39p M. Karl Sh urtliff 
Oct 01 2013 03:42PM Weld::n Wj 6502988097 
M,y 2301 0807p M. K8'1 Shurt111 
page 2 
2083433282 p .12 
I 
' 
Deny. 
DATED this---'c.......-day of cx::r-
I LR-nFJCI<~ . ~ - . ~~ da~ of 2013, 1hat I served a true 
I . 
and conect copy of the fi ' going do:ument 'lty .raetbod indicated below and addressed to each of 
the following: 
SteYen F. Sclloss 
HAWLEY T.RO_x; ENNIS & HAWLEY, U,P 
87? Ma.in S1ree~, ite 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
M. KARL SHUR1LJFF 
rLATN!lfrs FtllS't SET o, I TEAAOGA TORJes, IUQ UESTS FOR PRODUC7JON, ANO REQUESTS FOR 
ADMJSSION ro OErIDIDA 1- 12 
I 
.. n 
; 1.,; v 
Page 8 
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Steven F. Schossberger, ISB No. 5358 
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: 208.344.6000 
Facsimile: 208.954.5260 
Email: sschossberger@hawleytroxell.com 
mgordon@hawleytroxell.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
I. 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land ~mpany, LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and 
through its undersigned attorneys of record, and pursuant to Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, submits this Reply Brief in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
with this Court on November 15, 2013. 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT • PAGE 1 OF 20 
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Memorandum Support Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opening 
Murphy Land argued that the Addendum unambiguously provided that the Escrow Funds were 
to be available to it in the amount of damages suffered by the delay of possession of Crystal 
Springs Farm, and that, as a result, the only issue for resolution by this Court is the amount of 
such damages. See Opening Brief at pp. 9-12. Murphy Land acknowledged that the amount of 
damages is a question of fact, but it put forth evidence, from the affidavit of Frank Tiegs, that 
Murphy Land suffered damages well in excess of the three million dollar amount of the Escrow 
Funds. Id. at pp. 12-19. 
In response, the Hilliards devote most of their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Opposition") to extraneous and unmeritorious arguments based on 
affirmative defenses that the Hilliards did not plead and do not now adequately support. The 
Hilliards do not dispute the bulk of the material facts, and the small portions of their Opposition 
that actually address the real issues in this case, and Murphy Land's arguments regarding those 
issues, lack merit. 
The Hilliards make a feeble stab at arguing that the Addendum is ambiguous, but they 
proffer no reasonable alternative interpretation, nor any authority or logical explar1ation why the 
Addendum does not mean what it says. The Addendum is clear. 
As to the amount of damages - the only real issue of fact - the Hilliards rely solely on 
conclusory, vague affidavit testimony from a non-expert purporting to offer expert opinion. That 
testimony, from Jay Clark, is not admissible and should not be considered, for the reasons set 
forth in the Motion to Strike file by Murphy Land this same day. Even if it is considered, Mr. 
Clark's conclusory assertions are unsupp01ted by any specific facts and are woefully inadequate 
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a issue as to the amount of damages suffered Land the 
delay possession of Crystal Springs Farm, let alone any question about whether the amount of 
those damages exceeds three million dollars. As a result, Murphy Land is entitled to judgment in 
its favor as a matter of law and to a declaration from this Court ordering the release of the 
Escrow Funds to Murphy Land. 
II. LEGALSTANDARDS 
A. The Party Resisting Summary Judgment has the Burden to Show the Existence of a 
Genuine Issue of Material Fact. 
Once the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact. Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, -- Idaho---, 294 
P.3d 1111, 1116 (2013). The nonmoving party may not "rest upon mere allegations in the 
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Id. (quoting Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394-95, 224 P.3d 458, 461-
62 (2008)). "Under this standard, 'a mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts 
is insufficient to withstand summary judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a 
jury could reasonably return a verdict resisting the motion."' Kootenai County v. Harriman-
Sayler, -- Idaho---, 293 P.3d 637,641 (2012) (quoting Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 
802, 806, 229 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010)). "Further, 'conclusory assertions unsupported by specific 
facts are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment."' 
Id. (quoting Mareci v. Coeur D'Alene Sch. Dist. No. 271, 150 Idaho 740,744,250 P.3d 791, 795 
(2011)) (emphasis added). "Consequently, once the moving party has met its burden, the 
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ci,n,P'"''"' party must present affirmative evidence that demonstrates the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact." Id. 
B. The Party Raising an Affirmative Defense has the Burden of Supporting That 
Defense in Response to a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In their Opposition, the Hilliards raise numerous affirmative defenses on which they 
would bear the burden of proof at trial. As a result, the Hilliards have the burden of supporting 
those defenses at the summary judgment stage. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,771,215 
P.3d 485 (2009) ("a nonmoving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative 
defense on a motion for summary judgment"). 
C. As the Trier of Fact, this Court Need Not Draw all Inferences in Favor of the 
Nonmoving Party. 
Because this action is set for a nonjury trial, with this Court as the finder of fact, this 
Court is not constrained to draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving pruty. To the contrary, 
"when an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is 
entitled to aiTive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly 
before it and grant summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." 
Bauchman-Kingston P'ship, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 rdaho 87, 90,233 P.3d 18 (2008) 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
The Hilliards' Opposition contains seven different argument headings. While many of 
those arguments overlap, in an attempt at clarity, Murphy Land addresses them seriatim. 
1. The Addendum is not an Indemnity Agreement; In any Event, it is Clear, 
Unequivocal, and Certain that the Escrow Funds are to be Available to 
Compensate Murphy Land for its Damages from Delayed Possession. 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 4 OF 20 
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The that "Murphy Land contends that Addendum 4 created an 
contractual indemnity obligation requiring the Hilliards to indemnify it for its alleged 
lost profit," and that the Addendum lacks the requisite clarity to be an indemnity agreement. 
Opposition at 7-8. This argument fails because it mischaracterizes Murphy Land's position and 
because it ignores the fact that the relevant language is clear. 
Murphy Land did not -- and does not -- contend that the Addendum is an indemnity 
agreement requiring the Hilliards to indemnify it. hldeed, neither the word "indemnity" nor any 
of its variations appear in Murphy Land's Motion or Opening Brief. Instead, Murphy Land 
simply argued that the Addendum means what it says: that the Escrow Funds are to be made 
available to Murphy Land for damages suffered from delayed possession of Crystal Springs 
Farm. The notion that Murphy Land argued for an "express contractual indemnity obligation" is 
nothing more than the Hilliards' spin on Murphy Land's argument. 
Moreover, the Hilliards do not establish that, under Idaho law, language imposing 
indemnity must be "clear, unequivocal, and certain." The authority on which the Hilliards' rely 
does not establish that principle, and it does not help the Hilliards. R. W. Beck & Associates, Inc. 
v. Job Line Const. Inc., 122 Idaho 92, 96, 831 P.2d 560,564 (Ct. App. 1992) addresses a 
situation in which a third party claimed that it was an indemnitee of a contract between two other 
parties, and the court found no such intent in the contract. Under those circumstances, the court 
rightly read the contract narrowly. 
In any event, even if the Addendum was considered an indemnity agreement, and even if 
the Hilliards are right that language imposing an indemnity must be "clear, unequivocal, and 
certain," see Opposition at 7, the crucial language of the Addendum meets that test it says, 
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unequivocally, and certainly, that the Escrow Funds "shall be available to the extent 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction of the amount of purchaser's damage, if any, for 
loss or delay of possession of real estate purchased herein." See Tiegs, Aff., Exh. C. Notably, 
nowhere in the Opposition do the Hilliards make any reasoned argument that the foregoing 
language is anything other than clear and unequivocal. Rather, they merely attempt --
unconvincingly -- to argue that, despite the clarity of that language, it is insufficient to compel 
the result that it spells out, namely that the funds are to be used to compensate Murphy Land for 
its damages from delayed possession of Crystal Springs Farm. 
The Hilliards' reliance on case law stating the general rule that lost profits are generally 
not available in contract, see Opposition at 8, is misplaced because that rule applies to claims for 
breach of contract and consequential damages flowing from the breach. Here, there is no claim 
of breach or of consequential damages. The Escrow Funds were set aside to be made available 
to Murphy Land in the amount of its damages from delay in possession. Murphy Land simply 
asks this Court, consistent with the plain language of the Addendum, to determine the amount of 
its damages from delay in possession, and because Murphy Land is a business, its damages due 
to delay are its lost profits from being unable to fully farm Crystal Springs Farm. 
2. To the Extent any Consideration was Needed for the Addendum, it was 
Provided Because Murphy Land Agreed to Purchase the Farm Even Though 
the Hilliards had not Fulfilled the Conditions Precedent. 
Despite filing suit in this Comt to enforce the Addendum and then failing to raise any 
issues regarding enforceability of the Addendum in their Reply to Murphy Land's counterclaim. 
the Hilliards now contend that the Addendum is unenforceable for failure of consideration. 
Opposition at 9-10. Besides the curious timing of the argument, it lacks merit, for four reasons. 
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the Hilliards failed to plead failure 
8( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear that failure of consideration is an 
affinnative defense that must be pled. Nevertheless, the Hilliards made no mention of the 
alleged failure of consideration in their Reply Lo Murphy Land's counterclaim. And their actions 
belie their argument: far from claiming that the Addendum was unenforceable for want of 
consideration, the Hilliards filed suit in this Court to enforce it. Only now, when forced to 
confront the plain language of the Addendum and the undisputed fact that Murphy Land's 
damages exceed three million dollars, do the Hilliards shift course and proffer a new theory. 
Second, the Hilliards cite no authority for the proposition that the Addendum required 
additional consideration. By the terms of both the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the 
Addendum, the Addendum was made an "integral part" of that Agreement. See Tiegs Aff., Exh. 
B (Agreement), at <j{37; Exh. C (Addendum). There is no dispute that the Hilliards received 
consideration in connection with the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
Third, even if the Addendum required separate consideration, the Hilliards have failed to 
meet their burden of overcoming the presumption that there was consideration given for the 
Addendum. A written instrument such as the Addendum "is presumptive evidence of a 
consideration." Best Hill Coalition v. HALKO, LLC, 144 Idaho 813,818, 172 P.3d 1088 (2007) 
(citing LC.§ 29-103). "The burden of showing a want of consideration sufficient to support an 
instrument lies with the party seeking to invalidate or avoid it. ... Under LC. § 29-104, both the 
burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion rest upon the party 
contesting the adequacy of consideration." Id. (citing LC.§ 29-104). Here, the Hilliards' 
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presumption consists merely of conclusory 
of no consideration. See Opposition at 9-10. That is insufficient to meet their burden. 
Fourth, even if consideration was required, Murphy Land gave consideration to the 
Hilliards in co1mection with the Addendum by agreeing to purchase Crystal Springs Farm 
despite the failure of conditions precedent. "Consideration includes 'action by the prornisee 
which is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise."' Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005) (quoting Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 ldaho 
605,607,428 P.2d 524,526 (1967)). Consideration "may also consist of a 'detriment to the 
promisee or a benefit to the prornisor."' Id (quoting Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel 
Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599,603,514 P.2d 594,598 (1973)). 
Under the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Hilliards were obligated to 
terminate their existing lease with Jay Clark prior to closing, which was set for December 28, 
2010. See Tiegs Aff. at <Jl6, Exh. B. Moreover, as James Hilliard acknowledges, the Hilliards 
were obligated to provide clear title to Crystal Springs Farm to Murphy Land. See Hilliard Aff. 
at ~l 20. As of the original date of closing, December 28, 2010, the Hilliards had not terminated 
their lease with Jay Clark, and title to the Farm was clouded by Jay Clark's recorded iease and 
Jolm Clark's Memorandum of Ownership Interest. As a result, at the time of closing, Murphy 
Land was under no obligation to proceed with the purchase of the Farm -- the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement was unenforceable for failure of a condition precedent. In exchange for the Hilliards' 
promise to deposit $3,000,000 into escrow to protect it from damages from delays in possession, 
Murphy Land promised to move ahead with closing and purchase the Farm for $9,500,000 
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presence on the Farm and the on - something that it 
was not otherwise obligated to do. That is a detriment to Murphy Land. That was consideration. 
3. The Addendum is not Ambiguous. 
The Hilliards make a cursory and thoroughly unconvincing argument that the Addendum 
is ambiguous, see Opposition at 11-12. In its Opening Brief, Murphy Land argued that the 
Addendum means what it says: the Escrow Funds are to compensate Murphy Land for damages 
suffered from delayed possession of Crystal Springs Farm. See Opening Brief at pp. 10-12. The 
Hilliards do not offer any alternate interpretation of the Addendum, let alone a reasonable 
interpretation. Instead, they simply point out the immaterial fact that the Addendum docs not 
state "indemnity" or "lost profits." 
The Hilliards also argue about what they understood. But their alleged subjective self-
serving, post hoc "understanding" is relevant only if the Addendum is ambiguous. It is not, so 
their understanding is immaterial, and it cannot render the Addendum ambiguous. Swanson v. 
Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748 (2007) ("[a] contract is not rendered 
ambiguous on its face because one of the parties thought that the words used had some meaning 
that differed from the ordinary meaning of those words"). 
4. There was no Mutual Mistake. 
The Hilliards next float another novel, un-pled affirmative defense - mutual mistake -
whose validity is contradicted by their own actions. That argument suffers from the same 
infirmities as the Hilliards' argument about failure of consideration: it is an affirmative defense 
that was not plead, it is contradictory to the position that the Hilliards took by filing an action 
with this Court to enforce the Addendum, and it lacks any merit. 
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terse argument rescission is well of the mark and falls short of 
meeting their burden. Rescission is proper "where there is a mutual mistake of fact that is 
material or fundamental to the contract" O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 
188 P.3d 846 (2008) (emphasis added). "The party alleging the mutual mistake of fact bears the 
burden of proof.. .. The mistake must be common to both parties, and must be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence." Id. (citations omitted). The Hilliards do not establish any mistake of 
fact, let alone any mistake common to both parties. Instead, they merely argue that they had a 
different understanding of the Addendum that is contrary to its plain language. But a post hoc 
argument about a different understanding is not a basis for rescission; if it were, nearly every 
contract dispute would result in rescission. 
5. The Hilliards' Lost Profits Argument is Misplaced. 
The Hilliards' terse argument about lost profits, see Opposition at 13-14, misperceives 
the nature of this dispute. The Hilliards cite to case law regarding the foreseeability of 
consequential damages in an action for a breach of contract. This is not a suit for a breach of 
contract, however, but rather an action to determine the amount of damages per the clear 
language of the Addendum. Indeed, Murphy Land makes no claim of breach or for 
consequential damages. It merely makes a claim that the Escrow Funds, which were set aside to 
be made available to Murphy Land in the amount of its damages from delay in possession, be 
disbursed accordingly. To the extent foreseeability is at issue, because Murphy Land is a for-
profit business, and it is undisputed that Frank Tiegs informed James Hilliard that Murphy Land 
wanted to buy the Farm to farm it itself, it was eminently foreseeable that delayed possession 
would result in lost profits to Murphy Land. See Tiegs Aff. at ~[5. Moreover, the Hilliards' 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 10 OF 20 
45522.0004 6250027. I 
about foreseeability is a repackaging argument about mitigation, which, 
for the reasons discussed below, is unsupported. 
6. The Claim for Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing has no 
Merit Because the Hilliards Identify no Breach. 
The Hilliards' argument that Murphy Land breached the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, see Opposition at 14-15, is likewise nothing more than a repackaging of their 
argument about mitigation. For the reasons discussed below, the argument about mitigation is 
unsupp011ed. 
Moreover, the claim that Murphy Land breached the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing also fails because the Hilliards did not plead it as an affirmative defense pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 8(c), and in any event they do not identify any contractual covenant that Murphy Land 
allegedly breached. See, e.g., McKnight v. Torres, 563 F.3d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 2009) (the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "neither 'alters specific obligations set forth in 
the contract' nor 'adds duties independent of the contractual relationship'") (quoting Shawmut 
Bank, N.A. v. Kress Assocs., 33 F.3d 1477, 1503 (9th Cir. 1994)); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,289, 824 P.2d 841. 864 (1991) (A violation of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is "a breach of the contract. It does not result in a cause 
of action separate from the breach of contract claims .... "). 
Finally, the Hilliards' argument rests on its baseless contention that Murphy Land "chose 
to do nothing in mitigation." Opposition at 15. It is undisputed that Murphy Land moved swiftly 
to evict Jay Clark and continued to diligently prosecute its action against him until he was finally 
evicted on May 2, 2012. See Opening Brief at 17. Moreover, Murphy Land repeatedly 
demanded t.1-iat Jay Clark vacate the Farm and attempted to move its farming equipment onto 
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Springs Farm, see Tiegs Aff. at 919111,1 Through their sister company, Owyhee 
Farming, LLC, the principals in Murphy Land also rented a portion of that farm -- the portion 
that Jay Clark had not already planted to alfalfa or wheat or contracted for corn -- for growing 
potatoes. Id. at Cfll8. Murphy Land deducted the profits earned by Owyhee Farming from 
growing those potatoes from its calculation of damages, thereby lessening its claim against the 
Hilliards. Id. As a result, the Hilliards' claim that Murphy Land did "nothing" is simply false. 
7. There is no Genuine Issue Either as to the Amount of the Damages Suffered 
by Murphy Land or that Such Amount Exceeds Three Million Dollars. 
As to the real issue in this case -- the amount of damages suffered by Murphy Land as a 
result of the delayed possession of Crystal Springs Farm -- the Hilliards respond to Murphy 
Land's detailed discussion and proof of damage by stating that they "do have a genuine dispute 
as to its damage claim." Opposition at 15. But while the Hilliards may believe that there is a 
genuine dispute, they fail to put forth sufficient evidence to establish any such dispute. Instead, 
the Hilliards rely solely on the affidavit of Jay Clark. But Mr. Clark's affidavit is inadmissible as 
purported expert testimony from a non-expert. And even if considered by the this Court, Mr. 
Clark's statements on which the Hilliards rely in support of their assertion of a genuine dispute 
about damages are a textbook example of "conclusory assertions unsupported by specific facts" 
that are insufficient to create a genuine issue and prevent summary judgment from entering for 
Murphy Land. See Kootenai County, 293 P.3d at 641 (2012). 
On the law, the Hilliards quote extensively from Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912. 918-19, 
684 P.2d 313, 320-21 (Ct App. 1984), in support of their assertion that the fact and measure of 
damages for crop loss are questions of fact Murphy Land agrees that Wing conectly states the 
law in that regard, and that the measure of damages is a question of fact. However, the Hilliards 
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not proffer evidence to create a genuine the amount damages. 
to clarify, Wing discusses two different issues regarding damages from crop loss -- causation and 
the measure of damages. Here, only the latter is at issue. 
Although Murphy Land does not technically seek damages for crop loss, the formula 
stated by the Wing court for calculating crop loss damages is logical to apply here: the measure 
for damages for crop loss "is the difference between the value of the crops actually raised and the 
value of the crops that would have been raised under normal conditions." 106 Idaho 919. Of 
course, "[t]he amount of damages need only be established to a reasonable degree of certainty. 
'Reasonable certainty' does not require mathematical exactitude, but only that the damages be 
taken out of the realm of speculation." Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 774, ll8 P.3d 99 
(2005). 
Murphy Land established its damages to at least a reasonable certainty with evidence of 
the amount that Murphy Land would have profited had it been able to farm the entirety of 
Crystal Springs Farm in 2011 and 2012, as compared to the crops that it actually farmed, and it 
demonstrated that the difference exceeded three million dollars. See Opening Brief at 12-17; 
Tiegs Aff. at 1!Cfl 16-22. That evidence is sufficient to meet Murphy Land's burden to establish 
the amount of damages. See Mclean v. Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779,783,430 P.2d 670 (1967) 
("the testimony of the plaintiff, evincing the gross receipts of the business for comparable 
periods, the overhead expenses and estimated profit derived by computation therefrom as a 
percentage of gross receipts, all based upon her prior experience in the operation of the business, 
was sufficient to enable the jury to determine respondent's loss of profits for the period of 
inoperation with reasonable certainty"). 
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Hilliards solely on Clark's assertions about yield, 
price, and cost of certain crops.1 Mr. Clark states that he does not "believe that Mr. Tiegs' 
estimate of yields for DNS wheat are historically accurate," that those are "high yields," and that 
Crystal Springs Farm "was not traditionally producing yields of those amounts." Clark Aff. at 
~[6(c). But Mr. Clark does not disclose whether he ever grew DNS wheat on Crystal Springs 
Farm, and he fails to account for any differences in farming practices between him and Murphy 
Land. It is reasonable to infer that Frank Tiegs, who operates a large-scale farming operation, 
might be able to obtain a better yield than Jay Clark, a former attorney-turned farmer. Mr. Clark 
also fails to provide any specific facts about the yield he achieved. 
Mr. Clark similarly states that he "believe[s]" that Mr. Tiegs's estimates of costs and 
sales prices of crops are "unrealistic." Clark Aff. at <J[6(d), (e). But again, Mr. Clark provides no 
specific facts on which his belief is based, nor any specificity about what a "realistic" cost or 
sales price estimate might be. Instead, he merely states that the price for Norkotah potatoes 
"would have been near the high point of the market for such potatoes in 2011," without any 
support for that statement or any explanation why, even if true, Murphy Land would not have 
been able to obtain such a price. 
1 The Hilliards included in their filing the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds, in which Mr. Edmunds, a 
non-disclosed expert, purports to offer expert testimony regarding the amount of damages 
suffered by Murphy Land. For the reasons set forth in the Motion to Strike and supporting 
documents filed by Murphy Land, Mr. Edmunds' affidavit should not be considered by this 
Court. For that reason, and because the Hilliards do not refer to his affidavit in their 
Opposition at all, let alone base any argument on it, Murphy Land will not address the 
assertions in that affidavit in this Reply. 
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Indeed, Mr. fails to provide specific facts about yields, costs, or sales prices at 
Indeed, as to 2012, he or merely states, without any explanation or supporting facts, that he 
"believe[s] that Mr. Tiegs' projections for the year 2012 to be similarly wrong in regard to 
yields, costs and sales prices." Clark Aff. at <Jl7. Mr. Clark's statements are nothing more than 
"conclusory assertions unsupported by specific facts," and, as a result, they are "insufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment." Kootenai County, 293 P.3d 
at 641 (2012).2 Simply put, the Hilliards have not established any genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages suffered by Murphy Land. 
8. The Hilliards did not Plead, and do not Adequately Support, the Affirmative 
Defense of Mitigation. 
The Hilliards final argument is that Murphy Land "egregiously failed to take reasonable 
steps to mitigate their damages." Opposition at 19-20. The Hilliards argue that Murphy Land 
should have simply rented out the entirety of Crystal Springs Farm from Jay Clark. Even 
assuming that the duty to mitigate applies herein, the Hilliards have not met their burden of 
supporting that affirmative defense. 
"The doctrine of avoidable consequences, or the duty to mitigate, is an affirmative 
defense that provides for a reduction in damages where a defendant proves that it would have 
been reasonable for the plaintiff to take steps to avoid the full extent of the damages caused by 
the defendant's actionable conduct. Where an injured party takes steps to mitigate the damages 
2 Mr. Clark also avers that Mr. Tiegs does not refer to the "windfall" of avoided cost to Murphy 
Land occasioned by the costs Mr. Clark had allegedly incurred prior to his eviction on May 
2, 2012. While Mr. Tiegs indeed does not refer to any "windfall," his calculations for the 
alfalfa and white wheat harvested in 2012 reflect lower costs for those crops. 
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""""""''"' by another, she is entitled to the costs she reasonably incurs in avoiding those damages. 
McCormick lnt'l USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 923-925, 277 P.3d 367(2012) (citations 
omitted). The party who invokes this doctrine bears the burden to prove that the "damage could 
have been lessened." Whitehouse v. Lange, 128 Idaho 129,136,910 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1996) 
( citing Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 170, 765 P .2d 680, 681 
(1988). In other words, the defendant "bears the burden of proving that the proposed means of 
mitigation were reasonable under the circumstances, could be accomplished at a reasonable cost, 
and were within the plaintiffs ability. Proof of the latter of these three requires more than a mere 
suggestion that a means of mitigation exists." McCormick, 128 Idaho at 136. 
Like the remainder of the Hilliards' arguments, their mitigation argument fails for 
multiple reasons. 
First, mitigation is an affirmative defense, see McCormick, 128 Idaho at 136, but the 
Hilliards did not plead it as required by I.R.C.P. 8(c). 
Second, it is not apparent that the doctrine of avoidable consequences applies here. As 
the Hilliards note, that doctrine applies in the context of a breach of contract or tort action. See 
Opposition at 19. The Hilliards cite no authority supporting the notion that there is a duty to 
mitigate in this context. Because they bear the burden of supporting their affirmative defense, 
the failure to establish the applicability of the doctrine to this case is alone sufficient to doom the 
Hilliards' argument. 
Third, even assuming, arguendo, that there is a duty to mitigate in this context, the 
Hilliards fail to meet their burden to support the defense. In support, the Hilliards point again to 
the affidavit of Jay Clark, this time to Mr. Clark's statement that he was "ready willing and able" 
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to Murphy lease any of fields on the they had paid a rent to so." 
Aff. at 9[4. But these statements amount merely to "mere suggestion that a means of 
mitigation exists." McConnick, 128 Idaho at 136. The Hilliards have propounded no evidence 
Corn1 indicating that Murphy Land would have suffered less damage had it rented from Mr. 
Clark, including no specifics about how much Mr. Clark would have charged to rent the 
remainder of Crystal Springs Farm. As a result, they have failed to adequately support their 
affinnative defense of mitigation. See Whitehouse, 128 Idaho at 136 (defendant argued that 
plaintiff could have "restored [the mare's] fertility, and thereby reduced their damages, by 
sending her ... for evaluation by specialists"; court held that defendant did not satisfy his burden 
to prove that plaintiffs damages would have been reduced because "he did not present evidence 
that such evaluation likely would have led to a cure for the mare's infertility, nor did he show the 
probable cost of such testing"). 
Moreover, Jay Clark's assertions are inconsistent with previous affidavits he has 
submitted to this Court. In his most recent affidavit, Mr. Clark takes the position that, in early 
2011, Murphy Land could have rented "any of the fields" and "could have farmed what they 
wanted, when they wanted": in Mr. Clark's words, "f a]ll they had to do was ask." Clark Aff. at 
919. But Mr. Clark previously averred that, by early 2011: (1) he had already planted 1204 acres 
of Winter Wheat and 1650 acres of alfalfa; (2) he was "required" to plant 142 acres of sugar 
beets; (3) he was "under contractual obligation" and "legally obligated" to plant corn in four of 
the remaining fields, which corn was "already sold"; (4) that two of the fields were "unavailable" 
for growing potatoes because they had been grazed by cattle. See Second Affidavit of Matthew 
Gordon filed concunently herewith ("Second Gordon Aff."), ~[3, Exh. B. (Second Affidavit of 
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Clark Case No. 11 900 on March 1, 2011), at <fi7, 13, & 16. Mr. 
Clark further averred that, as of February 2011, he had invested approximately $763,880 for the 
2011 crop year, and that he expected to gross more than two million dollars from those crops in 
2011. See Second Gordon Aff., 9[2, Exh. A (Affidavit of Jay P. Clark filed in Case No. CV-11-
01900 on February 25, 2011), at 'I[44. Mr. Clark also swore that if Murphy Land had been 
permitted to farm additional fields in 2011, it would have resulted in him "being in default for a 
number of contracts both to plant and grow crops on the property," and that there would "not be 
enough water to go around" if Murphy Land planted crops of its choosing on certain fields. See 
Second Gordon Aff., ~[3, Exh. B, at Cj{3F, 17. Most tellingly, Mr. Clark averred that he would not 
agree to "let someone else farm land that I intend to farm for a number of years in the future 
unless the farming is controlled and monitored by me," in part because "the choice of crops may 
very well affect my ability to effectively use the farm in the future." Id. at~[ 23 (emphasis 
added). In short, despite Mr. Clark's claims in his most recent affidavit about the supposed ease 
of renting from him and his alleged willingness to let Murphy Land farm whatever, wherever it 
chose on the Farm, Mr. Clark's contemporaneous statements paint a very different picture. 
As discussed eariier, the Hilliards' argument about failure mitigation also ignores the 
evidence that Murphy Land aggressively and diligently pursued litigation to remove Jay Clark 
from Crystal Springs Fann as soon as possible. That the litigation did not result in his removal 
until May 2, 2012 is not the fault of Murphy Land. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons. the Hilliards have failed to establish any genuine issue of 
material fact that would preclude an award of summary judgment to Murphy Land on all claims 
and counterclaims and a declaration ordering that the Escrow Funds be released to Murphy Land. 
DATED THIS --12_ day of December, 2013. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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DEC O 6 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 ) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW 
GORDON 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Countercla imant. ) 
) 
MATTHEW GORDON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I make this affidavit and the statements herein based upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land 
Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") in the above-captioned matter. 
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3. as A is a true accurate copy of portions 
Affidavit of Jay Clark filed on February 25, 2011 in the District Court for the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, in Case No. CV 2011-01900-M. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the Second Affidavit 
of Jay Clark filed on March 11, 2011 in the District Couit for the Third Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, in Case No. CV 2011-01900-M. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
Matthew Gordon 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 61h day of December, 2013. 
Name: Tammy N. Miller --------
Notary Public 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires: 05/30/2014 
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THOMAS CLARK 
State Bar No. 1329 
and FEENEY 
Defendants 
Jay Clark and John Clark 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. 0. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
FILED 
___ A.r~i!J} M. 
FEB 2 5 2011 
~HARLon·E SHERBURN, CLERK 
TFUNAAMAN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THrn.D JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC., an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
\IS. ) 
) 
.IA Y P. CLARK; JOHN CLARK; DANIEL ) 
MORI and all of the unknown owners and all of) 
the unknown claimants to any right, title, estate, ) 
lien or interest in whole or in part in and to all ) 
mineral and mineral rights on and in and ) 
ingress and egress rights to and from the real ) 
property, which is adverse to Plaintiffs ) 
ownership or a cloud upon Plaintiffs title ) 
lhereto (referred to as DOES 1-50), ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV 2011-01900-M 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY P. CLARK 
* * * * * * * * * * 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of ) 
JAY P. CLARK, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. My full legal name is Jay Phillip Clark. I am a resident of Elmore County, Idaho. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAV P. CLARK ·l-
EXHIBIT 'A' 
----
coa~ ORIGINAL 
s 
lease. 
rent" See page 2 
practices is contrary to expressed agreements 
grazing 
the 
41. Nearly every field on the Ranch is well fenced. There is a feedlot on the Ranch. 
There were several hundred cattle were grazing on the Ranch immediately prior to the Plaintiffs 
purchasing the Ranch. This all should have made it no surprise to the Plaintiffs that they were 
buying a Ranch with a rich tradition of cattle grazing. In addition, Dan Mori grazed the fields in 
2009 before and after Lance Funk grew potatoes on the Ranch without anyone making any 
complaints about the grazing. 
42. Also attached as Exhibit J is an agreement from myself and Lance Funk from 2009 
and from 20 l 0. The 2010 agreement for Mr. Funk and I to grow sugar beets together on the Ranch 
specifically incorporates the crop share lease that is the subject of this litigation. Mr. Funk being a 
principal of the Plaintiff, for over a year the Plaintiff operated pursuant to said crop share lease. 
43. Since I have no intentions of growing potatoes, cattle grazing would not in anyway 
negatively effect my crops. In fact, for the corn that I grew on the Ranch, cattle grazing is necessary 
to utilize and diminish excessive crop residue. If the corn fields are not grazed, not only is feed 
wasted, but significantly more tillage will be required before those fields will have a suitable seed 
bed. Cattle grazing is in no way causes waste upon a farm. 
44. If the Court grants the requested Temporary Restraining Order, I will suffer 
significant financial loss. So far I have crops as enumerated above that have been planted in which 
I have invested for the 2011 crop year and beyond approximately $763,880. If I am allowed to 
harvest those crops, my expected gross will be approximately $2,281,275 in crop year 2011. 
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45. I have twelve ( full time employees on the property and thirteen (13) 
the next 30 These employees 
would have been working on the property at that time the Plaintiff was looking at the property for 
sale and many would have been on the property at the time of closing of the sale. All of these 
employees will lose their employment if the Temporary Restraining Order is granted . 
.ft, 
DATED This c}S day of Februar 
11 ;:!t/-
1 
Ja 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thls ;)~day .?f February, 2011. 
NO! ~RY PUBf:,IC FOR s~ o~o J J ~- ' II ~ 
Res1dmg at: c~ , - ffrnu..., ~ c:'.{, , 
Commission expires: c:}. - ~ 7- J ;l 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·i1l 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J5 day of February, 2011, .I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Steven F. Schossberger 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 
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THOMAS CLARK 
Idaho State Bar No. 1329 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Jay Clark and John Clark 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. 0. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
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IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF TIIE TIIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IBE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
MURPHY LAND COMP AJ.'N, LLC., an Idaho ) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JAY P. CLARK; JOHN CLARK; DANIEL ) 
MORI and all of the unknown owners and all of) 
the unknown claimants to any right, title, estate, ) 
lien or interest in whole or in part in and to all ) 
mineral and mineral rights on and in and ) 
ingress and egress rights to and from the real ) 
property, which is adverse to Plaintiff's ) 
ownership or a cloud upon Plaintiff's title ) 
thereto (referred to as DOES 1-50), ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JAY P. CLAR.K~t-
EXHIBIT \ g I 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JAY P. 
CLARK 
LAW OrFICE:$ OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
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JAY P. CLARK, being first duly sworn upon oath. deposes and states as follows: 
1. My full legal name is Jay Phillip Clark. I am a resident of Elmore County, Idaho, 
and one of the Defendants in the above-captioned matter. I have knowledge of the following facts 
and am competent to testify to the same. 
2. The idea of splitting Crystal Springs Fann into various parcels to be shared by the 
parties is an extremely poor idea without an agreement between the parties to do so and will create 
numerous issues and disputes between the parties which will only extend the litigation: make the trial 
much longer and require both sides to retain numerous experts. 
3. Some of the issues which can be avoided by not requiring the parties to share the 
ranch include the following: 
A. 
B. 
Water issues. 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
There will be disputes over water allocation. 
Potential disputes regarding repair of an antiquated system 
Disputes regarding responsibility to repair, maintain tind operate the 
water system. 
Potential disputes regarding paying power bills 
Crop rotation and the affect that tho Plaintiff's choice of crops will have on the ranch 
in future years for me under the terms of the existing lease with options to renew. 
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Rental issues as far as how much rent the Plaintiff should pay which would include: 
whether it be cash or crop rent, and 
iL the manner in which it is to be calculated. 
Damage issues by reason of Plaintiff's use of the farm. By comparison, the lease 
adequately addresses the compensation that I am to pay to the Plaintiffs for the use 
of the property. 
Placing litigants who do not get along on the property will increase the likelihood of 
further problems that will need to be addressed by the Court. The parties inability 
to get along is evidenced by the fact that Lance Funk still owes me money and has 
not given a reason for not paying it as mote fully addressed in my prior affidavit and 
herein. 
Sharing the Fann will result in me being in default for a number of contracts both to 
plant and grow crops on the property. 
For these reasons, and others, it would be an extremely poor decision to require the parties to share 
the Farm.. These issues are more fully developed in the following paragraphs. 
4. Plaintiff's claim that it now has a greater claim for ground at the Ranch reserved for 
spring crops then for ground already planted with fall crops assumes that either spring crops are less 
important than fall crops, or that it intended to use and occupy the remaining 500 or so acres of the 
Ranch, I would have already done so. The only reason those fields are not already planted to com 
is because corn will most likely be killed by frost if planted before mid April. According to 2010 
Idaho Agricultural Statistics, prepared by the Idaho State Department of Agriculture, corn was 
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2 above entitled book). 
year from April through June See enclosed Exhibit Al (page 7 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
5. If I had known last fall that my lease on the Ranch would in any way be contingent 
upon all fields being planted, I could have also planted those remaining fields in wheat. The 
Plaintiff planted wheat on their farm near Murphy until December 15, 2010, which is the last day 
to do so under the federally subsidized insurance program. I finished planting the 1204 acres of 
8 wheat on November 19, 2010. See the "Planted Acreage Worksheet" dated December 14, 2010, 
9 Exhibit D attached to my previous Affidavit. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
6. As stated in paragraph 28 in my previous affidavit, I am prepared to plant and grnw 
around 500 acres of grain corn on the Ranch in fields 257, 258; 275 and 280. By far, the best land 
on the Ranch suitable for row crops, is the four fields (called ''pivots" because of the automated 
irrigation system on these fields pivot around a center tower) of ground that Plaintiffhas identified 
as fields 257,258,262, and 263. Com cannot be grown on the majority of the ground on the Ranch 
since around 1800 acres of the Ranch is irrigated with "hand1inesn or ''wheellines"1 which require 
1 7 that they manually be moved once or twice a day. Since field com often grows over ten feet tall, as 
18 
19 
20 
it did last year on the Ranch, pivots are the only practical way for irrigation com on the Ranch. 
7. The remaining fields on the R£lllch are fanned and planted according to the field 
21 numbers on the map provided by the Plaintiff as follows: 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
A. Wheat The 1204 acres of Winter Wheat is planted in fields 261,262, the field not 
labeled but between 258 and 262,263, the southern half of 264,267,268,269, the 
fields betv.teen 268 and 269 and the fields not identified to the south of field 287, 
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E. 
8. 
field 270, , a field not identified to the east of field 271, the comer 
fields also not identified around and between the fields 277 and 2831 and :field 281. 
Alfalfa. Approximately 1650 acres of alfalfa is planted in the north half of field 264, 
field 265, field 266, field 272 and two small fields located to south of field 272> field 
273, three corner fields that adjoin field 273, field 276, field 277, field 278, field 279, 
field 282, field 2831 field 284, a field not identified but located directly south of field 
284, field 285, field 286, field 287, and a field not identified but located just north 
of field 287. 
Sugar Beets. My current contract with Snake River Sugar Company will require me 
to plow out most of the alfalfa currently planted in field 278 and field 279 to plant 
142 acres of sugar beets. 
Field Com I am under contractual obligation and am prepared to plant com in field 
257,258,275, and 280. 
Spring Wheat. I intend to plant 80 acres of Spring Wheat in field 2.59. 
Three of the four pivots that are slated for corn raised sugar beets in 2010 and would 
therefore be a poor choose for raising sugar beets again in those fields which are fields number 257, 
258 and 280. The last time another fanner tried to grow ''back to back" sugar beets on the Ranch 
resulted in a terrible crop because of soil diseases like Rhizomania flourished in those conditions. 
Also, two of those four pivots have already seen potatoes in 2009 and then sugar beets in 2010. 
Potatoes and sugar beets are very hard on farm ground because they "mine" much of the nutrients 
out of the soil in a just a couple of years. Giving the soil Ha break", means growing a grass crop, 
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11 
corn or wheat, or a legume such as Alfalfa., all of which build up the soil instead of harm the 
9. Fields 275 and field 280 would also be unavailable for the Plaintiff to raise potatoes 
since these fields were entirely grazed by cattle during for the past three months. At least Plaintiff's 
position has been that potatoes cannot be grown in these two fields pursuit to agricultural standards 
as published by GAP. 
10. Com is the most profitable crop of those crops that would be suitable to grow in two 
of those pivots. Corn in this area can produce a yield nearly twice that of wheat In 2010 Idaho 
Agricultural Statistics, shows average com yield per acre of 180 bushels for Idaho in 2009. See 
Exhibit Bl. I produced around 200 bushels of corn per acre on the one pivot of com I grew last 
year on the Ranch_ Also in 2010 Idaho Agricultural Statistics. shows the average winter wheat yield 
per acre of 111 bushels and average Spring Wheat yield of 90.0 bushels per acre for Owyhee County 
in 2009. See pages of 23 and 25 of the above entitled book marked as Exhibit Ct. While the 
current price per bushel for com is around one dollar per bushel less than wheat, the revenue from 
corn for the Plaintiff's share as landlords of the Ranch would be substantially more than for wheat. 
11. The Plaintiff does not have a recent history of growing com so they are not equipped 
or prepared to take advantage of com that has seen nearly a 100 percent increase in price since last 
year. As I also stated in my previous affidavit, I have already purchased nearly $50,000 in com seed 
from Forage Complete> a company from Caldwell, which was done on November 9, 2010, well over 
a month before I had learned that the Plaintiff was purchasing the Ranch. Because of th.is being an 
record year for corn, it is extremely doubtful that Plaintiff would be able to procure any of the 
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( 
quality corn seed necessary for a good crop at this late stage in the season. 
12. I have also prepared and am legally obligated under contract to a contractor. Sid and 
Tanner Wing who owns Blue Collar Farms agreed to plant the corn crop in fields 257,258,275 and 
field 280. This is the same contractor who planted my com field last year in field 275. 
13. Furthermore, the oorn to be planted in those four pivots is already sold. See Exhibit 
Dl, a contract for the purchase of my 2011 com crop. Prior to my purchase of com seed in early 
November 2010, I had received verbal conformation from Daniel Mori (Dan) that he would be 
willing to purchase my anticipated com crop for 2011 of around 120,000 bushels of corn. As Dan 
stated in his affidavit previously filed with the court, he nms a custom cattle feeding operation. 
Critical to his operation is that Dan must secure sufficient feed for the approximately 5,000 head of 
cattle that be expects to feed for 2011. 
14. The irrigation system at the Ranch includes four independent irrigation systems with 
around 4,500 horsepower· of electric motors capable of pumping up to 40 million gallons a day. It 
takes at least fifteen of my employees to effectively manage and operate this system. Essential to 
its effective operation is the careful planning and coordination of where crops may be grown 
according to the water needs of the crop and the many limitations of the watering system. Lance 
Funk was allowed to g;ow potatoes in 2009 and sugar beets in 2010 io fields 257 through 264 
because that was not only the best soil on the Ranch for row crops, but also because that is where 
the best water system on the Ranch is located. 
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contrast, the Cottonwood Pumping Station supplies all the water to all fields 
numbered from 275 through 289, around 1070 acres. There would not be enough water to 
accommodate sugar beets or potatoes in field number 275 and 280, and com could only be grown 
there if water is significantly restricted to alfalfa fields 277 and 283 during July and August. With 
new alfalfa stands planted in 2010 in fields 286 through 289, any rationing of water there could ruin 
the new ~lfalfa. Some of the more mature alfalfa stands already suffered last year by Lance Funk 
growing sugar beets in 280, since there was not enough water left over to provide adequate pressure 
to water the hay fields in 276 through 279. 
16. 
17. 
For 2011, I am required by contract to plant sugar beets in fields 278 and 279. 
There will not be enough water to go around. Most of the inigation system on the 
ranch is severely dilapidated on the Ranch in 20 I 1. Jn the Cottonwood Pump Station area, the 
system was not designed adequately to ever water I 070 acres. Even if! use great care and only plant 
corn in those open fields, that com is likely to be hanned by interruptions in water supply. However, 
com is more resilient than potatoes or sugar beets, especially during critical times of plant 
development. Also, com will not require as much water as sugar beets until July, and by then, the 
wheat in field 281 will be finished, which will definitely help pivot field 280. By not baVing to 
share water, especially within the area watered by the Cottonwood pumping station. crop production 
will still be less than ideal, but I will only have myself to blame for how and when daily decisions 
are made as to which crops within those 1070 acres will wither and which ones will wither less. 
18. This is Just one example of many situations on the Ranch that will require a close and 
careful cooperation to maximize crop production, a situation that is very unlikely to occur if the 
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were to forced to share the Ranch while this litigation is pending. This would like 
spouses being forced to work full time together while they are getting a divorce, a situation likely 
to greatly enhance the litigation between the parties. With the parties already litigating against each 
other, rationing water between us would probably require frequent court supervision. Ultimately, 
the situation would also further burden this court with additional expert witnesses necessary to 
establish damages because both sides will have damages due to lack of water. 
19. As for the alfalfa stand growing in field 273, that the Plaintiff claims is too mature and 
ready to take out, it is true I told Lance Funk in mid December 2010 that I would consider leasing 
that field to him for potatoes in 2011, for cash rent. However, those negotiations were all based on 
the premise that Lance Funk was accepting my lease as valid, an expectation that was naturally 
created because no remarks had been made that questioned the validity of my lease for the Ranch. 
Also, in December alfalfa hay was still only selling for around $90 per ton, still below the cost of 
producing it. 
20. The poor market was also coupled with the fact that the 2010 crop year was one of 
t.be worst on record for alfalfa production in Southwest Idaho because of bad weather (many farmers 
lost half of their alfalfa crop in 2010 due to bad weather). For example, my records show that field 
273 produced 891 tons of alfalfa hay during the 2009, while during the year 2010, that same field 
only produced 529 tons. The Plaintiff shows that field to be 128.31 acres, so for 2009 that is 6.94 
tons per acre and for 2010, due to record bad weather that field produced 4.12 tons per acre. Once 
again, the 2010 Idaho Agricu!tutal Statistics, shows average alfalfa yield per acre for Owyhee 
County in 2009 to be 6.00 tons per acre. See Exhibit El (page 40 of above entitled book.) This 
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shows \\las producing above the 
county ave-rag.:. Far201 l~ the standof rur-a1!aitsclf should be simi1nr lo tho past two y¢U$ and.still 
c~pablc of prodll(;ing ut least aver.age or bettt:r yields. 
21. As oftoduy's date. 1 am still owi:d by l..ailco Funk su~ar beet revenue from Flcld 27 4, 
for my own Sugat Beet crop grown. at the Rnnch in 2010. These are funds that r previously referred 
to in parag,mph5 :39 and 40 in my previous affidavit. r have still not received MY 11otiCl.l or any 
j1.1st!lic:atfot1 .Crom Lance 1<'unk or the PlaintHl" as to why they are 'Withholding thl)sc funds from me. 
22. In addition to issues ri;ga:rding crop rotation and w.:iti=r ~-e~ there will be a..0:1.irnber 
of otfo.:rprcblcms and i~,:;, i nch.tding daraagc claims bcc::ausc of di ~putt::: wilh r~cctto a.Uocation 
of willi:r. tl1at may arise if the: '?lainlHT is allowed to farm pi;,11,ion!l of tl1~ Crysml Springs farm. 
Th~se ru:lditioMl claims w.:iuld include how Phrlntlff is to pe.y rent and th, fair market value of tho 
same which would reqt.dTe adclitioilal expert tttSt:imony. 
., .. 
_.,, 1 do not agree to Just kt someone else form hmd that 1 intend to farm for a number 
u r y~,rs in the future unless the farmfo g ii,; .:ontrol.L::d aud monitored by me. For $:'(ample. tho choice 
This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, v1Sit http://www.gfi.com 
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Steven F. Schossberger 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy/(208) 954-5260 
By ~ Atto ~y for Defendants 
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DEC 1 2 2013 I 
M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
Attorney at Law 
816 West 200 
Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
1 Telephone (208) 343-2900 
;Facsimile (208) 343-3282 
I 
I WELDON s. "'00D 
!Attorney at law 
Idaho State Bar Number IO 15 
17 Al verno Court 
.Redwood Citv, California 94061 I • 
'
Telephone: (650) 743-1079 
lax: (650) 298-8097 
I 
IAttomevs for Plaintiffs 
' . 
' I 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDI IAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN A\·o FOR THE CO TY OF OWYHEE 
I 1JA:\1ES AND BARBARA HILLIARD, 
I 
f s. 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 13 03004 
MOTION T AMEND REPLY TO 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY. LLC, 
' -
COUNTER AIM 
I 
I 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiffs move the Court to allow the amendment of eir Reply to Counterclaim 
;tiled herein. A proposed Amended Reply is attached hereto. 
! 
DATED this 
i 
! 
MOTION TO AMEND REPLY TO COUNTERCLAM - 1 
I 
i 
: 
i 
Steven F. Schossberger 
HAWLEY TROXELL El\1NIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
MOTION TO AMEND REPLY TO COUNTERCLAM - 2 
Bannock, 
1 
Idaho 83701-1652 
ljelepbone (208) 343-2900 
f:ax (208) 343-3282 
1~ttomey for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THIRD JUDICI L DISTRICT 
i 
I 
I 
i 
OF THE STATE OF JDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, 
TY OF OWYHEE 
I 
I 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 3 03004 
I 
! 
I 
vs. 
I 
Plaintiff, 
MURPHY LAND COMP ANY, LLC, 
An Idaho Limited Liability Company, 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiffs reply to the Counterclaim: 
I 
I. 
AMENDED 
COUNTERC 
i The allegations of paragraphs 1,2,3,4, first sentence of 5, fir t clause of 6, 11, 12, 13, 14 
11 and 18 of the Counterclaim 
I 
! 
are admitted. 
i 
I 
I rr 
I 
j The allegations of paragraphs second and third sentence of , second clause of 6, 7, 8, 9, 
I 
I 
10, 15, 1 7 and 19 of the Counterclaim are 
I . 
denied. 
I 
I 
I 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Ajl\tfENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCL.AJM - 1 
are applicable, to 
or allegation 
Defendant's 
c/aims for relief. In addition, Plaintiffs, asserting the following dffenses, do not admit that the 
I 
bfden of proving allegations or denials contained in the defenses i upon them, but to the 
c~ntrary, assert that by reason of denial and/or by reason of relevan statutory and judicial 
i 
aµthority, the burnden of proving the facts relevant to many of the efenses and1or burden or 
p~oving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defi ses is upon Defendant. 
I 
Moreover, Plaintiffs do not admit, in asserting in any defense, any sponsibility or liability but, 
I 
I 
t~ the contrary, specifically deny any and all allegations of responsi ility and liability alleging in 
I 
I 
tfue complaint. 
i 
i 
i 
A. Estoppel Defendants are barred from maintaining t is action against the Plaintiff 
based upon the doctrine of estoppel; among other things: 
I 
I 
(1) Defendant purchased the Crystal Springs Farm on December 3 , 2010 knowing that Jay P. 
I 
d1ark and others were occupying the farm and further knowing that Jay P. Clark had filed with 
i 
tJe Owyhee County Recorder a purported several year lease of said arm' Indeed, RE-11 
I 
' I 
Addendum No. 4 between Plaintiffs and Defendant recognized and ade provision for the 
I 
a~counting ofrents to be collected from said tenant [Jay P. Clark]. 
I B. Waiver. 
I 
I (D Defendant undertook abortive and unsuccessful legal efforts in e District Court for the 
i 
Third District in o ... vyhee Count to remove Jay P. Clark from the C 'Stal Springs Farm after 
I 
I 
Defendant purchased said farm on December 30, 2010. By volunte ring to undertake such 
I 
I 
I 
rJmoval efforts the Defendant vitiated the need for Plaintiffs to do o and waived any right of 
i 
~NDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - 2 
I 
I 
Springs Farm made it l gally and more 
' 
~fficult for Plaintiffs to obtain legal recourse to have said Jay P. ark removed from said farm. 
I 
Indeed, RE-11 Addendum No. 4 suggests at most that Plaintiffs we e to have two (2) exceptions 
I ta the policy of title insurance deleted. (Albeit RE-11 Addendum n .4 does not with specificity 
I 
o~ particularity set forth whether the burden of having the exceptio s removed commitment was 
I 
to be on Plaintiffs (sellers) or Defendant (buyer). 
I 
2~ One of the principals of Defendant ( Lance Funke) occupied p of the Crystal Springs Farm 
J 2011 (and prior years) and farmed said part, thus causing some o the damages Defendant 
I 
I 
claims in the Counterclaim herein. Principles of equity and fair de ing ought preclude 
I 
Defendant or some of them from profiting by use of the Crystal Sp ngs Farm in 2011 and also 
I 
pf ofiting by charging a loss of use of said farm to Plaintiffs. 
3l Defendant has filed in the United States District Court for the D strict of Idaho (Bankruptcy) a 
I 
claim for damages against Jay P. Clark in a sum greater than four ·mon dollars. Said claim is 
I 
iri the Chapter 12 proceeding of said Jay P. Clark (Case >Io. 12-006 9-JDP). Said claim 
! 
ehcapsulates the same dollars that Defendant asserts (paragraph 17 f Counterclaim) are O\Ving to 
' 
I it by Plaintiffs. (To be sure it is suggested in the Bankruptcy proce ding claim filed against Jay 
J. Clark by Defendant that Plaintiffs here indemnified Defendant a ainst any damages they assert 
I 
akainst Jay P. Clark by virtue of RE-I I Addendum no.4. Plaintiffs o not agree that RE-11 
I 
I 
4ctdendum no. 4 is in any wise an indemnification agreement for th benefit of Defendant). By 
pksuing those dollars against Jay P. Clark the Defendant has waiv and/or abandoned any 
I 
I 
ctaim they might otherwise have against Plaintiffs. (Again, to bes e Plaintiffs do not concede 
I 
any such right of claim of Defendant against them.) 
! 
A!MENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - 3 
I 
f'"\U~ ._,_,, v' 
C. 
I 
The Plaintiffs allege as additional affirmative defents: 
1. Ambiguity of Addendum 4 
2. Addendum 4 is a new agreement requiring new c nsideration and there was 
none. 
3. Mutual Mistake 
4. Failure to mitigate damages 
5. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
6. Murphy's claimed damages are excessive 
D. Reservation of Rights. Plaintiff reserves the right t raise additional affirmative 
&tenses based upon information obtained during the discovery pro ess. 
i 
REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNE FEES 
The Plaintiffs' request that they be awarded costs and atto 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment accordingly. 
DATED this ___ day of ______ , 2013. 
M. KARL SHURTL 
AlMENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - 4 
! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
20 I hereby certify that on __ day 
-------· 
, I served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by metho indicated below, upon: 
Steven F. Schossberger 
Matthew Gordon 
Hawley Troxell Ennis § Hawley LLP 
P.0.1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
[ ] Fa simile 
[ ] U .. Mail 
[ ] H d delivery 
M. KARL SHCRTLI 
~MENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - 5 
FILED 
~.M. __ .P.M. 
OEC 19 2013 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMAN'T 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-
DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS 
TESTIMONY AND GRANTING IN 
PART 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT 
TESTIMONY OF KEN EDMUNDS, JAY 
CLARK, ROBERT BENNETT AND 
JAMES HILLIARD 
On November t 5, 2013, Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC 
("Murphy Land") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56{c). On November 29, 2013, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants James and Barbara 
Hilliard (the "Hilliards") filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMAN'T MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY AND 
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT TESTiMONY OF KEN EDMUNDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT 
BENNETT AND JAMES HILLIARD- I 
45522.0004.6275916. ! 
the Ken F. Bennett and James 
C. Hilliard. On December 5, 2013, Murphy Land filed its Motion to Strike and Exclude the 
Affidavit of Ken Edmunds and portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark, and filed its Objections to 
Evidence and Motion to Strike and Disregard the Affidavit Testimony of Ken Edmunds, Jay 
Clark, Robert F. Bennett and James C. Hilliard. On December 5, 2013, Murphy Land filed its 
Notice of Hearing on the Motions to Exclude and to Strike Plaintiffs Affidavits. Plaintiffs did 
not file a written objection to hearing Murphy Land's Motion to Exclude and to Strike PlaintifTs 
Affidavits at the hearing scheduled at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment on 
December 13, 2013, nor did Plaintiffs file a written objection to Murphy Land's Motions to 
Exclude and Strike Plaintiffs' Affidavits. 
On February 13, 2013 Karl Shurtliff, counsel for the Hilliards, and Steven F. 
Schossberger and Matthew Gordon, counsel for Murphy Land, were present at the hearing. Mr. 
Shurtliff objected to proceeding on the Motion to Exclude and Strike, arguing that the motion 
was not filed 14 days in advance of the hearing as required by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). For the reasons 
articulated on the Record, the Court read I.R.C.P. 56(c) together with LR.C.P. 7(b)(3) and 
determined that it could go forward with the hearing, as the motion to exclude was filed pursuant 
to the I.R.C.P. 56(c) requirements and therefore, the requirements of I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) need not be 
complied with, otherwise, the time limits of I.R.C.P. 56(c) would be meaningless. Thereafter, 
the Court proceeded with the hearing, although over Mr. Shurtliff s objection. 
Pursuant to Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho l, 8-9, 205 P.3d 650, 654-55 
(2009), ciling Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 844 P.2d 24 (Ct.App. 1992), prior to ruling on the 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMAN'T MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY AND 
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY OF KEN EDMUNDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT 
BENNETT AND JAMES HILLIARD- 2 
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Motion for entertained and ruled upon Murphy Land's objections 
to the of affidavit testimony Ken Edmunds, Clark, Robert F. Bennett 
and James C. Hilliard. On December 13, 2013, the Court orally entered its rulings on Murphy 
Land's Motions to Exclude and to Strike Certain Testimony from the affidavits offered by the 
f lilliards in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court's rulings on Murphy 
Land's Objections to the Hilliards' evidence stated on the Record on December 13, 2013, are 
incorporated by reference herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Murphy Land's Motion to Strike 
and Exclude the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds and portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark is granted, 
and Murphy Land's Motion to Strike and Disregard the Affidavit Testimony of Ken Edmunds, 
Jay Clark, Robert F. Bennett and James C. Hilliard is granted in part. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED THIS _ft:day of December, 2013. 
oily J. u ey6 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMAN'T MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY AND 
GRANTING fN PART DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY OF KEN EDMUNDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT 
BENNETT AND JAMES HILLIARD- 3 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_!_1aay of December, 20I3, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMAN'T 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS 
TESTIMONY AND GRANTING TN PART DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY OF KEN 
EDMUNDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT BE by the method indicated below, and addressed to each 
of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Barmock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
{Attorney for Plaintfff',} 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
17 Alvemo Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
Steven F. Schossberger 
Matthew Gordon 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite l 000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Vb U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
OE-mail 
D Telecopy: 208-343-3282 
Vb U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail: weldon@weldonwoo<l.com 
D Telecopy: 650-298-8097 
/ D U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail 
D Telecopy 
ANGELA BARKELL 
Clerk of the Court 
By____..~____.· '-"-'-=~--+~..,.,..,_~~~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY AND 
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STR1KE AND 
DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY OF KEN EDMUNDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT 
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with I.he Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law announced orally at the hearing on 
December 13, 2013, which are incorporated herein by reference, the Court rules as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that summary judgment is 
granted in favor of Murphy Land as against the Hilliards on all claims and counterclaims, that 
Murphy Land is awarded the three million dollars ($3,000,000) that was deposited into escrow 
with Guaranty Title, Inc. on December 30, 2010 in connection with the sale of Crystal Springs 
Farm, and that the Hilliards' Complaint against Murphy Land be dismissed with prejudice. 
SO ORDERED THIS -l3:=day of December, 2013. 
District Judge 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAlMANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
DefendanUCounterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DefendanUCounterclaimant Murphy Land Company. LLC's ("Murphy Land") Motion 
for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before this Court on December 13, 2013. Steven F. 
Schossberger and Matthew Gordon of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP appeared and 
argued for Murphy Land. M. Karl Shurtliff appeared and argued for Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants James and Barbara Hilliard ("Billiards"). Having considered the filings and 
arguments of the parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and in accordance 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - l 
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i HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi day of December, 2013, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
{Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
17 Alverno Court 
Redwood City, CA 9406 I 
Steven F. Schossberger 
~S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_ day of December, 2013, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by lhe method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I -1652 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
17 Alvemo Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an [daho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
ORDER DIRECTING RELEASE OF 
FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW TO 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC 
Upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC, and the Court being fully advised in 
the premises, and in accordance with the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
announced orally at hearing on December 13, 2013: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Guaranty Title, Inc. is authorized and directed to 
immediately release and disburse to Murphy Land Company, LLC the three million dollars 
ORDER DIRECTING RELEASE OF FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW TO 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC - I 
45522.0004.6275596 
deposited Inc. on 
sale of Crystal Springs farm. 
SO ORDERED THIS l1_day of December, 2013. 
District Ju ge 
ORDER DIRECTING RELEASE OF FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW TO 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC -2 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this of December, 2013, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ORDER DIRECTING RELEASE OF FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW 
TO MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC by the method indicated below, and addressed to each 
of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
I 7 Alvemo Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
Steven F. Schossberger 
~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
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D Hand Delivered 
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D Hand Delivered 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company. ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 58(a), 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is entered in 
favor of Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") as against 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants James and Barbara Hilliard ("Hilliards") on all claims and 
counterclaims as follows: 
I. Murphy Land is awarded the three million dollars ($3,000,000) deposited into 
escrow at Guaranty Title, Inc. on December 30, 2010 in connection with the sale 
of Crystal Springs Farm; and 
JUDGMENT-I 
45522.0004.6275959 l 
2. claims are m 
THIS ~day of December, 2013. 
u~ ~ 
MollyJ~;i 
District Judge 
JUDGMENT- 2 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this(tl!y of December, 20I3, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: · 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
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Weldon S. Wood 
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Steven F. Schossberger 
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D Overnight Mail 
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' 
WELDON s. woop~I 
Attornev at law ' 
Idaho S~ate Bar Num~ r 1015 
1 7 Alvemo Court I 
Redwood City, Califotjlia 9406 l 
Telephone: (650) 743~ ~079 
Fax: (650) 298-8097 11 
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Deputy Clerk 
Attorneys for Plaintiffsj , 
IN THE dliTRlCT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDlcrAL DISTRJCT 
I i 
FOR THE S~TE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE CO~WNTY OF O\VYHEE 
' I ,I 
• i: 
' j l 
JAMES AND BARBt HILLIARD, ) 
) 
) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURPHY LA~TJ) co~ PANY, LLC, 
Defen 
I 
I 
Case No. CVii 13 03004 I 
i 
' 
MOTION T~ ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
1; 
59( e ), the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants ~ove the Court to alter or 
I 
amend by reversing th~ ame (1) the Judgment entered DecemberJ19, 2013 herein; (2) the 
Order granting Defen#t/Counterclaimant's Motion for summart Judgment entered 
pecember 19, 2013; rn ~I e Order directing release of funds held~ Escrow to Murphy Land 
I · I !· 
I , 
~OTJON TO ALTER\1R AMEND JUDGME!ff-1 
----------J--------4o-c----~----,---
,v,,, ,_,, -· ,vi11,1••1 
I 
I 
: ! 
• I 
I ; I 
I 
Company, enter;e~ December I 3 ( 4) the 
I 
1 Defendant/Counterclaibant' s to 
I i 
i ; 
p.<:' 
testimony and granti~~ in part Defendant/Counterclaimanfs Mof;ion to Strike and disregard 
~ I , 
I 
the Affidavit testimo~Yi of Ken Edmunds, Jay Clark, Robert Be~ett and James Hilliard 
1 ! I 
entered December 19\ t0!3. , . 
Pursuant to Rt!Llj 7(b)(3)(c), the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants desire to present oral 
' argument and wil fil~ f briefv. · hin ourteen (14) days in suppo~ of the motion. 
: I I: 
DATEDthis · 1 ,2014. 
I 
. I 
, I 
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; 1 
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~~ M.KAff SHURTLIFF 
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M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
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816 West Bannock, 
Box 1652 
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Telephone (208) 343-2900 
Facsimile (208) 343-3282 
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Attorney at law 
Idaho State Bar Number 1015 
l 7 Alverno Court 
Redwood City, California 94061 
Telephone: (650) 743-1079 
Fax: (650) 298-8097 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLIARD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MURPHY LAND COMP ANY, LLC, 
Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I. 
Case No. CV 13 03004 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
THE MOTION 
Pursuant to Rule 59(e), the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants (Plaintiffs) have moved the 
Court to alter or amend (1) the Judgment entered December 19, 2013 herein; (2) the Order 
granting Defendant/Counterclaimant's (Defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment ~ntered 
December 19, 2013; (3) the Order directing release of funds held in Escrow to Murphy Land 
Company, LLC entered December 19, 2013 and (4) the Order granting 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 1 
Defendant/Counterclaimant' s Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs/Counterdefendant' s expert witness 
to and 
December 19, 2013. 
II. 
THE PREDICATE FOR THE MOTION 
With respect the Plaintiffs have moved for relief pursuant to Rule 59( e) in an effort to 
suggest to the Court errors that the CoUi-t committed in granting the orders and judgment 
referenced above. The purpose of a Rule 59(e) motion as set out in First Security Bank v. 
Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 570 P. 2d 276 (1977) and Lowe v. Lynn, 103 Idaho 259, 646 P. 2d 1030 
(Ct. App. 1982) is to correct errors of fact or law that occurred and thus avoid the need for appeal 
as to those issues. Simply put, the Plaintiffs urge that the Court committed significant error in 
reaching conclusions, findings of fact and entering the orders which it has filed herein. Those 
errors result in a significant award of monetary damages ($3,000,000.00) to Defendant and 
importantly deprived the Plaintiffs of the opportunity to have the facts and apposite law of this 
case explicated in a trial on the merits. 
While the Court entered four (4) separate orders and/or judgments; all of which are 
sought by this motion to be altered or amended, the primary order is the one granting the motion 
for summary judgment to Defendant. The others are preliminary to or a result of the motion. The 
motion granting summary judgment to Defendant should be altered or amended by being 
withdrawn or reversed and the other orders similarly held for naught. 
III. 
WHAT HAPPENED 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 2 
in this case was set for December 2013. On November 4,201 the Court in a 
reset Defendant, 
13 to 
filed motion for summary judgment.* 
On November 15, 2013 the Defendant filed it's motion for summary judgment together 
\Vith the affidavit of Frank Tiegs setting forth his calculation of "damages" incurred by 
Defendant in the delay of possession of the property which Defendant had purchased from 
Plaintiffs on December 30, 2010. Defendant's motion was not timely under Rules 56(c) and 
6( e )( 1 ); Plaintiffs nonetheless responded to the motion in a timely fashion and made no objection 
to the failure of the motion to strictly adhere to the time constraints set out by Rules 56( c) and 
6(e)(l). Thereafter, on December 5, 2013 (Thursday),Defendant moved to strike and disregard 
the affidavit testimony of all four ( 4) of Plaintiff's affiants (Motion to Exclude/Strike) served by 
mail (See Rule 6(e)(l)). In addition to the motion to exclude/strike, the Defendant filed a reply 
memorandum to Plaintiffs' response memorandum and also filed an affidavit from its attorneys 
consisting of written affidavit testimony proffered in a prior case by one (1) of Plaintiff's affiants 
(Jay P. Clark). Rule 56(c) does not provide for reply affidavits. 
The motion to exclude/strike was accompanied by a notice of hearing; setting the hearing 
on the motion to exclude/strike for the same time as the previously scheduled motion for 
summary judgment hearing (December 13, 2013). There was no motion to shorten time filed by 
Defendant. 
The motion to exclude/strike simply did not comply with the time requirements of Rule 
*Of significance is the fact that other than rescheduling the trial date and setting the date for hearing, the motion (to 
be filed) for summary judgment, the court did not alter or amend the previously set forth scheduling order which 
effectively precluded further pre summary judgment discovery. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 3 
is no dispute as to that fact 
3 were 
on 
untimeliness under the Rules a..11d the resulting unfairness/prejudice to Plaintiffs.* Overriding 
the Plaintiffs' objection to taking up the motion to exclude/strike the Court examined the 
affidavits of Plaintiffs and largely granted the motion to exclude/strike - the effect of which was 
to eviscerate the Plaintiffs' affidavits and with them the Plaintiffs testimonial arguments against 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Thereafter on the 19th of December 2013, orders and a judgment flowing from the 
December 13, 2013 hearing were filed. This motion follows. 
IV. 
RULE 7(b)(3)(A) 
The failure to comply with the time constraints imposed by Rule 7(b)(3)(A) critically and 
fundamentally changed the course of litigation and deprived the Plaintiffs of their right to a 
determination of the issues of this case based on a thoughtful, thorough and fair exposition of the 
real issues of the case. Clearly, the record of the facts underlying this case are less than fully 
explicated. The Defendant is likely to argue "no harm- no foul" notwithstanding its failure to 
comply with the time constraints of the Rule. If the patent violation of the Rule is not prejudice 
per se then Plaintiffs would urge that the violation of the time requirements deprived them of the 
opportunity to move the court to allow changes in their affidavits or even additional affidavits to 
meet the criticisms set out in the motion to strike/exclude. The motion to redo, modify or expand 
upon the affidavits by Plaintiffs would have been made and if allowed would just as surely have 
* Counsel for Defendant orally moved to shorten time; that oral motion was not dealt with. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 4 
in the change/alteration of Plaintiffs affiants to the extent they would not have been 
court or lack of opportunity is prejudice 
as 
7(b)(3)(A) is in fact and as well prejudice per se - there being no bona fide reason for non 
compliance with such a fundamental Rule of due procedural process. 
Rule 7(b)(3)(A) says in no uncertain words that a "written motion" and notice of the 
hearing on that motion shall be filed with the Court and served so that it is received no later then 
fourteen (14) days before the time specified for the hearing. 
Here the motion and notice of the hearing on that motion were filed on December 5, 
2013(and served by mail); many days fewer than fourteen (14) days before the hearing. There is 
no question as to that fact. See Parkside Schools, Inc. v. Bronco Elite Arts§ Athletes, LLC, 145 
Idaho 176 (2008), 177 P.3d at 178 wherein the Supreme Court is discussing Rule 7(b )(3) set out 
"It is clear that Parkside failed to comply with applicable provisions of LR.C.P. 7(b)(3) and the 
District Court ignored those provisions, abusing the discretion." (emphasis added). 
Defendant misled the Court by arguing the proposition that there exists a tension 
between Rule 56 and Rule 7 (b)(3)(A) and that adherence to the time requirements of Rule 7 
(b)(3)(A) would interfere with the appropriate processing of a motion pursuant to Rule 56. No 
such tension exists and the suggestion otherwise caused the Court to error. 
A motion to exclude/strike is a motion separate from and independent of a Rule 56 
motion for summary judgment. Motions to exclude/strike are not incidents of a Rule 56 motion 
and are neither a necessary nor essential part of a Rule 56 motion. Motions to exclude/strike can 
be heard in the context of a Rule 56 motion or otherwise. However, a motion to exclude/strike is 
not part of a Rule 56 motion. Also, a Rule 56 motion does not include a motion to exclude/strike. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 5 
are separate. Arguments that they are bound together and that the failure to consider an 
at a motion hearing is 
to 
exclude/strike was caused by the faiiure of Defendant to comply with the rules and caused as 
well by Defendant's desire to proceed to a hearing at which Plaintiffs were significantly 
disadvantaged by the failure, deliberate or otherwise, of Defendant to comply with a 
straightforward, uncomplicated and clear Rule of procedure. 
Nothing in the Rules and nothing in the procedural history of this case suggests that the 
motion to exclude/strike could not have been properly filed and noticed for hearing without 
interference with the motion for summary judgment. Thus, if the motion to exclude/strike were 
thought by Defendant's counsel to be critical to a determination of its motion for summary 
judgment all that was necessary was to simply vacate and reset the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment and properly set the motion to exclude/strike. 
There was no reason that the motion for summary judgment had to be heard on the 13th of 
December, 2013. The argument that the motion to strike/exclude had to be heard on that date as 
an absolutely necessary precursor to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment is only that 
- argument. There is no basis in law or in fact for the argument. Time as to either motion was not 
of the essence. There was clearly time within the existing trial time schedule for the orderly 
processing of all motions. Indeed, even if not so, the time schedule should not affect fundamental 
fairness to either party. Due process requires fundamental fairness of process.* 
The Court erred in accepting the Defendant's argument that adherence to the time 
* Indeed, in extraordinary circumstances, a motion to shorten time well might have been in order. However, this was 
not a case of extraordinary circumstances. There was no emergent need here to proceed on December I3, 2013 with 
either motion, let alone both of them. 
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of Rule 7 (b)(3)(A) would interfere with the expedient examination of the Rule 56 
the to to exclude/strike to come 
on 13 to the 
Plaintiffs fundamental fairness in this case and to require Defendant to follow the rules. Rules 
designed and intended to promote fairness and to avoid prejudice to one or the other of the 
parties. 
The clear purpose of Rule 7 (b)(3)(A) is to allow a party the opportunity for and the time 
to prepare an orderly, proper and thoughtful response to the proposition put forward by the 
proponent of a motion. The fourteen ( 14) day requirement of the rule is to allow the opposing 
party that opportunity. Here, the Plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity afforded them by 
Rule 7 (b )(3)(A) to deal with the issues raised by the motion to exclude/strike. 
To be sure, Defendant will no doubt argue that a few days notice of the hearing rather 
than fourteen (14) days as required by Rule 7(b)(3)(A) on the motion to exclude/strike was all 
that Plaintiffs needed to avoid prejudice to them in avoiding or countering the motion to 
exclude/strike. Au Contraire. If a few days notice is sufficient or the equivalent of the fourteen 
(14) day rule expressed in 7(b)(3)(A) it would have been a simple matter for the rule writers to 
say so. They did not. In addition; it is abundantly clear that fourteen (14) days would have 
allowed Plaintiffs the opportunity to examine the motion to exclude/strike; examine as well the 
bona fides of the motion and to take corrective action to avoid or meet the arguments advanced 
by the motion. Thus, with adequate time to prepare, to re-examine the proffered affidavits the 
Plaintiffs likely could have determined the need to seek to address the issues raised by the motion 
by a motion of their own seeking to remedy the deficiencies in their affidavits raised by the 
motion to strike/exclude. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 7 
That opportunity to redress, correct or avoid was denied Plaintiffs by the untimeliness of 
had a few motion 
was to 
motion, study the affidavits and seek such action (for example, a motion to supplement response 
affidavits) as would avoid the case being determined on a whole lot less than a complete record. 
That lack of opportunity, of time is what Rule 7(b)(3)(A) seeks to avoid. That the Rule 
was ignored caused prejudice and undue lack of equal legal positioning to Plaintiffs - it caused as 
well an unfair advantage to Defendant. An advantage that would not have been obtained had 
Defendant followed the Rule. It would seem to this writer that if prejudice to the Plaintiffs could 
not be found facially on Rule 7(b)(3)(A) (See Parkside, supra) and the failure to comply with it 
by the Defendant that prejudice in the lack of opportunity to meet the motion by the lack of time 
and the unfair advantage to Defendant in not having to contest the issues with Plaintiffs well and 
properly prepared and noticed is as patent as are the words of the Rule. 
V. 
DAMAGES 
The affidavit of Frank Tiegs indicated damages well in excess of three million dollars for 
the failure of Defendant to have possession of the farm in 2011 and part of 2012. * 
Of course it is noted that there was no opportunity to examine the testimony of Mr. Tiegs. His 
affidavit and its conclusions were accepted in whole by the Court without Plaintiff being 
afforded any opportunity to cross-examine or to examine those numbers and conclusions. Indeed, 
* The seeming inconsistency between paragraphs 21 & 22 of Mr. Tiegs' affidavit was not examined. In paragraph 21 
he asserts a loss of$3,790,548.50; in paragraph 22 he asserts a loss of$4,333,726.30. The Courts failure to 
determine which paragraphs of damage Mr. Tiegs meant to be determined is likely explained by the Defendant's 
requesting "only" $3,000,000.00 in damages; a number less then either figure set out in paragraphs 21 or 22. Of 
course, a purist might suggest that before damages of$3,000,000.00 are awarded on a Sumn.1.ary Judgment motion 
that it might be well to in fact determine what are the damages are in fact. A fact not found by the Court. 
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was 
to 
one iota of supporting data or materials.* 
The Court accepted Mr. Tiegs damage numbers of either $3,790,548.80 (paragraph 21) or 
$4,333,726.30 (paragraph 22) and asked counsel how much of that the Defendant wanted on the 
grant of summary judgment. The Defendant asked for three million dollars and that is what the 
Court awarded. All without a hearing, a trial or the opportunity even for argument otherwise. It 
was a number thrown out and a number caught Supra. 
Leaving aside the issue of how Mr. Tiegs calculated the numbers and the palpably absurd 
notion that Defendant would have realized a net profit of over 39% of the purchase price in its 
first year of operation of a not historically well managed or well maintained farm the decision to 
award that sum requires some reflection. 
Three million dollars were placed in an escrow account. That is clear. The purpose of the 
three million dollars is contested by the parties; however, the Court found and concluded that the 
purpose was solely to pay Defendant damages for delay in possession. The Plaintiffs urge that 
finding and conclusion to be in error, as was the order directing the payment of those dollars to 
Defendant. 
(A) 
Firstly, the Plaintiff would suggest that the order directing the release by Guaranty Title 
of the funds held in escrow is ultra fines mandati. Guaranty Title is not a party to this case. 
* The first questions that Mr. Tiegs might well have been asked were "How many farms do you know of that had a 
return on investment of over thirty-nine (39) percent the frrst year they were owned, notwithstanding the condition of 
the fann at the time of purchase? Where are they? 
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non ought not be subject to an order of a Court in a case unrelated to it. In 
248 1 Supreme 
The district court correctly held that it had no personal jurisdiction to grant the motion. 
There must be personal jurisdiction over a party before a court may enter an order against 
it, whether in a civil or criminal case at 500 (emphasis added). 
See also Judge Leonard Hand's 
[N]o court can make a decree which will bind any one but a party; a court of equity is as 
much so limited as a court of law; it cannot lawfully eajoin the world at large, no matter 
how broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro tanto brutum 
fulmen, and the persons enjoined are free to ignore it. It is not vested with sovereign 
powers to declare conduct unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited to those over whom it gets 
personal service, and who therefore can have their day in court. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. 
Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir.1930). 
The order should be set aside. 
(B) 
The Court in dealing summarily with issues raised at a summary judgment hearing failed 
to consider the whole of the issues. 
Thus, the Court concluded that the three million dollars escrowed were solely for the 
benefit of paying the Defendant damages for loss or delay of possession of the farm. 
However, in doing so the Court failed to consider the import on those three million 
dollars of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Addendum No. 4: "(2) in the event any 
deposited funds remain with Guaranty Title, Inc. after exhaustion of all of seller's remedies and 
defenses and of all appeals thereafter with respect to the removal of the title matters disclosed in 
the exceptions, the company shall have the option to interplead such funds into a judicial District 
Court for the State ofldaho proceeding." 
Clearly that sentence anticipates and means that the Plaintiffs (sellers) are to be provided 
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the three million dollars amount of their costs having the exceptions removed from 
judgment awarding all of the three million dollars to Defendant should have been allowed the 
opportunity, per addendum 4, to explicate their costs and attorney fees and then, even if 
otherwise correct, the judgment in favor of Defendant should have been reduced by the costs and 
attorney fees of Plaintiff which would per the clear language of Addendum 4 have come first. 
Plaintiffs were denied that opportunity by the Court's entry of judgment without considering its 
full impact. Another reason why summary judgment should not have been entered. 
Clearly there was a genuine issue of fact as to the entitlement to, and availability of, the 
three million dollars. For those reasons alone, if not others, summary judgment should have been 
denied. 
VI. 
JAY CLARK AFFIDAVIT 
Notwithstanding, that Rule 56 (c) does not provide for reply affidavits* the Defendant 
provided an affidavit of its attorneys which had appended to it affidavit material filed in an 
earlier case, not involving these parties, that Defendant asserted contradicted affidavit testimony 
of Jay P. Clark filed in this case. 
In its oral decision respecting the motion to strike and disregard portions of the affidavit 
of Jay Clark, the Court made it clear on the record that it found his affidavit filed in this case to 
be contradicted by and inconsistent with the affidavit testimony he had proffered in the earlier 
* The first two (2) sentences of Rule 56 (c) speak to affidavits. The third (3) sentence is inapposite to affidavits and 
the fourth (4) sentence provides that the moving party may file a reply brief. There is no reference to reply affidavits. 
Clearly, had the rule writers intended reply affidavits they could have said so; the other references to affidavits 
demonstrate the awareness of affidavits. 
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case. it was 
lUvOU'-v and creditability. 
to holding 
weighing 
To the degree that the Court was finding that the proffered earlier affidavits of Jay Clark 
were contradicting of and inconsistent with the affidavit filed in this case the Court erred in 
ignoring the requirements of Rule 613 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence which provide that 
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the 
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded 
and an opportunity to interrogate the witness therein. Here neither happened. 
A basic tenant of Rule 613 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is that of fairness to the 
witness and the other party. The use of prior inconsistent statements is to be part of the 
truth finding process of litigation; not a ploy to snare a silenced witness and an unaccounted for 
opposite party. Fundamental fairness and common sense provide the basis for Rule 613 -
witnesses ought be allowed the opportunity to explain their testimony in the context of 
seemingly inconsistent prior statements. Here neither the witness nor the Plaintiffs were afforded 
that opportunity. 
In Openshaw v. Adams, 92 Idaho 488, 492, 445 P.2d 663, 667 (1968) the Supreme Court 
held that upon introduction of evidence which seemingly impeaches or contradicts witness's 
testimony, a witness should be permitted reasonable opportunity to explain the impeaching 
evidence. The Court noted that "[I]t is settled that upon introduction of evidence which 
seemingly impeaches or contradicts a witness's testimony, the witness must be permitted a 
reasonable opportunity to explain the impeaching evidence." Openshaw v. Adams, 92 Idaho 488, 
492, 445 P.2d 663, 667 (1968). 
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purpose requiring foundation for impeachment is to avoid unfair surprise and 
an to correct testimony or 
see 
Idaho Placer Min. Co. v. Green, 14 Idaho 249, 93 P. 954,955 (1908), the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that where a written document is offered in evidence to impeach or contradict a witness, it is 
error to refuse such witness an opportunity to explain the same. 
In addition, the Court clearly evidenced at the December 13, 2013 hearing on the motion 
to exclude/strike the testimony of Jay P. Clark that it was weighing the statements contained in 
the affidavit filed in this case as contrasted with the testimony put forth by Jay P. Clark in the 
affidavits in the earlier, unrelated case. 
The trial court should not assess the credibility of affiants. Baxter v. Crane, 135 Idaho 
166, 172, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). 
Judging credibility is not appropriate during summary judgment proceedings where no 
evidentiary hearing has been held. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 249, P.3d 
857(2011). 
It is not proper for the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant at the summary 
judgment stage when credibility can be tested in court before the trier of fact. Stanley v. Lennox 
Indus., Inc., 140 Idaho 785, 102 P.3d 1104 (2004). See also Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168,868 
P.2d 496 (Ct. App. l 994)(when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is not within the 
trial court's province to assess the credibility of an affiant or deponent when credibility can be 
tested in court before a trier of act); Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668,670,691 P.2d 1283, 
1285 (Ct. App. 1984 )( even when the court will serve as trier of fact, credibility determinations 
"should not be made on summary judgment if credibility can be tested by testimony in court 
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(Ct. App. 
can be 
court 
The Court should not have allowed the "prior inconsistent statements" offered by 
Defendant to be received absent a real opportunity (for example, a trial on the merits) for the 
affiant to explain the seeming inconsistencies and it should not have engaged in weighing the 
evidence provided by the various affidavits of Jay P. Clark.* Weighing of evidence at a summary 
judgment proceeding is simply out of keeping with the function and purpose of a summary 
judgment proceeding. To be sure, the Court also opined that even if Jay Clark would have leased 
more of the farm ground to Defendant in year 2011 than he did, that fact was of no moment 
because the Defendant had no obligation to lease ground from an improperly holding over tenant 
in order to mitigate its damages. The determination that there was no need for Defendant to 
mitigate its damages in that manner was a conclusion of law based on a scant, incomplete record. 
A record that could not be completed by virtue of the grant of the summary judgment motion. Jay 
Clark's affidavit filed in this case raised at least two (2) genuine issues of material facts that 
should have precluded Summary Judgment. 
First, Jay Clark based on historical and personal knowledge of the "farm" set forth his 
view that the claimed possible profits by Mr. Tiegs were grossly exaggerated. Mr. Clark, who 
had operated the farm for years, had vastly superior knowledge than did Mr. Tiegs as to what 
could have been grown on the farm in 2011 & 2012and what the yields, costs and profits for 
those crops would have been. A genuine issue of fact contention as to damages. The Court totally 
discounted his testimony in that regard based apparently on its view that he lacked credibility 
* This supposes that the earlier affidavits of Jay Clark were properly before the court by virtue of a reply affidavit of 
Defendant's attorneys. A suggestion the Plaintiffs do not agree with. 
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because of was an improperly holding over tenant. That is 
a a fact was 
is error. 
The second genuine issue of fact raised by Jay Clark in his affidavit in this case was as to 
the issue of mitigation. He asserted that he would have leased more of the farm to Defendant in 
2011. Thus, allowing mitigation of damages. The Court opined that the Defendant had no 
obligation to rent ground from an improperly holding over tenant in order to mitigate damages. 
Jay Clark set forth a genuine issue of fact and the Court improperly and without a record 
concluded as a matter of law that in these circumstances there was no need to mitigate. That is 
not in keeping with a Summary Judgment. 
VII. 
KEN EDMUND'S AFFIDAVIT 
The Court granted Defendant's motion to exclude the affidavit of Plaintiffs' expert Ken 
Edmunds. Also, the Court granted the motion to strike and disregard the affidavit testimony of 
Ken Edmunds. 
Basic to the Court's granting of the motion in regard to Ken Edmund's affidavit was its 
apparent conclusion that he was not an expert and that he was not entitled to rely on underlying 
data from other sources to reach his conclusions. The Court suggested a "lack of foundation" to 
support 
several of the conclusions reached by Mr. Edmunds and suggested as well that some of his 
conclusions were based on hearsay and thus not admissible. 
Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 934 P.2d 20 (1997) suggests that what the court did here 
was in error. Thus, the Court here clearly looked at "foundational issues" and used the term 
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considered and opinions held by Mr. Edmunds. 
not 
sure, must 
However, the testing of admissibility ought be based on thoughtful analysis of the proffered 
testimony; not a summary, cursory, unquestioned view of the proffered testimony in a vacuum of 
evidence. 
Ken Edmunds' affidavit indicates at page 1 that he was retained as an "expert" by 
Plaintiffs. The only basis for concluding otherwise was the argument of counsel for Defendant 
and the Court's weighing of the evidence presented in the remainder of Mr. Edmunds' affidavit. 
If Mr. Edmunds's expertise was to be questioned, it should have been done in a trial with the 
opportunity for laying the foundation for his expertise afforded. That was not done here. Mr. 
Edmunds was determined not to be much of an expert based solely on a reading of his affidavit.* 
The striking of portions of Mr. Edmunds' affidavit was based on "lack of foundation" 
shown in the affidavit. A determination at odds with Hines and contrary to the teaching of Rules 
703 and 705 of the Idaho Rules of evidence. 
Here the Court apparently determined that Mr. Edmunds was not an expert and thus 
Rules 703 and 705 of the Rules of Evidence were not applicable. Had the Court considered Mr. 
Edmunds an expert for purposes of reviewing his affidavit, then Rules 703 and 705 would have 
been apposite and the stricken materials from his affidavit received based on those rules. By 
disregarding Mr. Edmunds as an expert, the Court did not permit him the normal respect of 
permitting opinions or inferences by experts without providing the underlying fact or data (Rule 
* Indeed, the Defendant was aware of Mr. Edmunds by virtue of Plaintiffs disclosure and his earlier involvement in 
other related cases. ff Defendant wished to question his "expertise" the opportunity for deposition/discovery was 
well in hand. 
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Indeed, would suggest that if the Court had concerns in that regard that the 
a manner summarily 
were to 
than weighing the evidence presented by him in the affidavit, which the Court did here, the 
opportunity for further foundation as to his challenged expertise should have been provided. A 
hearing on a motion for summary judgment is not to be used as a vehicle to inhibit a party from 
having its day in court before a trier of fact. If the Court had questions about Mr. Edmunds' 
expertise it should have asked those questions - it should not have summarily concluded that he 
lacked expertise by looking solely at what he said, or more importantly, did not say in that 
affidavit. 
But for the fact that the Court gave no credence to the issues raised by Mr. Edwards, the 
fact remains that his affidavit raised genuine issues of material fact that should have precluded a 
grant of Summary Judgment. 
VIII. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT R. BENNETT 
The court determined that several of the statements in the affidavit of Robert F. Bennett 
were hearsay and/or lacked foundation and thus would not be admissible. That determination 
without granting Plaintiff the opportunity to lay a foundation. 
Frankly, the lack of foundation argument seems misplaced. Thus, paragraphs 4, 6, 8 and 
11 have as much foundation as do any of the other paragraphs of the affidavit. For example, the 
statement (2 )" I am duly licensed as a real tor by the state of Idaho, employed by LeMoyne Realty 
and Appraisals, Inc., and I maintain office in Mountain Horne, Idaho" is grounded on no more 
"foundation" then, is the statement in paragraph ( 4) " I learned that Lance Fu11k had been a tena.11t 
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on that farm during the 2010 growing season and so I approached Mr. Funk to see whether he 
purchasing the farm." Obviously, paragraph 4 could have included, 
BEEN 
MATTER, THE DATE OF THE CONTACT, THE MEANS OF THE CONTACT AND 
WHETHER SOMEONE ELSE WAS PRESENT. THE REST OF THE "FOUNDATION" IS 
THERE. 
As to paragraph (11) "Just before Christmas, I told Buyer's representative, Tim Tippet, 
with whom I had extensive dealings in negotiating the sale/purchase of the farm, that if Buyer 
would not accept Jay P. Clark's lease the Hilliards would just have to send the earnest money 
back. Mr. Tippet replied "Oh no, we can't do that," because of Buyer's desire to complete the 
sale before year end, 2010 in order to take advantage of the 1031 Tax Deferred Exchange." 
stricken for "lack of foundation". The Plaintiff would simply suggest that the only foundation 
lacking is the means of the communication (telephone, in person, email or whatever and who 
else, if anybody, was privy to the conversation). Surely, the opportunity to supply that bit of 
information in an effort to get to fact finding would not be inordinate. 
The paragraph is important because it demonstrates the incorrectness of the Court's 
observation that consideration for Addendum 4 was the going forward with the original purchase 
agreement and the earlier down payment. (See Response Brief of Plaintiffs). The statement is not 
offered for the truth of the statement that there was an ongoing I 031 exchange in the offing but 
rather the state of mind of Defendant in making the statement. Indeed, as Rule 801 (d)(2) would 
indicate, the statements of Mr. Tippet as described by Robert Bennett are admissions of a party 
opponent in a representative capacity and are thus not hearsay. 
The statement set out in paragraph 13 of Mr. Bennett's affidavit ascribed to Sheryl 
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of Guaranty Inc. stricken by the Court as hearsay would similarly not be hearsay 
as it was a statement of a representative of the party opponent. Ms. Reyment was representing 
transaction 1s no reason not 
representative status for each. *Indeed, Rule 801 based on the likelihood of truth in the statements 
a party opponent (representative) would seem to apply to Ms. Reyment's statement. 
IX. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES C. HILLIARD 
(A) 
The Court did not strike paragraph 17 of Mr. Hilliard's affidavit but stated the statement 
was "unclear" as a concept of what Addendum 4 was. With respect, the statement in the 
paragraph is clear. Mr. Hilliard states that he was aware that he (they) could provide clear title by 
paying the Clarks $2,950,000.00. While the Defendant argues that was not the purpose of 
Addendum 4, nobody can argue with what Mr. Hilliard thought it was. That he may have been 
wrong in that conclusion does not vitiate his reasoning or make it unclear. 
Indeed, there is nothing in this record that would indicate that he was wrong in his 
conclusion. In mid December 2010 before the sale to Defendant, sellers became aware that if 
they paid the Clarks $2,950,000.00 they could convey clear title to Defendant. That fact is simply 
not in dispute and is not unclear. The Court is weighing evidence in reaching the conclusion as to 
paragraph 17. 
(B) 
The second sentence of paragraph 18 of Mr. Hilliard's affidavit is stricken as hearsay. 
* As above, had sufficient time been allowed Plaintiffs to meet the motion to strike/exclude an affidavit from Ms. 
Reyment herself might well have been obtained that would have avoided the ascription of hearsay to the statement 
found by the court to be hearsay in Mr. Roberts' affidavit. 
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statement from Mr. Bennett the Mr. Tippet replied that Buyer could not do that [ accept 
earnest desire to close ... agreement before end 
1 
offered for the truth of the statement as to the 1031 exchange but rather as to the state of the mind 
as to the issue of going forward with the sale and whether there was any "new consideration" 
given the Hilliards (paragraph 23). Thus, not hearsay. As to consideration, please see Plaintiffs' 
Response Brief. 
(C) 
A portion of Mr. Hilliard's paragraph 20 is stricken(" ... we believed our sole obligations 
to Buyers were to provide clear, unencumbered title to Crystal Springs Farm ... ") because the 
court determined it not to be relevant to the intent of Addendum 4. 
While the Court would be entitled to its view of what Addendum 4 said or did not say 
after a trial on the merits, so would be Mr. Hilliard. That Mr. Hilliard's view and the Court's 
view did not agree does not make Mr. Hilliard's view irrelevant - it would make it wrong in the 
Court's view. 
This is rather simply weighing evidence - a function not in keeping with a motion for 
summary judgment. 
(D) 
While the Court did not strike paragraph 22 of Mr. Hilliard's affidavit, it indicated that it 
was not relevant unless there was ambiguity in Addendum 4. 
Simply put, the Court determined there was no ambiguity in Addendum 4. It could only 
reach that conclusion by weighing the evidence. Again; the issue on summary judgment is not 
weigbing evidence. If evidence needs be weighed it needs be weighed by a trier of fact. The 
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summary judgment is not a trier of 
no new 
consideration for the obligation to deposit $3,000,000.00 of the $9,500.000.00 purchase 
price ... ") was stricken as a "legal conclusion". Again, the Court determined that going forward 
with the "deal" and the earlier down payment was consideration for Addendum 4. That was the 
Court's view in granting the motion for summary judgment. It was not and is not the view of Mr. 
Hilliard. He was stating as a fact that he and his wife received no new consideration for the 
obligation to deposit $3,000,000.00 of the purchase price in escrow. That is a simple fact - not a 
legal conclusion. The Court concluded as a matter of fact and law, albeit without hearing 
evidence, that no new consideration was necessary to support Addendum 4. After a trial and after 
full exposition of the issues that might well still be the same conclusion of the Court. However, 
that does not change the fact as stated by Mr. Hilliard, that they received "no new consideration". 
Indeed, it would appear that the Court was weighing the evidence of consideration and 
concluded that weighing by finding adequate consideration in the going forward with the deal 
and the earlier payment of a down payment. Again, all without a hearing as to those issues of fact 
or law. 
The Plaintiffs simply suggest that such weighing of evidence has no place in a motion for 
summary judgment. 
The question is not whether Mr. Hilliard was right in his conclusion as to a lack of new 
consideration for Addendum 4 but rather whether he raised an issue of genuine fact that needed a 
mindful, thoughtful and thorough undertaking of the issues by a trier of fact to determine. He did. 
Rather than. looking at the statement as raising a fact at issue the Court weighed that statement 
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it wanting fact and in law. A decision, once again, not in the province of the Court 
Similarly the Court determined paragraph 26 of Mr. Hilliard's affidavit to be "irrelevant" 
unless Addendum 4 was ambiguous; which the Court found ( again without trial or presentation 
of evidence) it was not. 
Paragraph 26 simply recites facts. Those facts are not, nor can they be seriously disputed. 
The Court ruled those facts as set out in paragraph 26 to be irrelevant. Irrelevant not facially but 
because the Court concluded that there was no ambiguity in Addendum 4 and that therefore the 
issue of whether providing clear title was irrelevant because the addendum, in the Court's view 
was unambiguous, and only provided for the payment of damages to the buyer on account 
of the failure of being able to possess the farm on the date of the purchase and that the provision 
of clear title had nothing to do with Addendum 4. * 
In any event, the Court's conclusion that Addendum 4 is unambiguous is a finding of fact 
or a conclusion of law outside the parameters of a motion for summary judgment. It was fact 
finding not a determination of whether there were facts that needed to be found. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court instead of measuring whether the Plaintiffs' arguments raised genuine issues of 
material fact in the face of the motion for Summary judgment indulged the desire of Defendant 
and determined instead the merits of the issues raised by Plaintiffs, £g lack of consideration, 
mitigation of damages, measure of damages etc, and concluded that they lacked merit and 
* Indeed, by granting summary judgment, the Court precluded trial of the cause of damages to Defendant. Thus, 
were the damages and delay in possession caused by Plaintiffs or were the damages caused, at least in part, by the 
failure of Defendant to appropriately and adequately obtain possession of the farm by moving onto the farm by legal 
action (which was tried abortively) or otherwise? 
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the motion Judgment. 
only as to whethJ, such iss~7) needful of resolution exist. 
DATED this \ day of ~ cqL , 201~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 ) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON 
RE REQUEST TO NOTICE HEARING 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclairnant. ) 
) 
MATTHEW GORDON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
l. I make this affidavit and the statements herein based upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant/Counterclairnant Murphy Land 
Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") in the above-captioned matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON RE REQUEST TO NOTICE 
HEARING- I 
45522.0004.6344653. l 
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A is a true accurate of an I sent to 
Shurtliff and Weldon S. Wood, counsel for Plaintiffs James and Barbara Hilliard, on 
January 13, 2014. I have received no response to that e-mail. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the Complaint for 
interpleader filed by Guaranty Title, Inc. in this Court on January 6, 2014, Case No. CV 2014-06 
(without exhibits). 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
Matthew Gordon 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) ~ 
:;.:i 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 21:"'st day of January, 2014. 
~-
C~_Lz: 
Name: Tammy N. Miller 
Notary Public 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My commission expires: 05/30/2014 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON RE REQUEST TO NOTICE 
HEARING-2 
L.VO-~:;)':f-::>L'l:L 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of January, 2014. I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON RE REQUEST TO 
NOTICE HEARING by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
[Attorneys for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
1 7 Al verno Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail 
B'Telecopy: 208-343-3282 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com 
~lecopy: 650-298-8097 
Matthew Gordon 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON RE REQUEST 
HEARING-3 
NOTICE 
J?age 4 
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Matthew Gordon 
From: Steve Schossberger 
Sent: Monday, January 2014 2:15 PM 
To: Karl (karlshurtliff@gmail.com); weldon 
Cc: Matthew Gordon 
Subject: Hilliards / Murphy Land [IWOV-DMSMSG1.FID618370] 
Good afternoon Karl and Weldon: 
I see that your memorandum in support of motion to alter/amend the Judgment is due Wednesday, 1/15/2014. 
We checked with the court today and the next available hearing date with Judge Huskey is February 14, 2014, at 10:30 
a.m. in Murphy. 
We will be noticing a motion for that day/time. 
Please concurrently submit a Notice of Hearing on your motion for 2/14/2014 at 10:30. 
Thank you, Steve 
STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER 
Partner 
direct 208.388.4975 
mobile 208-830-356 l 
fax 208.954.5260 
web hawleytroxell.com 
email ssch ossberger@hawleytroxell.com 
HAWLEY TROXELL 
Attorneys and Counselors 
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may be confidential, privileged, 
attorney work product, or otherwise e,empt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the 
employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this 
message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at ZOB.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message. 
1 
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_F}~P.M. 
340 East t 111 North 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-4412 
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144 
Idaho State Bar No. 1479 
JAN O 6 2014 
ANGELA BARKELL, CLERK 
TRINA AMAkVi 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
GUARANTY TITLE, INC., an Idaho Case No. CV-~~ Q{.p 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES C. HILLIARD and BARBARA G. 
HILLIARD, husband and wife, and 
lvfURPHY LAND COMP ANY, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
For cause of action against the defendants, the plaintiff complains and al !eges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is now and has been during all times mentioned herein a corporation 
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Idaho, with its principal 
place of business located in Mountain Home, Elmore County, Idaho. 
2. Plaintiff is authorized by the State of Idaho to do business as a title insurance 
company and an escrow company. 
3. Defendants James C. Hilliard and Barbara G. Hilliard are husband and wife, and 
are residents of the state of Florida, and are sometimes hereinafter referred to as "Hilliards". 
EXHI~TB 
t.J .( I 
ASSIGNED JlHJC:kE 
THOMAS J. RYAN 
is an 
1s referred to as "Murphy Land". 
5. Hilliards owned real property located in Owyhee County, Idaho, that they sold to 
Lance Funk and/or his assignees and which contract for sale was assigned to Murphy Land. 
Hilliards and Murphy Land agreed that Plaintiff herein would be the escrow holder concerning 
funds involved in their contract for the sale of said real estate. 
6. Billiards and Murphy Land have each transacted business in the state ofidaho as 
defined in Idaho Code§ 5-514. 
7. Because of the ownership of real property in the state ofidaho, the sale of said 
real property located in the state ofidaho and the placing of funds in escrow with Plaintiff in 
the state of Idaho, HiJliards and Murphy Land have subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the state of Idaho. 
8. Venue is proper in this case because the real estate in question is located in 
Owyhee County, Idaho, and because Hilliards and Lance Funk andior his assignees agreed in 
the RE-11 Addendum No. 4 that is attached hereto as Exhibit E that in the event the funds 
mentioned herein that were deposited with Plaintiff remain with the Plaintiff and all remedies, 
defenses and appeals therefrom have been exhausted, the Plaintiff can interplead the funds into 
a Judicial District Court for the State of Idaho. 
9. James C. Hilliard and Lance Funk and/or Assignees entered into an agreement 
entitled RE-23 Commercial Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated 
November 5, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and by this reference made 
a part hereof, by which James C. Hilliard agreed to sell certain real property located in Owyhee 
County, Idaho, to Lance Funk and/or Assignees. 
Page 7 
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Funk 
2010; granting to 
11 
HiHiard a buy-back option on 
the real property or a portion of the real property, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
B and by this reference made a part hereof. 
11. Billiards and Lance Funk and/or Assignees entered into RE-11 Addendum# 2 
dated December 28, 2010, extending the closing date from December 28, 2010, to December 
29, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C and by this reference made a part 
hereof. 
12. Hilliards and Lance Funk and/or Assignees entered into RE-11 Addendum# 3 
dated December 29, 2010, extending the closing date from December 29, 2010, to December 
3 0, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and by this reference made a part 
hereof. 
Page 8 
13. Hilliards and Lance Funk and/or Assignees entered into RE-11 Addendum No. 4 
dated December 30, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E and by this reference 
made a part hereof. Pursuant to this agreement, Hilliards deposited Three Million Dollars 
($3,000,000.00) from the procee.ds due them from the sale of the property with the Plaintiff 
herein as trustee, the receipt of which was acknowledged by Plaintiff. The sum of Three 
Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) placed with Plaintiff by Billiards is still in the possession of 
Plaintiff. 
14. A dispute has arisen between the defendants Billiards and Murphy Land, which is 
evidently the assignee of Lance Funk. Each claims to be entitled to the Three Million Dollars 
($3,000,000.00), or a portion thereof, which is being held in escrow by Plaintiff. 
15. an against Murphy 
and for the Owyhee, No. 13-
03004 seeking the Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) being held in escrow by the Plaintiff 
herein. Murphy Land filed a counterclaim alleging that it was entitled to the Three Million 
DoJlars ($3,000,000.00). 
16. Judgment was entered in Case No. CV-13-03004 on December 19, 2013, in favor 
of Murphy Land awarding it the Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) that is being held in 
escrow by Plaintiff herein. A copy of said Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit F and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
17. In addition to the Judgment entered in Case No. CV-13-03004, the Court also 
entered on December 19, 2013, Order Directing Release of Funds Held in Escrow to Murphy 
Land Company, LLC, authorizing and directing Plaintiff herein to immediately release and 
disburse to Murphy Land the Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) being held by Plaintiff 
herein. A copy of the Order Directing Release of Funds Held in Escrow to Murphy Land 
Company, LLC, is attached hereto as Exhibit G and by this reference made a part hereof. 
18. Plaintiff herein and its attorneys have received correspondence from the attorneys 
for Murphy Land requesting that Guaranty Title transfer the Three Million Dollars 
($3,000,000.00) being held by it to Murphy Land. 
19. Plaintiff herein and its attorneys have also received correspondence from the 
attorneys for the Hilliards demanding that it not comply with the Court's order and threatening 
to seek damages from P]aintiff if it does comply with the Court's order. Hilliards insist that the 
Court's order is not final and that Plaintiff should not comply with the order. 
Page 9 
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escrow at been willing to to 
such person or persons as should be lawfully entitled to receive them and to whom Plaintiff 
could safely and without hazard to itself pay them. Plaintiff offers to deposit said sum of 
money into Court at such time and under such conditions as the Court may order and direct. 
.1:1age 10 
21. Plaintiff is not in collusion with either of defendants touching the matters in 
controversy in this cause. Plaintiff is not in any manner indemnified by defendants or either of 
them. Plaintiff has not brought this suit in interpleader at the request of the defendants, or 
either of them, but has filed of its free will to avoid being harassed and subjected to double 
costs and liability and to avoid unnecessary suits. 
22. Plaintiff has employed the law firm of Hall, Friedly & Ward as its attorneys to file 
this interpleader action and prosecute it to an end. The Plaintiff requests that the Court award to 
it its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred herein pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-32 l, 
23. This action for interpleader is Plaintiffs only means of protecting itself from 
litigation in which it has no interest. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court: 
(a) Enter an order or a decree requiring defendants to interplead in this cause and to 
settle their respective rights to the sum that is now in the possession of Plaintiff; 
(b) Enter an order or a decree authorizing and directing Plaintiff to pay into the Court 
or the Clerk of the Court the sum of Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00); 
( c) Enter an order or a decree restraining defendants, and each of them, from 
commencing in any court any action against Plaintiff in which defendants, or either of them, in 
any manner seeks to recover the sum that is now in possession of Plaintiff, or any part of the 
sum, or to recover any sum 
or 
(d) Enter an order or a decree forever releasing and discharging Plaintiff from all 
liability to defendants in this cause on account of the matters relating to this cause; 
(e) Determine the amount ofreasonable attorney fee and costs to be paid to the 
attorneys of Plaintiff for services to Plaintiff in this cause and enter an order or a decree 
authorizing and directing these attorney's fees and all court costs and expenses incurred by 
Plaintiff in this cause be paid out of the above-mentioned sum of Three Million Dollars 
($3,000,000.00); and 
(f) Grant such other and further relief as it deems just and proper. 
DATED this ti day of ~v7 ,201-1_. 
I 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
By~~:~ 
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SS, 
) 
Sheryl Reyment, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that she is the secretary of the 
plaintiff named in the foregoing complaint, that she has read said complaint, knows the contents 
thereof, and believes the facts therein stated to be true. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ti day of~( , 201 f. 
~,.,.a'''p"R"lger,.,A ~ v~ 
,..,"'\ ~· l}]I) "#';,.t O / 
.l ,..,,,.. ........ .,._i.,..~ Notar Pliorldah~ 
:: .... ,, ... \ f / ~oTA~,r \ \ Residing at Mountain Home, Idaho 
:*: -·- •*:: Mycommissionexpires: S-1--3-?-<.'JL5 : \ : : -
\ -.. J>us1,,c l l 
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Steven F. Schossberger, ISB No. 5358 
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: 208.344.6000 
Facsimile: 208.954.5260 
Email: sschoss berger@haw leytroxell .com 
mgordon@hawleytroxell.com 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclairnant 
FILE 
_---.A.M.::L~o _PM 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclairnant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED 
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and 
through its undersigned attorneys of record, moves this Court to issue an amended Order 
directing the release to Murphy Land of the $3,000,000 deposited with the clerk of the Court by 
Guaranty Title, Inc. Oral argument is requested. 
MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT- I 
45522.0004.6434862. l 
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MEMORANDUM SUPPORT MOTION ISSUE Al\!IENDED ORDER 
Murphy Land hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to 
Issue an Amended Order ("Motion"). The basis for the Motion is that this Court has already 
determined that Murphy Land is entitled to the $3,000,000 held in escrow by Guaranty Title, 
Inc., and this Court has previously Ordered that such funds be immediately disbursed and 
released to Murphy Land. By this Motion, Murphy Land merely seeks an Amended Order 
directing the Clerk of the Court -- rather than Guaranty Title, Inc., the party to whom the 
previous Order was directed -- to disburse and release those funds to Murphy Land. 
On December 17, 2013, this Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of Murphy Land 
and awarded Murphy Land the $3,000,000 amount that was, at the time, in the possession of 
Guaranty Title, Inc. Also on December 17, 2013, this Court issued an Order authorizing and 
directing Guaranty Title, Inc. to immediately release and disburse the $3,000,000 to Murphy 
Land. Guaranty Title, Inc. subsequently filed an interpleader action with this Court, and on 
February 28, 2014, this Court (Honorable Judge Nye) granted its Motion to Deposit the 
$3,000,000 with the Clerk of the Court. Pursuant to that ruling, the $3,000,000 will be deposited 
with the Clerk of the Court. As a result, Murphy Land respectfully requests that this Court issue 
an Amended Order, consistent with the Court's earlier ruling on Summary Judgment and its 
earlier Order to Guaranty Title, Inc., that directs the Clerk of the Court to immediately disburse 
and release the $3,000,000 to Murphy Land. 
MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT-2 
45522 0004.6434862. I 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
~~ By~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclairnant 
MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT-3 
45522.0004.6434862. I 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of February, 2014, I caused to be served a 
Lrue copy of the foregoing MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
17 Alverno Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
Jay R. Friedly 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
[Attorneys for Plaintif!J 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
DE-mail 
0 Telecopy: 208-343-3282 
D U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com 
0 Telecopy: 650-298-8097 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail: jay@hfwlaw.com 
0 Telecopy: 208.587.3144 
Matthew Gordon 
MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM 
SUPPORT-4 
Oct 26 01 M Karl Shurtliff p.1 
I 
I 
i 
MAR O 6 2014 
Karl Shurtliff I
I 
Anomey at Law I 
• l 
816 West Bannock, Suit~ 200 
P.O. Box 1652 i· 
Boise, Idaho 83701-165 
Telephone (208) 343-29 0 , 
Fax (208) 343-3282 , : 
Attorney for Plaintiffs j I 
• IN TJ DISTRICT COURT oJ THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI T 
OF TIIE ST Aj~E OF IDAHO, IN ANh FOR THE COUNTY OF O YHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA ILLIARD, 
Case No. CV 13 03004 
.vs. 
I 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RESPONSE TO MOTI01 TO ISSUE 
AMENDED ORDER 
MURPHY LAND CO!Al'J.Y, LLC, 
An Idaho Limited Liabil ty Company, 
Defe dant. 
I 
The Plaintiffs ob ect to the motion of Defendant for an Amended Order· 
I • 
I 1 
h 1re~ith. j 
DATED This __._ _ __._day o!i ~ 
I 
I 
2014. 
M. \KARL SHURTLIFF I Attprney for Plaintiffs 
I I 
RESPONSE TO t.mnf N TO ISSUE AMENDrD ORDER -1 
I i 
I I 
I I 
1 1 h 1 (J I ' vr,;u 
A 
LEAK 
Oct M. Karl Shurtliff 208 282 
i 
RTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I hereby certify that od this day of h il~ , 2014, t I served a true 
• I 9 
· and correct copy of the toregoing docwnent by method indicated below and ad essed to each of 
I the followmg: 
Steven F. Schos:r:rger i 
HA V/L~Y TROt:~L EJ\.TNIS & HA WLfY, LLP 
877 Mam Street,~Smte 1000 : 
Boise, Idaho 837 I I . 
I 
I 
I 
f 
I 
I 
I 
i 
i 
I 
I 
RESPONSE TO MOT!Or TO ISSUE AMENDEf ORDER -2 
I : 
[~] 
[ J Facsim le 
[ ] Hand livery 
3'7/2014 1.~z·z~ ~M 
Steven F. Schossberger, ISB No. 5358 
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: 208.344.6000 
Facsimile: 208. 954.5260 
Email: sschossberger@hawleytroxell.com 
mgordon@hawleytroxell.com 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
_Fl~Zi.M. 
MAR O 7 2014 
&~~:_:~LL, CLERK 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON 
IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
MATTHEW GORDON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I make this affidavit and the statements herein based upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land 
Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") in the above-captioned matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 1 
45522.0004.6450337 l 
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3, as 1 is a true accurate the s 
Transcript of Proceedings for the hearing held in this case on December 13, 2013. 
4. I was present at hearing on February 28, 2014 in the Interpleader Action filed in 
this Court by Guaranty Title, Inc., Case No. CV-2014-06, when the Honorable Judge Nye orally 
granted Guaranty Title, Inc.' s Motion to Deposit with the Clerk of the Court the $3,000,000 it 
held in escrow. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
Matthew Gordon 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 2 
45522.0004.6450337. l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this try of March, 2014, I caused to be served a tme 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MA ITHEW GORDON IN SUPPORT OF 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
17 Alvemo Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
Jay R. Friedly 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
[ Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 E-mail 
l".B"ielecopy: 208-343-3282 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
D E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com 
!!3"felecopy: 650-298-8097 
0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 E-mail: jay@hfwlaw.com 
~copy: 208.587.3144 
Matthew Gordon 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 3 
~age 1 to 1 of 128 
l' -isty Davenport 
District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for the County of Owyhee 
- - - - - - - - - - - X 
James Hilliard, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Murphy Land Company, LLC, 
Defendant. 
- - - X 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Held on December 13, 2013, before 
Case No. 
CV-2013-3004-M 
Honorable Molly J. Huskey, District Court Judge. 
Reported by 
Laura L. Whiting 
CSR No. 688 
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1 
sheets 
3 2014 1:33:23 PM ~~risty Davenport 20 
Page 2 to 2 of 12s 
APPEARANCES 
FOR PLAINTIFF HILLIARDS 
M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-2900 
FOR DEFENDANT MORPHY LAND COMPANY 
STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER 
MATTHEW P. GORDON 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 344-6000 
* * * * * * 
·~4-5928 Page 6 
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3 
1 IDAHO 
2 Friday, December 13, 2013, 1:19 p.m. 
3 
4 THE COURT: Canyon County Case 2013-3004, 
5 James and Barbara Hilliard versus Murphy Land 
6 Company. 
7 MR. SHURTLIFF: Your Honor, Kari Shurtliff 
8 representing the Hilliards. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shurtliff. 
10 Mr. Gordon, Mr. Schossberger, here for 
11 the Murphy Land Company. 
12 MR. GORDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: It may take me just a minute to 
14 gather all of these papers. 
15 Okay. Now, a couple of motions in this 
16 case as well. Assuming my list Is correct, there 
17 has been a motion for summary judgment filed by 
18 the Defendants. There has been a motion to strike 
19 portions of the affidavits filed In response to 
20 that motion for summary judgment. And I 
21 received -- It was filed yesterday; I received it 
22 this morning -- a motion to amend the reply to the 
23 counterclaim. 
24 Is there any other motion pending 
25 before the Court that I have not articulated? 
4 
1 Mr. Shurtliff? 
2 MR. SHURTLIFF: None that I'm aware of, Your 
3 Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Schossberger? 
5 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: You mentioned the motion 
6 to strike. There's two independent motions, one a 
7 motion to strike and disregard, and then the --
8 well, to exclude expert opinion, and then the 
9 other objections to evidence and motion to strike. 
10 But other than that clarification, no, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Now, rf I understand this 
12 correctly, Mr. Shurtliff -- well, I wlll just say 
13 this. There ls-· the motion to amend the reply 
14 has not been noticed up for a hearing, that I have 
15 seen. 
16 MR. SHURTLIFF: It was not. 
17 THE COURT: So it Is not before the Court 
18 for a decision today. So I will note that it's 
19 been filed, but we will not be making any 
20 decisions on that at this time. 
21 So again, the court has read all of the 
22 documents. I want to break this into pieces, 
23 gentlemen, only so that I can make sure that I 
24 have a handle on it. We're going to start first 
25 with the motions to strike portions of the 
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affidavits. Because in order for me to rule on 
the summary judgment decision, I have to determine 
whether or not there are affidavits either in 
support or response. So we have to go through the 
affidavits in the first instance anyway. 
So I have read, Mr. Schossberger -- I 
don't know if you want to provide additional 
argument. Let's see lf I have all the filings, 
and we can break them up and do them one motion at 
a time. 1'11 just let you start with whichever 
one you want. 
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
On the --
MR. SHURTLIFF: Your Honor --
THE COURT: I'm sorry. 
MR. SHURTLIFF: If I may interrupt. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. SHURTLIFF: I apologize. But we object, 
Your Honor, to taking up this motion. There was 
no order to shorten time. It was not timely filed 
pursuant to rule -- the 14-day rule that was 
referenced earlier. Seems apposite to me. It was 
a motion to strike and exclude and all of that, 
and that was only flied this week. There's no 14 
days notice. 
6 
THE COURT: I don't think they were filed 
this week. I think they were filed before, but 
let me just double-check the stack of stuff here. 
Do you have the filing dates handler 
than I do, Mr. Schossberger? 
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Yeah. December 5th. 
Yeah, Your Honor, procedurally, we received the 
opposition by the Plaintiffs to our motion for 
summary judgment on Monday, December 2nd. And a 
couple days of that, then flied a motion to strike 
and disregard the motion to exclude, because this 
hearing was set on the 13th. 
So In a summary judgment proceeding, 
the way that the rules work under Rule 56, In 
order to preserve those objections, or to make 
those objections prlor to the hearing, It can only 
be done between when you got the opposition. And 
then when you get someone's reply, it doesn't 
provide for the 14 days. 
If -- at this time, given this 
objection, I would orally move to shorten time and 
to have It heard. Mr. Shurtliff has had a -- he 
was served on Thursday, the 5th, with It. He's 
had it for over a week. There's been no 
opposition lodged by the Plaintiff In response to 
-~risty Davenport Page 8 
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1 either the motion to strike and exclude the expert 
2 or the motion to strike and disregard the 
3 affidavit testimony. 
4 
5 
6 
The Court is correct that under the 
Ryan v. Beisner and the other court 
listed !n the motion to strike, that the 
7 Court must first make a preliminary determination 
8 as to the admissibility of evidence under 
9 Rule 56(e) before it can consider and decide upon 
10 the merits of the summary judgment. And that's 
11 what I would request that the Court do at th is 
12 time. 
13 And further, I would add that the way 
14 that we've laid out the objections, it's very 
15 detailed. It's specific. By citation of 
16 paragraph to statement listing the objection, I 
17 was going to submit based upon the written 
18 paperwork to the Court and the proposed order, 
19 which goes by the specific paragraph, the 
20 statement, the objection, and then the Court's 
21 ruling. 
22 And unless there were any specific 
23 questions the Court had into any specific 
24 objection, I was going to submit that way. And 
25 certainly Mr. Shurtliff having the motion and the 
8 
1 way that it's styled can certainly present any 
2 argument that he has right now to any of those 
3 specific objections, just like you would have at 
4 the time of a trial. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. So --
6 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, Your Honor, if 1 may. 
7 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Shurtliff. 
8 MR. SHURTLIFF: I appreciate the quality of 
9 Mr. Schossberger's work and hls motion to exclude 
10 and all of that. But the rather simple fact of 
11 the matter is that Rule 7(b){3} says what it says. 
12 Motions filed 14 days, opportunity for response. 
13 That's procedural due process. That's what that 
14 rule Is all about. It's not about whether 
15 Mr. Shurtliff can, at the last minute, on the last 
16 day, argue because of the well laid out motion. 
17 The simple fact of the matter is, Your 
18 Honor, that if they received a reply, and If they 
19 thought there was something untoward about the 
20 affidavits, then certainly their motions are 
21 appropriate. But there's no law that says they 
22 had to hear the motion for summary Judgment today. 
23 I know it was set, but the motion for 
24 summary judgment doesn't obviate Rule 7(b)(3). 
25 The motion for summary judgment was set 
age 7 to 10 of 128 
9 
1 significantly -- some time ago. Phone call, 
2 couple phone calls, suggestion of reset the motion 
3 for summary judgment would have taken care of that 
4 problem. 
5 I'm not prepared to argue their motions 
6 to exclude. What's why we have 7(b)(3). 14 days. 
7 Give me an opportunity. I'm not maybe as swift as 
8 some folk, but that's what the rule says; and 
9 that's what we think it ought to have. And to 
10 orally move to shorten time at the -- the minute 
11 before the suggested taking up of his -- seems to 
12 me to put the Plaintiff here in an awkward and 
13 unseemly position to argue motions that are 
14 significant. 
15 And I'm not suggesting they're not 
16 significant, but we're not prepared to argue 
17 those, and the rule doesn't seem to suggest that 
18 we ought to be. The rule says we have 14 days' 
19 notice. We don't. Or an order to shorten time. 
20 If there had been an order to shorten time --
21 they're familiar with it; had one in the other 
22 case. We might have been anticipating what we're 
23 doing. But I -- it puts us at significant 
24 disadvantage, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Well, I'm just looking quickly 
10 
1 to see lf there is any case law governing this 
2 issue. It would have been appropriate, 
3 Mr. Shurtliff, if you were objecting -- it would 
4 have been nice to see an objection before today. 
5 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, 1 appreciate that, 
6 Your Honor. We got it Monday, and we're here 
7 Friday. I --
8 THE COURT: Well, the notice of hearing was 
9 filed December 5th. 
10 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, we got it Monday. 
11 So -- so -- but I -- you know, I -- I recognize we 
12 could have flled an objection, but why do you have 
13 to object to somebody not following the rules? 
14 THE COURT: Well, I think there is a 
15 question about whether 7(b) applies to motions to 
16 strike affidavits In a reply In a summary judgment 
17 proceeding, which is what I'm probably not going 
18 to be able to find this quickly. Trying to --
19 trying to look at this right now. 
20 Mr. Schossberger, when was the motion 
21 for summary judgment filed? 
22 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: November 15th, 2013. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Notice of hearing was 
24 filed November 18th. 
25 All right. Here's what the Court Is 
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to Court will find the motion for 
2 summary judgment was filed November 15th. The 
3 opposition, along with the attached affidavits, 
4 was filed November 29th. The motions to strike --
5 !et me just make sure that's correct. 
6 The memorandum in opposition was filed 
7 November and that included the affidavits of 
I 8 Jay Clark, James Hilliard, Robert Bennett, and I 9 Mr. Edmunds, along with a copy of the addendum. 
10 The Defendant's motion to strike and 
11 exclude the affidavit of Ken Edmunds and portions 
12 of the affidavit of Jay Clark was filed 
13 December 5th, as was the motion to strike the 
14 affidavit of Mr. Edmunds. I think it was 
15 Mr. Edmunds, parts of Mr. Hilliard, as I 
16 recollect, parts of Jay Clark. And the reply was 
17 filed 12/6. 
18 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: And there was an 
19 additional affiant, Robert Bennett. 
20 THE COURT: Robert Bennett. The Court's 
21 going to look at the rules. 
22 Rule 7(b)(3) says unless otherwise 
23 ordered by the Court, which order may, for cause 
24 shown, be made on ex parte application, or as 
25 specified elsewhere in the rules. Written motion 
12 
1 has to be filed with the Court and served so that 
2 it is received no later than 14 days before the 
3 time specified for the hearing. The motion Is 
4 supported by affidavits; it shall be served and 
5 filed no later than seven days before the hearing. 
6 Rule 56(c), motion for summary 
7 judgment. The motion and affidavit and briefs 
8 shall be served at least 28 days before the time 
9 for the hearing. The adverse party can reply, and 
10 if it desires to serve opposing affidavits, it has 
11 to do so 14 days before the date of the hearing. 
12 Shall also serve an answering brief 14 days prior 
13 to the hearing. And then the moving party has 
14 seven days to file any kind of reply brief. Those 
deadlines have all been met. 15 
16 Under 7(b){3)(B), it says when a motion 
17 is supported by affidavits, the affidavits shall 
18 be served with the motion. Any opposing 
19 affidavits have to be filed no later than seven 
20 days. 
21 It does not seem that you can read 
22 7(b)(3) and 56-3 (sic) together, because It would 
23 always require, then, a change in the date of the 
24 summary judgment hearing. Because unless the 
25 affidavits are already on file, they don't come in 
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1 until 14 days before the hearing. And so if they 
2 come in 14 days before the hearing, that 
3 necessarily means we'd have to move the summary 
4 judgment motion hearings. Otherwise there's no 
5 way under 56(c) that you can comply with 7(b){3). 
6 So here's what we're going to do. The 
7 Court's going to go forward on the motion today. 
8 The Court is going to find that when you read 
9 7{b)(3) and Rule 56(c) together, in addition to 
10 the case law requirements that In order to rule on 
11 a motion for summary judgment, the Court has to 
12 first determine whether or not the affidavits 
13 contain admissible evidence, either in support of 
14 or in opposition to the motion for summary 
15 judgment. 
16 Those will necessarily, if they're 
17 coming from the adverse party, always come 14 
18 days -- well, unless somebody files in advance, 
19 but they're not required to be filed more than 14 
20 days. Therefore, the Court is going to find that 
21 under Rule 56(c), that a motion to strike 
22 affidavits for purposes of a summary judgment 
23 motion does not fall within the Rule 7(b)(3) 
24 requirement in the absence of any sort of 
25 objection or motion -- objection to the hearing on 
14 
1 that motion. 
2 That motion was filed December 6th in 
3 this case. There was no objection or opposition 
4 filed to that notice of hearing. The parties are 
5 all here today, prepared to go forward on the 
6 motion for summary judgment. And so we will go 
7 forward with the motion on summary judgment. And 
8 we will start first with the motion to strike the 
9 affidavits. 
10 Mr. Schossberger, which do you wish to 
11 go forward with first? 
12 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 The motion to strike and disregard the affidavit 
14 testimony of Ken Edmunds, Jay Clark, 
15 Robert Bennett, and James C. Hilliard, I will 
16 submit, based upon the written memorandum and the 
17 order to the Court. 
18 And on the second motion to strike and 
19 exclude the affidavit of Ken Edmunds with the 
20 attachment, and then portions of the affidavit of 
21 Jay Clark, that's submitted based upon the rules, 
22 as argued to the Court, that the affidavit 
23 evidence needs to be admissible under Rule 56(e). 
24 The affidavit of Ken Edmunds saying I've been 
~· 26~ retained as an expert witness does not satisfy 
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1 that requirement of Rule 56(e). It also doesn't 
2 with Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. 
3 Furthermore, Plaintiffs should be 
4 the Court at this juncture from 
5 disclosing an expert witness, because didn't 
6 comply with the Court's scheduling order. They've 
7 never disclosed an expert witness prior to just 
8 submitting these affidavits. 
9 They were issued an Interrogatory No. 3 
10 that asked the Rule 26(b)(4) requirements, which 
11 also are in connection with Idaho Rule of Evidence 
12 705, saying if you have an expert witness, tell me 
13 who he Is, his or her qualifications, all the 
14 facts, data, basis for your opinions, what records 
15 are you relying upon, et cetera. 
16 The response to Interrogatory No. 3, 
17 which was provided back in early October, was not 
18 yet decided. There's been no supplemental answer 
19 ever provided by the Plaintiffs at Interrogatory 
20 No. 3. 
21 Idaho Rule of Evidence 705 specifically 
22 states that if you have propounded an 
23 interrogatory, seeking the requirements of 
24 26(b)(4), that the expert must disclose all of 
25 that information prior to being able to testify. 
16 
1 The affidavit of Ken Edmunds, clearly he has not 
2 been properly disclosed, he is not qualified in 
3 the affidavit as an expert, and the attachment to 
4 his affidavit Is pure hearsay and should be 
5 excluded. 
6 And then the same arguments are 
7 advanced with respect to the identified portions 
8 of Jay Clark's affidavit found in paragraph 6(c), 
9 d, e, and paragraph 7, where he's purporting to 
10 offer hls beliefs as having farmed on the property 
11 and make expert opinions. Those also don't 
12 qualify under Rule 702 and should be excluded. 
13 Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Schossberger. 
15 Mr. Shurtliff, we will start with the 
16 Court's concern about why this Individual -- well, 
17 Mr. Edmunds, potentially Mr. Bennett, and 
18 Mr. Clark, to the extent you're proffering him as 
19 an expert, why those have not been disclosed 
20 pursuant to the Court's schedul!ng order. 
21 MR. SHURTLIFF: Your Honor, as to 
22 Mr. Edmunds, I think that there was a notice of 
1 23 disclosure of a rebuttal witness flied. 
I 24 THE COURT: That doesn't -- disclosure of a 
25 rebuttal witness 
17 
1 disclosure for an expert. 
2 MR. SHURTLIFF: Disclosure of a rebuttal 
3 expert witness in regard to and in opposition to 
4 Mr. Tiegs, Your Honor. The Plaintiff's case 
5 didn't require, doesn't necessitate, won't have an 
6 expert witness on his behalf in his case in chief. 
7 The only need for an expert from this side of the 
8 table ls in rebuttal to Mr. Tiegs' alleged 
9 expertise. That's what Mr. Edmunds was Indicated 
10 to be. 
11 THE COURT: And when was that disclosure 
12 made? 
13 MR. SHURTLIFF: I believe -- well, I don't 
14 have a copy of the Repository with me, but I think 
15 that was on or about October the 29th. I think, 
16 Your Honor, in addition --
17 THE CLERK: There was a dlsclosure rebuttal 
18 expert filed October 29th. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. And what -- what -- I'm 
20 sorry, Mr. Shurtliff. And as part of that 
21 disclosure, what was flied? 
22 MR. SHURTLIFF: Just that we would -- his 
23 name, identification, and a CV. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. SHURTLIFF: And we -- because at that 
18 
1 time we didn't know exactly what --
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. SHURTLIFF: -- what we would do. So we 
4 did it. 
5 Now, in addition, the suggestion that 
6 we didn't supplement the interrogatory's correct, 
7 as far as it goes. But not supplementing an 
B Interrogatory, as the Court knows, you're supposed 
9 to seasonably reconcile your information as you 
10 glean It. We haven't done it, I'll concede that, 
11 but been doing other things. But that's for 
12 trial. That doesn't say you have to do It in 
13 advance of filing an affidavit for summary -- in 
14 response to a summary judgment. 
15 So I think, Your Honor, the -- it's --
16 I think It's a little bit disingenuous, frankly. 
17 And I don't like that word particularly, but I 
18 think ft's a little bit disingenuous to suggest 
19 that Mr. Edmunds wasn't known to Murphy Land In 
20 the context of this case. We filed It; we noticed 
21 it. What else would he be for? So they had since 
22 October 29th to examine him, depose him. There's 
23 been no request for any information from him or 
24 whatever. 
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he just says he's an expert, well, his CV was 
attached. He is an expert. I think he -- I think 
he testified in an earlier case here as an expert. 
So he's not an unknown commodity. 
Now, you might not like his expertise, 
and I can understand all that, but that goes to 
cross examination. That's one of the reasons we 
ought to have trials, Instead of summary judgment 
motions, In my opinion. But that's just an 
opinion. 
But if you don't -- they knew where he 
was -- they knew who he was, where he was coming 
from, and what he had to say. And we set it out 
in an affidavit. He said, I am an expert. 
Now, Mr. Schossberger says, well, that 
ain't enough. Well, lf you don't think he's an 
17 expert, take his deposition or put him on the 
18 stand and have him testify and take him apart. 
19 But anybody can be an expert, as the Court knows, 
20 experience, scientific knowledge, whatever. He 
21 said, I'm an expert. If you don't think he is, 
22 dispute it. But there's nothing in the record 
23 that would suggest he isn't. 
24 And so, Your Honor, his report that he 
25 attached with his affidavit in reply to the 
20 
1 summary judgment motion is that of an expert. If 
2 you don't like it, cross examine him, depose hlm, 
3 whatever. But you don't disregard ft because he 
4 didn't elicit -- you didn't elicit some maglc 
s words from him as to his, quote unquote, 
6 expertise. He Is an expert until this Court --
7 this Court, not Mr. Schossberger; not me -- this 
8 Court determines otherwise. And that hasn't been 
9 done. 
10 Mr. Edmunds is an expert, his affidavit 
11 is that of an expert, his report Is that of an 
12 expert, and It should be received. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Shurtliff, I just have a 
14 couple of questions for you. 
15 MR. SHURTLIFF: Sure. 
16 THE COURT: Just find the pieces of paper 
17 here to ask them to you. And I'm sorry I'm not 
18 more organized. 
19 Okay. Now, I'm looking at Mr. Edmund's 
20 affidavit. And the only information that I have 
21 in the affidavit -- it's really very short. He 
22 makes the affidavit based on his knowledge. He's 
23 been retained as an expert. And then attached ls 
24 the summary analysis. Is there -- is there any 
25 other Information from Mr. Edmunds that 
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1 missing? 
2 MR. SHURTLIFF: Not in that affidavit, Your 
3 Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Now, my question relates 
5 to this, Mr. Shurtliff. As I look at Mr. Edmund's 
' 5 It says he served as a business consultant 
7 since 1987 after leaving International accounting 
8 firms to form h!s own practice, and he's worked 
9 with various businesses and industries, with a 
10 primary focus on high net worth individuals and 
11 their investments. He's advised on debt mezzanine 
12 and equity financing structures, Including initial 
13 public offerings. 
14 As I go on and read that paragraph, as 
15 I look at his summary, I'm unclear. I was just --
16 eventually the question I'm going to ask you, I'm 
17 unclear about his expertise in farming. 
18 MR. SHURTLIFF: I would -- I would think, 
19 Your Honor, that the unclarity of his expertise in 
20 farming would be correct. But the expertise Is In 
21 looking at the underlying date of the information 
22 and materials and relating them, collating them, 
23 and putting them together. It's not -- I don't 
24 think he is an expert in farming. He's an expert 
25 in numbers, and in dealing with numbers, and in 
22 
1 getting to source of numbers and those sorts of 
2 things. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. SHURTLIFF: So I would agree with the 
5 Court that he probably couldn't grow a Shepody 
6 potato from any other kind, but I think he knows 
7 numbers and the abillty to get to the numbers as 
8 to those matters. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. And so, for example, as 
10 I'm looking at the summary, it appears that he got 
11 some of his Information from external sources, 
12 such as information from the University of Idaho. 
13 Where is that foundational material -- I know 
14 there's a lot of documents here, and I may have 
15 missed it. Has the underlying foundation for his 
16 summary -- have I missed it somewhere ln the 
17 record? 
18 MR. SHURTLIFF: No, you have not, Your 
19 Honor. It was not asked for. And I think under 
20 the rules of evidence, It would be an appropriate 
21 matter to examine Into an expert's underlying 
22 lnformatlon and data and sources to determine 
23 their quality and so forth. But I don't think 
24 It's necessary that it be laid out in advance of 
that Inquiry. Rule 703, rules of seem 
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1 to support that -- or seems to suggest that to me, 
2 at least. That's my reading. 
3 THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at 705. So 
4 appears that he can testify without 
5 disclosure unless the Court requires otherwise, or 
6 under the rules of discovery, those Items 
7 were either requested and/or disclosed. So I 
8 would turn to Mr. Schossberger or Mr. Gordon. Has 
9 the Defendant inquired about -- through any 
10 discovery requests if there's going to be any 
11 experts for the basis or foundation of their 
12 opinions? 
13 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Yes, Your Honor. As 
14 provided to the Court, attached to my affidavit 
15 regarding this motion to strike, Mr. Shurtliff 
16 served the response to the first set of 
17 interrogatories, request for production, request 
18 for admission on October 2nd. And I have provided 
19 to the Court a copy of the response to 
20 Interrogatory No. 3. 
21 Interrogatory No. 3 states: Please 
22 identify each person you may call as an expert 
23 witness at the trial of this matter. State the 
24 subject matter on which the expert is expected to 
25 testify. State the substance of the opinions to 
24 
1 which the expert is expected to testify. State 
2 the underlying facts and data upon which the 
3 expert opinions are based. rdentify ail documents 
4 upon which your expert may rely to express any 
5 opinions in this matter. And identify all 
6 individuals that your expert may rely upon to 
7 express any opinion in this matter. Response not 
8 yet decided. 
9 Also In request for production No. 3: 
10 Please produce a complete file of any expert 
11 retained by you for this litigation, and expected 
12 to testify at trial, including all bills, 
13 correspondence, emails, drafts, notes, research 
14 documents, materials relied upon, and each report 
15 of the expert's findings, opinions, or conclusions 
16 thereon. 
Response to production No. 3: 17 
18 Objection, attorney/client privilege. However, an 
19 appropriate response to a pretrial order. These 
20 materials will be supplied. To be sure, these 
21 materials have not as of yet been fully coilected. 
22 THE COURT: Now, October 2nd is before the 
23 disclosure of the expert on October 28th or 29th, 
24 whenever that was. So it appears -· and I guess 
25 I'm trying to understand, Mr. Shurtliff. How come 
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1 the basis upon which Mr. Edmunds is basing his 
2 opinion has not been disclosed to the Defendants? 
3 MR. SHURTLIFF: I suppose, Your Honor, that 
4 the -- that the answer is It hasn't, pursuant to 
5 the interrogatory. But the affidavit and the 
6 report were provided In the context of the summary 
7 judgment motion, which are a little bit different. 
8 So I would suggest, Your Honor, that we're kind of 
9 backing away -- the Interrogatory needs to be 
10 supplemented. 
11 THE COURT: Mm-hmm. 
12 MR. SHURTLIFF: When? 
13 THE COURT: Well, my -- my expectation would 
14 be that it's at the time that the experts --
15 perhaps even if not when the expert is disclosed, 
16 although I certainly think that's best practice, 
17 if you have it, I would imagine certainly by 
18 November 27th when you want to proffer an expert 
19 opinion that you should be complying with the 
20 interrogatory requests. 
21 MR. SHURTLIFF: December, I think. But 
22 the -- 29th. Well, the -- I respect your 
23 position, but r don't know that I agree with ft, 
24 Your Honor. You know, there's only so much one 
25 can do, and I think the purpose of the 
26 
1 interrogatory, the purpose of the discovery, the 
2 purpose of the rules, are so that we have 
3 knowledge. We know what's happened. We're not 
4 shocked. We're not surprised. We're not 
5 ambushed. 
6 Well, is there any shock, surprise, or 
7 ambush? l don't think so. They were provided 
8 Mr. Edmund's affidavit. They never·· they moved 
9 to strike. They didn't move to ask for the 
10 underlying data, information, or facts, or the 
11 persons at the University of Idaho with whom he 
12 spoke. They never noticed up a quick deposition. 
13 So I ·- again, there's only so much 
14 anybody can do. But that could have been done. 
15 And I don't know that the failure to supplement 
16 the interrogatory in a seasonably, timely manner, 
17 is critical to an affidavit In a summary judgment 
18 motion. We've got two more months before the 
19 trial. 
20 THE COURT: Well, we don't really have two 
21 months when you take out sort of the Christmas 
22 holiday season. We have six weeks. 
23 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, some people don't 
24 celebrate that. 
25 THE COURT: the Court 
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1 session for most of those days. 
2 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Your Honor, I'd just 
J additionally add for the record that the Court's 
4 order dated October 11th, 2013, in 
5 4 and required both the Plaintiff 
29 
1 And there is another that parties should not be 
2 prejudiced by the action or inaction of a -- one 
3 of the other parties. 
4 This case was reset in October from, I 
5 believe, a January to a February setting. And 
6 Defendant to disclose expert witnesses, 5 Court required, and it appears that the parties 
7 together with their opinions and reports. So that 7 all got copies, that experts were to be disclosed 
a was an express requirement from the Court, not 8 by October 11th for the Plaintiff, and by 
9 just identify who the person is and attach a CV, 9 October 29th for the Defendant. 
10 but together with their opinions and reports. And 10 It appears that the Plaintiff has 
11 that was not done; never has been done. 11 disclosed a rebuttal expert. They did that on 
12 THE COURT: By what date, Mr. Schossberger? 12 October 29th. But to date there has still been 
13 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: The Plaintiff was to 13 nothing complying with the Court's order to 
14 disclose expert witnesses, together with their 14 disclose all of the documents that be complied 
15 opinions and reports, by October 11, 2013. The 15 with. The Court is therefore, for failing to 
16 last day for Defendant to disclose rebuttal 16 comply with the Court's scheduling order, I am 
17 experts, together with their opinions and reports, 17 going to strike the summary of Mr. Edmunds. 
18 is October 25, 2013. I 18 Alternatively, the Court would strike any and all 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 19 pieces of hearsay Information in that document, 
20 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, I can say in that 20 and we will go through it as follows. 
21 regard, Your Honor, that by October 25th or the 21 Starting with the beginning of the --
22 earlier date, the facts or opinion -- we had 
23 Identified Mr. Edmunds as an expert, and that was 
24 it. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
28 
1 MR. SHURTLIFF: Wasn't no more. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Now, let me go back a 
3 lfttle bit, because the Court sent out a 
4 stipulation for pretrial scheduling, The Court 
5 sent out an order for pretrial conference on 
6 September 5th. The Court also noticed that in 
7 that document that it would be sending out a 
8 stipulation that the parties had ten days or else 
9 the Court would be setting the deadlines. 
10 The Court got a letter from the 
11 Defendant's attorney in this case indicating that 
12 he had done this stipulation, that they'd tried to 
13 reach you, Mr. Shurtliff. Didn't get a response. 
14 So the Court entered an order for purposes of 
15 pretrial planning, and we did that on 
16 October 15th, is when we had the last hearing. 
17 And so we thereafter issued the dates that were 
18 there. 
19 Now, that order required that any and 
20 all experts be disclosed by the dates given, and 
21 that one of the sanctions for them is exclusion of 
22 the experts. There's a couple of competing issues 
23 at stake here. One of them is that the parties 
24 have a complete and fair opportunity to be heard 
1 25 on the merits of their case, all of the parties. 
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22 start with the first paragraph, the Court is going 
23 to assume -- that may be incorrect, but I'm going 
24 to do it nonetheless -- that that information is 
25 obtained from the affidavit of Frank Tiegs. And 
30 
1 I'm just going to double check that. 
2 So we're going to assume that that 
3 information comes from the affidavit of Mr. Tiegs, 
4 which Is something that, if I were not otherwise 
5 excluding the summary, would be admissible. The 
6 second paragraph, the first sentence will be 
7 stricken on the grounds that it's hearsay. It's 
8 relying upon information from a third source not 
9 yet disclosed. And therefore, the second sentence 
10 has no foundational basis. That would also be 
11 stricken. 
12 MR. SHURTLIFF: I'm sorry. You lost me, 
13 Your Honor, where you were. 
14 THE COURT: The Kenneth D. Edmunds 
15 attachment to affidavit. I'm on the second 
16 paragraph. 
17 MR. SHURTLIFF: Loss of income 2011? Or a 
18 more typical rent per acre. 
19 THE COURT: A more typical -- yeah, I'm 
20 there. 
21 MR. SHURTLIFF: Okay. I'm sorry. 
22 THE COURT: A more typical rent per acre. 
23 The Court Is going to strike that, lack of 
24 foundation and hearsay. And therefore, that 
renders lack of second 
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beginning therefore Tiegs. So in sum 
2 the second paragraph is stricken. 
3 I don't find anything particularly 
4 objectionable in the third paragraph under loss of 
5 rents, because it doesn't seem, really, to be 
6 much. Under loss of income 2011, 
7 Mr. Schossberger, on the last sentence, first 
8 paragraph that begins this plan Indicates a net 
9 Income, I could not -- and again, I apologize if 
10 I've missed It -- the net income of $810,000 from 
11 the related company, is that in Mr. Tiegs' 
12 affidavit? Because I can't find that number. 
13 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: We're looking, Your 
14 Honor. 
15 It doesn't look like these numbers on 
16 Mr. Edmunds' attachment are a match to the numbers 
17 testified to by Mr. Tiegs. 
18 THE COURT: The Court Is going to strike 
19 that sentence, the second sentence, first 
20 paragraph, under loss of income 2011. It does not 
21 appear to be based on the affidavit of Mr. Tiegs. 
22 There Is no indication of where that Information 
23 was derived. Therefore, there is a lack of 
24 factual foundation. It would not be admissible as 
25 it Is listed at tria I. 
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1 In the third paragraph, it claims that, 
2 second sentence, Tiegs asserts these potatoes, due 
3 to early harvesting, would have sold for a 
4 higher-than-market average price of $320 per ton. 
5 I'm trying to determine -- the Court is going to 
6 strike the words higher than market average price. 
7 There is nothing in this affidavit that indicates 
8 that that is a higher than market price. There Is 
9 no factual support attached to this affidavit. 
10 There is nothing in Mr. Tiegs' affidavit. So it 
11 is unclear from where Mr. Edmunds derived that 
12 information. Therefore, It is hearsay and/or not 
13 factually supported. 
14 The Court is going to strike under the 
15 third paragraph the sentence it appears that the 
16 timing is such that he could have obtained 
17 alternative land. That appears to be speculative. 
18 It also appears to be refuted by an affidavit by 
19 Mr. Clark that he was not going to be willing to 
20 work with other Individuals, So there does not 
21 appear to be --
22 MR. SHURTLIFF: Which affidavit Is that, 
23 Your Honor? That's -- that's not an affidavit In 
24 th is case. 
25 THE COURT; There is, actually, an affidavit 
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1 in this case. It was filed with 
2 Mr. Schossberger's reply -- I'm sorry. It was --
3 MR. SHURTLIFF: Indeed, that's correct. 
4 THE COURT: Sonry, it was -- let me find it. 
5 MR. SHURTLIFF: By Mr. Schossberger. 
S THE COURT: I don't believe it It may 
7 have been Mr. Gordon. I just can't remember which 
8 of them filed with It. 
9 MR. GORDON: Your Honor, it was filed with 
10 the second affidavit of Matthew Gordon, 
11 December 6th. 
12 THE COURT: That's what I thought. The 
13 second affidavit contains an earlier affidavit by 
14 Mr. Clark, wherein Mr. Clark makes -- testifies 
15 that he was not willing to share the land with 
16 Mr. Tiegs, that it would have been unworkable to 
17 have the parties working the iand together, and so 
18 although in his affidavit as part of this motion 
19 for summary judgment he indicates he was willing 
20 to lease the land. The earlier affidavit filed by 
21 Mr. Clark indicates that, in fact, that was not 
22 what he was willing to do. 
23 Secondly, and we haven't gotten to this 
24 yet, but there is no requirement that -- that I 
25 could find that Murphy Land was required to lease 
34 
1 the land from the individual who wrongfully chose 
2 not to vacate in order to mitigate their losses. 
3 So we will be striking that paragraph. Therefore, 
4 we will also be striking the last sentence on the 
5 first page of the summary that begins the net 
6 income, because that no longer has any factual 
7 support. 
8 On the loss of income 2012, first 
9 paragraph, it's the third sentence. It begins: 
10 This farm has historically been known as a less 
11 productive farm. The Court Is going to strike 
12 everything thereafter. There is nothing In 
13 Mr. Tiegs' affidavit that indicates the farm is 
14 less productive due to the rocky soil. There is 
15 nothing in Mr. Tiegs' affidavit that indicates it 
16 has higher than normal operating costs, and 
17 therefore his loss calculation is not accurate. 
18 Again, Mr. Edmunds says that his 
19 affidavit is based only on his review of Mr. Tiegs 
20 there -- and he does not Indicate he has relied on 
21 any other Information to reach this conclusion. 
22 Then we go to other Issues. We will 
23 strike the second sentence, in light of the lack 
24 of foundation for his summary and loss of income 
25 2012. We will also strike the remainder of that 
of 35 sheets 
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1 paragraph. We have no factual Information about 
z what the University of Idaho uses, whether they're 
3 entitled to any kind of subsidy because they're a 
4 public institution. There simply is lack of 
5 foundation and/or hearsay to justify that 
6 paragraph. 
7 Simiiariy, with the second paragraph, 
8 starting with the sentence based on the University 
9 of Idaho crop information, the remainder of that 
10 will be stricken. There's a lack of factual 
11 foundation and/or hearsay. 
12 The Court is going to strike the 2013 
13 operating results. There's been no foundation 
14 laid that that would be a -- although there is a 
15 conclusory statement It may be a better and more 
16 reliable estimate. There's no factual foundation 
17 to explain why it would be a more factual 
37 
1 Now, the Court is going to note 
2 specifically that any farming that occurred on 
3 2011, 2012, the Court is not going to allow 
4 Mr. Clark to rely on that. It has been determined 
s that he was wrongfully in possession of that 
6 property during that time frame. In fact, that he 
7 is now going to use his wrongful possession as a 
8 basis to defeat the motions, the Court is not 
9 going to permit. 
10 So the Court finds no objection to the 
11 statement Murphy Land may not have commenced 
12 operation until May 2012. The Court is going to 
13 strike the remainder. There is no basis of 
14 knowledge. It's not clear where the foundation 
15 for that is coming from. The Court also finds it 
16 to be irrelevant. 
17 Subsection B, to the extent it requires 
18 foundation. So on alternative grounds, the Court 18 an expert -- it requires expert testimony under 
19 is striking the affidavit of Mr. Edmunds. 19 702, 705, the Court will strike it. Mr. Clark has 
20 Now, we'll go through the Mr. Bennett 20 not been disclosed as an expert. 
21 affidavit. And I apologize that this Is taking so 21 Now, separately, he may simply be the 
22 long, gentlemen. 22 Individual who farmed It, and may have separate 
23 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Before we do that, Your 23 knowledge. But the Court finds that whether or 
24 Honor, If we could -- on the affidavit of 24 not the ground had been prepared for planting of 
25 Jay Clark, was it inconsistent to also address 25 crops in 2011, and whether the Owyhee Farming 
36 38 
1 proffered and purported expert opinions objected 
2 to In paragraph 6(c), d, e, and 7? Is the Court 
3 so inclined? 
4 THE COURT: Yes. I just need to find that 
5 affidavit. I had Mr. Bennett's affidavit In front 
6 of me, which is why I was going to go with that 
7 one. 
8 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. We can go with 
10 Mr. Clark's affidavit. It is subsection -- or 
11 paragraph 6. Starting with paragraph 6, to the 
12 extent Mr. Clark Is being offered as an expert, 
13 the Court is going to strike his affidavit in its 
14 entirety. He has not been disclosed as an expert. 
15 To the extent he is a layperson, then there will 
16 be a different standard and will allow the 
17 affidavit as to a layperson. 
18 Starting with paragraph 6, starting 
19 with subsection A, I don't -- I think the two 
20 sentences in the initial paragraph 6 may 
21 potentially remain. The Court ls going to strike 
22 subsection A. The Court cannot find the relevance 
23 of whether or not there were related farming 
24 companies that farmed on that property during 
25 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. 
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1 Company grew those crops, Is Irrelevant. 
2 Yes, Mr. Shurtliff? 
3 MR. SHURTLIFF: His -- he was the farmer. 
4 He was there. He knows the ground had been 
5 prepared for the planting of crops. He -- B is 
6 based on his personal knowledge, Your Honor. And 
7 then the last paragraph, the last sentence, 
8 Mr. Tiegs indicated he -- that's based on 
9 Mr. Tiegs' affidavit. 
10 THE COURT: Yes, and I --
11 MR. SHURTLIFF: That's -- that doesn't call 
12 for any expertise or anything. Anybody could read 
13 Tiegs', Mr. Tiegs' affidavit in that regard. And 
14 Mr. Clark knew the facts that predicate B. 
15 THE COURT: Yes, but the reason that he knew 
16 the facts that predicated B Is that he was 
17 unwilling to vacate the property, despite being 
18 told to do so. Now --
19 MR. SHURTLIFF: But that -- Your Honor, that 
20 makes him a bad person. That doesn't make him a 
21 bad witness. That doesnt make his knowledge 
22 Irrelevant. It makes him a bad person that didn't 
23 vacate the property. But he vacated It when he 
24 was -- when this Court told him to vacate it. So 
25 I -- with due respect, Your Honor, r -- I don't 
of 35 sheets 
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1 think that just being a bad person negates your 
2 ability to be a witness. 
3 THE COURT: Well, and I think we need to 
4 here. The Court is not saying that 
5 Mr. Clark is a bad person. What the Court is 
6 Is that Mr. Clark is not going to be 
7 able -- to coin a phrase that the Court finds --
8 doesn't use frequently either, disingenuous, to 
9 claim based on his withholding that he now has 
1 o personal knowledge. But you do raise some 
11 legitimate points. 
12 Mr, Schossberger, if you'd like to 
respond. 13 
14 
15 
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: If we're talking about 
paragraph 6(b), I think that the evidence before 
16 the Court in the Defendant's motion for summary 
17 judgment is -- which is undisputed -- is that 
18 Owyhee Farming did grow potatoes on the farm in 
19 2011, and the acreages, I believe, 458 acres. So 
20 that's -- that's a fact that's been put into the 
21 record. 
22 Mr. Clark's statement that, contrary to 
23 Tiegs' affidavit, in paragraph 11, ground had been 
24 prepared for the planting of crops in 2011, does 
25 lack an adequate factual foundation, and is 
40 
1 conclusory1 and doesn't show any relevance as to 
2 the Import of that statement. 
3 TI-iE COURT: Okay. Here is the contradiction 
4 in the two. Mr. Tiegs' affidavit says that 
5 Mr. Clark's continued presence on the farm 
6 prevented Murphy Land from entering it and 
7 preparing It for the planting of crops in 2011. 
8 He Is saying that ground had been prepared for the 
9 planting of crops. 
10 Now, the Court Is going to strike that 
11 first part, up until the Owyhee Farming Company. 
12 The Court is striking contrary to Tiegs' 
13 affidavit, ground had been prepared for the 
14 planting of crops in 2011. That's not what the 
15 affidavit says. The affidavit says that 
16 Mr. Clark's presence prevented Murphy Land from 
17 entering and preparing It. There Is no dispute 
18 that Murphy Land was prevented from preparing the 
19 land in the way Murphy Land wished to do so in 
20 2011. 
21 Therefore, the Court is going to -- the 
22 fact that Mr. Clark may have prepared the land 
23 does not refute the paragraph 11. So the Court is 
24 going to strike that first sentence. The Court 
25 will allow to remain, starting Owyhee Farming 
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1 Company did grow potatoes on the farm in 2011. 
2 The Court will also allow the statement, Mr. Tiegs 
3 indicated he would have grown 451.3 acres of 
4 Norkotah potatoes, because that is premised on the 
5 statement of Mr. Tiegs. 
6 New, in the second part of that, 
1 Mr. Funk grew Shepody potatoes on the farm in 
8 2011, Mr. Schossberger, that does appear to be a 
9 fact in front of the Court. Perhaps not Mr. Funk 
10 Individually, but his farming company. 
11 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: That's correct. Owyhee 
12 Farming grew Shepody potatoes in 2011. Yeah, the 
13 reference to Mr. Funk is not correct. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. So the Court is going to 
15 strike Mr. Funk, because It may be that it was not 
16 Mr. Funk personally. The conclusory statement, 
17 there was nothing to stop Mr. Funk and/or Owyhee 
18 Farming Company from growing Norkotah potatoes on 
19 the farm in 2011 rather than Shepody, perhaps I'm 
20 not understanding the -- well -- what Mr. Funk 
21 and/or Owyhee Farming Company did, the Court is 
22 having a difficult time understanding the 
23 relevance as to whether or not Mr. -- I'm sorry, 
24 Murphy Land could get on and farm in the way that 
25 they felt was appropriate. 
42 
1 If I'm understanding correctly, 
2 Mr. Shurtliff, it is the position of the Hilliards 
3 that because Mr. Tiegs and/or Mr. Funk had other 
4 farming entitles that were farming at the time, 
5 that the proceeds from those other farming 
6 entities should have been used to offset the 
7 damages for Murphy Land not being able to access. 
8 Is that correct? 
9 MR. SHURTLIFF: I don't think so, Your 
10 Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Then what ls the 
12 relevance about whether or not unrelated farming 
13 companies had the ability to grow whatever crop it 
14 is they grew on those lands? 
15 MR. SHURTLIFF: Because Mr. Tiegs in his 
16 affidavit would Indicate that he would have grown 
17 the others, the Norkotah potatoes. And quite 
18 frankly, Your Honor, I think what the relevance 
19 here ls that they could have grown, Funk and/or 
20 Owyhee, which is a part of Murphy --
21 THE COURT: Well, it isn't part of Murphy. 
22 It's a separate company. 
23 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, It's -- I understand. 
24 But It's the same people, same business. They 
25 could -- they could have grown that more 
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1 expensive, more profitable potato, If they'd 
2 wanted to, is what Mr. Clark ts saying. They 
3 didn 
4 THE COURT: And I suppose --
5 MR. SHURTLIFF: And he -- and Mr. Tiegs then 
6 goes on at great lengths --
7 THE COURT: Starting In paragraph 19. 
8 MR. SHURTLIFF: -- to make a real profit on 
9 those potatoes that weren't grown. 
10 THE COURT: So this paragraph is used to 
11 refute the paragraph of paragraph 19 of Mr. Tiegs, 
12 when they're looking at similar farming companies 
13 to determine the amount of profit that was made 
14 and/or lost. 
15 MR. SHURTLIFF: Or that -- or that they 
16 couldn't have grown them there. Or that --
17 THE COURT: Well, what's his --
18 MR. SHURTLIFF: Or that they could. Because 
19 quite frankly, Your Honor, see, we've never had an 
20 opportunity to cross examine Mr. Tiegs on his --
21 THE COURT: Right, but Mr. Shurtliff --
22 MR. SHURTLIFF: -- on his affidavit. 
23 THE COURT: But here's my question. What is 
24 Mr. Clark's basis of knowledge for the last 
25 sentence of paragraph B, that there was nothing to 
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1 stop Mr. Funk and/or Owyhee Farming from growing 
2 Norkotah potatoes on the farm fn 2011, rather than 
3 Shepody? What is his basis of knowledge for that? 
4 MR. SHURTLIFF: His personal knowledge. 
s THE COURT: Is it based on conversations 
6 with Mr. Funk? Is it just --
7 MR. SHURTLIFF: No. He was there. He saw 
8 it. He knew. He knew the condition of the 
9 ground, the condition of the farm, the 
10 circumstances, the time, the season. 
11 THE COURT: The Court's going to strike 
12 that. There Is no basis that Mr. Clark has any 
13 knowledge about Mr. Funk or Owyhee Farming 
14 Company. I think it is perhaps an 
15 overgeneralizatlon to say there is nothing to stop 
16 him from growing the potatoes. He -- unless he's 
17 had conversations with Mr. Funk which are not 
18 alleged or alluded to here, Mr. Funk's and Owyhee 
19 Farming Company's planting choices, I don't know 
20 what personal knowledge that's demonstrated here 
1 21 that Mr. Clark would have about their choice to 
22 farm one product or another. 
23 Subsection C of Mr. Clark's affidavit 
24 Is going to be -- his statement that their 
25 estimates are not historically accurate and 
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1 overstates damages is going to be stricken. He 
2 has not identified why those yields are high, how 
J they overstate the damages, and whether -- and the 
4 basis of knowledge and/or the factual support for 
5 the claim that it wasn't traditionally producing 
5 yields of that amount 
7 The Court is also going to strike 
8 subsection D --
9 MR. SHURTLIFF: You're striking the last 
1 o sentence of C? 
11 THE COURT: Yes. I'm also going to strike 
12 paragraph D. I do think that Mr. Clark may have 
13 had the knowledge to document what costs for the 
14 farm would have been, Just like he may have had 
15 the experience to document subsection C, what the 
16 yields would be. But the Court finds that In 
17 these portions of the affidavits, that 
18 documentation is absent. And therefore, there is 
19 a lack of factual support for the statement that 
20 the estimate of costs are unrealistic. It Is 
21 Insufficient to simply say the total costs have 
22 historically been greater, without documenting 
23 what those costs have been. 
24 And to say, for -- also many costs, for 
25 example, maintenance and repair have been omitted, 
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1 it ls insufficient that provides -- there Is 
2 Insufficient factual support In this affidavit to 
3 support that conclusion, and there is insufficient 
4 factual support to support the conclusion that 
5 those costs would be significant. And therefore, 
6 the Court is going to strike section D of the 
7 affidavit as well. 
8 In subsection E, again, I thlnk that 
9 Mr. Clark perhaps has sufficient experience In the 
10 farm to estimate what crops would sell for. In 
11 this particular Instance, he has falled to provide 
12 that factual support as part of the affidavit. So 
13 the Court is going to strike, In the second 
14 sentence, the conclusion Norkotah -- that he would 
15 have sold the Norkotah potatoes for $16 per 
16 hundred Is high. The Court Is going to strike 
17 that. There's no foundation for that. 
18 There -- it's -- the next sentence Is 
19 based on hearsay, that that would be the high 
20 point of the market. Now, Mr. Clark may have 
21 personal knowledge of what the high point of the 
22 market was In 2011. It's not alleged he has 
23 personal knowledge of that. And there's no 
24 Indication that the potatoes, even if that would 
25 have been the high point, there's no factual basis 
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1 in this affidavit to support the conclusion that 
2 the potatoes could not have been sold for that 
3 amount. 
4 The same with subsection 7. 
5 Mr. belief that the projections for year 
6 2012 is similarly wrong. There's no factual 
7 support in this affidavit to come to that 
8 conclusion. Without the factual support for that 
9 statement, that statement wouid not be admissible, 
10 and therefore it will be stricken. 
11 The Court is going to strike 
12 paragraph 8 also, In regards to Mr. Tiegs and hls 
13 2012 projections, that he did nothing to stop them 
14 from growing what and how many acres they wanted 
15 that year. That is not factually supported. It 
16 is by Mr. Clark's presence on the land that 
49 
1 we could argue that had Mr. Clark vacated, he 
2 could have avoided $600,000 in hard costs, but I 
J 
4 
s 
that's neither here nor there. 
MR. SHURTLIFF: I think it's irrelevant. 
THE COURT: And the Court --
s MR. SHURT'uFF: Because -- because the 
7 question is what's the damage, if any. 
8 THE COURT: Correct. That's true, 
9 Mr. Shurtliff. 
10 MR. SHURTLIFF: Not the benefit to 
11 Mr. Clark. 
12 THE COURT: But the Court finds that there 
13 is not factual support for the claim that there 
14 were $600,000 in hard costs. There is simply a 
15 number and a conclusion. There is no underlying 
16 factual support for that number. Therefore, the 
17 stopped them from growing what they wanted and the 17 Court finds there is insufficient factual support 
18 number of acres. There is no support for the 18 for that. 
19 statement that Mr. Clark did nothing to stop them 19 That statement that there were $600,000 
20 from growing what they wanted to grow in 2012. As 20 In hard costs, as exists In this affidavit, 
21 I recollect, he was not removed from the property 21 without additional testimony, would not be 
22 until May. 22 admissible at trial. I'm limited to looking at 
23 Paragraph 9: 2012 when Murphy took 23 the affidavits that I have In front of me and 
24 possession of the farm, he had approximately 24 determining, In and of themselves, whether those 
25 $600,000 in hard costs in preparing the ground and 25 affidavits would constitute admissible evidence at 
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1 planting crops for the year 2012. The Court Is 
2 going to strike that paragraph. There Is no 
3 documentation of what those costs would be. It's 
4 further in the record that Mr. Clark knew in 2012 
5 that he -- that there was legal action to remove 
6 him from the property. He doesn't get to stay on 
7 the property and then claim he's somehow harmed by 
8 his wrongful holdover. So the Court is --
9 MR. SHURTLIFF: No, I don't -- if I may. 
10 
11 
THE COURT: You may, Mr. Shurtliff. 
MR. SHURTLIFF: I don't think he's 
12 claiming -- 1 don't think that says he was harmed. 
13 I think It was saying Mr. Tiegs and Murphy Land 
14 would benefit. 
15 THE COURT: Well, he says they did not 
16 reimburse him for those costs. 
17 MR. SHURTLIFF: That's rlght. And so if you 
18 go through an accounting, if they weren't 
19 reimbursed for those costs, then those costs 
20 accrued to their benefit. And that's -- that's 
21 $600,000 of benefit that's seem!ngly unaccounted 
22 for. 
23 THE COURT: Well, there's no documentation 
24 of whether there was $600,000 worth of hard costs 
25 and what that $600,000 costs were for. 
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1 trial. Without appropriate foundation, that 
2 statement would not be admissible at trial, and 
3 the Court is therefore going to strike it from the 
4 affidavit. 
5 MR. SHURTLIFF: And that's the reason we 
6 ought to have a trial, so we can get to the 
7 underlying predicates for these things. That's 
8 why we have trials, Your Honor. If there's a 
9 question about -- Mr. Clark says I had $600,000. 
10 It is conclusory. Most of what we say rs. 
11 THE COURT: Well, then Mr. --
12 MR. SHURTLIFF: So -- If you don't -- if we 
13 don't buy it, put him on the stand and don't buy 
14 It. But --
15 THE COURT: Well -- but that's not the 
16 standard. To refute a motion for summary 
17 judgment, the opposing party has to do more than 
18 make conclusory allegations. They have to allege 
19 specific facts to defeat the claims that have been 
20 raised in summary judgment. That would --
21 MR. SHURTLIFF: That would be relevant at 
22 trial. 
23 THE COURT: That would be relevant, that 
24 would be admissible at trial. In this particular 
25 case, Mr. Clark in this affidavit, and then 
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1 virtue of the Hilllards, have not specifically 
2 alleged sufficient facts to defeat the claims that 
3 have been raised, as relates to the expenses for 
4 damages in this case. The Court is not reqUired 
5 to scour the record to look for the underlying 
6 factual support. This affidavit simply doesn't 
7 sufficient factual support for the 
8 conclusions that it Is making. 
9 We will go next to Mr. Bennett's 
10 affidavit. 
11 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Is this paragraph 9, Your 
12 Honor? 
13 THE COURT: Yes. Actually --
14 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Yeah, second paragraph 9. 
15 THE COURT: Yeah, we could go to 
16 Mr. Bennett's. That's fine. 
17 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: Actually, on Mr. Bennett's, my 
19 understanding was you started with paragraph 4. 
20 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Correct. 
21 THE COURT: Paragraph 4, there's no basis of 
22 knowledge of how Mr. Bennett learned that Mr. Funk 
23 had been a tenant. The Court is unclear where his 
24 knowledge comes from. If It is something he is 
25 told by a third party, it would be based on 
1 hearsay, would potentially not be admissible. 
2 Therefore, the Court Is going to strike It for 
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3 lack of actual -- adequate factual foundation, 
4 and/or based on hearsay. It's entirely unclear 
5 where that information comes from. 
6 The Court will allow paragraph 5. It 
7 appears to be based on personal knowledge. There 
8 is a letter that was sent to Mr. Bennett, who 
9 would therefore have personal knowledge. I 
10 understand the letter itself would perhaps be 
11 hearsay. But it does set forth adequate grounds 
12 of personal knowledge that the Court will not 
13 strlke paragraph 5. 
14 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Your Honor, I'll only 
15 supplement, I guess, my objection in response to 
16 that, In terms of there's no foundation for when 
17 Mr. Funk expressed his interest In purchasing that 
18 farm to Mr. Bennett, where they were, who was 
19 present. Just saying he told me at some point in 
20 time, if that was at a trial, I'd object and say 
21 lack of foundation and inquire further. 
22 THE COURT: The Court understands that, 
23 Mr. Schossberger. The Court's going to leave it 
24 in. 
25 Paragraph 6, based on discussions with 
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1 Mr. Funk, he expressed Interest in closing the 
2 transaction before year end. There Is adequate 
3 foundation I mean, sorry, inadequate foundation 
4 for this. Again, each of these statements in 
5 these affidavits have to be independently 
6 admissible at trial. The purpose of these 
7 affidavits Is not to make general allegations that 
8 are then followed up at trlal with all of the 
9 adequate foundation. 
10 There is no foundation in this 
11 affidavit about when the discussions took place, 
12 the basis of closing, the reason for a particular 
13 date of closing. The Court is going to strike 
14 paragraph 6 for lack of adequate foundation. 
15 Similarly, with paragraph 8, 1 think 
16 Mr. Bennett may have had adequate knowledge about 
17 this. He may have been present at the time of the 
18 closing. He may have had independent knowledge 
19 about this, but there Is simply lack of foundation 
20 to indicate this was a clerical error. So the 
21 Court is going to strike. 
22 And It seems unfair to attribute that 
23 motivation to the seller when we don't have any 
24 evidence for that either, so the Court is going to 
25 strike paragraph 8 for lack of adequate 
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1 foundation. It also appears to rely on hearsay. 
2 Paragraph 9 is based on hearsay. The 
3 Court's going to strike it for that reason. 
4 Paragraph 11 is also based on hearsay. 
5 It's a conversation with another individual, and 
6 lt contains Information about what that other 
7 individual would say. Therefore it's a hearsay 
8 statement. The Court is going to strike It. 
9 MR. SHURTLIFF: Your Honor, in that regard, 
10 I would suggest that it's not hearsay. There's an 
11 exception. Mr. Tippett was well engaged In the --
12 as a representative of Murphy Land in dealing with 
13 Mr. Bennett, had many conversations about this 
14 matter. Murphy Land LLC, it's a -- doesn't have 
15 an Individual capacity. It was working through 
16 Its agent. Mr. Tippett was an agent. Had 
17 authority, apparent authority. 
18 THE COURT: How do we know Mr. Tippett was 
19 
20 
I 21 
22 
the buyer's agent? 
MR. SHURTLIFF: Mr. -- I think Mr. Bennett 
says so. 
THE COURT: Well, but how does Mr. Bennett 
23 know that Mr. Tippett is the buyer's agent? 
24 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, because they were 
25 negotiating the sale on buying this farm, Your 
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1 Honor. 
2 THE COURT: And where does it say that in 
l this affidavit, that he has independent knowledge 
4 that Mr. Tippett is the buyer's representative? 
5 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, I think he 
6 
7 THE COURT: Then there's lack of adequate 
8 foundation. The Court is going to strike 
9 paragraph 11. 
10 Similarly, with paragraph 13, 
11 Sheryl Reyment's comments are certalnly hearsay. 
12 Her belief about what the parties believed is 
13 double hearsay. The Court is going to strike 
14 paragraph 13. 
15 Finally, the affidavit of Mr. Hilliard, 
16 starting with paragraph 14. The Court does find 
17 that I think Mr. Hilliard perhaps of everyone 
18 would know his own intent on whether or not he 
19 intended to purchase the property. The Court will 
20 allow paragraph 14 to stand. If there is an issue 
21 with the -- the Court -- the Court's going to 
22 leave paragraph 14 in there. Mr. Hililard would 
23 have Independent knowledge about the intent of the 
24 parties at the time of the sale. 
25 Paragraph 17. The Court -- the Court 
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1 struggles with this section, because really, this 
2 requires -- it's unclear to the extent that this 
3 is Mr. Hilliard's interpretation of the addendum. 
4 His interpretation where the language is clear is 
5 irrelevant, or whether this was an acknowledgement 
6 by Mr. Hilliard that if things didn't go well, he 
7 would have to pay the $3 million. 
8 So I'm not -- I don't think that -- the 
9 Court is not going to strike this. However, the 
10 Court Is not going to allow it as a legal 
11 interpretation about the consequences of the 
12 addendum regarding the $3 mlllion that was put 
13 into the account. 
14 Okay. Paragraph 18, we've got a couple 
15 layers of hearsay there. The Court is going to 
16 strike everything starting with the sentence 
17 Mr. Bennett, because Mr. Bennett Is telling him 
18 what Mr. Tippett said. That's hearsay, two levels 
19 of hearsay. It's going to be stricken. 
20 Again, with paragraph 20, the 
21 statement: We believed our sole obligation was to 
22 provide clear, unencumbered title. To the extent 
23 that is a legal interpretation of the addendum, 
24 It's irrelevant, and the Court would strike it. 
25 To the extent it is simply Hilliard's belief that 
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1 he had to provide clear, unencumbered title, I 
2 think it is perhaps relevant as to his intent. So 
J the Court is not going to Court 
4 is not going to allow Mr. Hilliard's 
5 interpretation of the addendum to be controlling 
6 if the Court finds that the language of that 
7 addendum is clear and unambiguous. 
8 Paragraph 23, Mr. Hilliard's --
9 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: 22, Your Honor? 
10 THE COURT: Did I miss one? 22? I did. My 
11 a po log ies. 
12 22. The Court Is going to -- again, 22 
13 and 23 -- well, we'll stay with 22. 
14 Mr. Hilliard's understanding or legal 
15 interpretation of the addendum is not controlling. 
16 Because we don't get to the intent of the parties 
17 if the language of the contract is clear and 
18 unambiguous. 
19 His -- the fact that he understood that 
20 to resolve only the claims of the Clark Is 
21 Irrelevant to the legal Interpretation of the 
22 contact language in this case. The Court -- to 
23 the extent this evidence is Mr. HIiiiard's 
24 understanding, the Court will not strike It. 
25 But again, the Court will not use this 
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1 paragraph as controlling the interpretation of the 
2 addendum to the contract if the Court finds that 
3 the addendum Is clear and unambiguous. This 
4 paragraph would only become relevant if the Court 
5 finds that we have to divine the intent of the 
6 parties to resolve any ambiguities in the 
7 addendum. 
8 Paragraph 23, the first sentence is a 
9 legal concluslon. I don't think that Mr. Hilliard 
10 Is in a position to make a legal conclusion about 
11 whether or not he received consideration. And so 
12 to the extent that paragraph 23 contains a legal 
13 conclusion about whether or not the Hilliards 
14 received consideration for the execution of that 
15 addendum, the Court is going to strike that. 
16 In paragraph 26, Mr. Hllllard's 
17 conclusion that he believed he had fulfilled the 
18 obligation to remove the described exceptions --
19 and I believe that was the two liens, thereby 
20 delivering a clear title -- to the extent he has 
21 personal knowiedge that the described exceptions 
22 were removed, the Court will allow it to stay. 
23 To the extent this paragraph is to be 
24 read as any binding legal authority that the Court 
25 would be required to follow, the Court declines to 
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1 strike that. Whether or not the exceptions were 
2 fulfilled is a -- I think a different question 
3 than the question the Court Is being asked to 
4 under the summary judgment motion. And so 
5 the Court would find it Irrelevant to that 
6 purpose. 
7 To the extent it slmpiy reflects 
8 Mr. Hilliard's understanding, it's -- he's welcome 
9 to have his understanding, but it would not be 
10 binding on the Court unless the Court finds that 
11 it is not a clear and unambiguous contract. 
12 Now that we've gone through the 
13 affidavits, Mr. Schossberger, do you wish to argue 
14 your motion for summary judgment? 
15 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Your Honor, I've been 
16 suffering a cold. My voice isn't so good, so I'm 
17 going to let Mr. Gordon argue. 
18 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Gordon. 
19 MR. GORDON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
20 There are basically two questions for 
21 this Court to address in this motion for summary 
22 judgment. The first question: Does the addendum 
23 mean what it says? Is it clear and unambiguous 
24 about its language, that the escrow funds are to 
25 be used and to be made available to compensate 
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1 Murphy Land for its damages suffered as a result 
2 of loss or delay of possession of Crystal Springs 
3 Farm? The second issue is is there a genuine 
4 issue of material fact regarding whether or not 
5 Murphy Land suffered in excess of $3 million in 
6 damages? 
7 The answer to the first question Is 
8 yes, the addendum means what it says. The answer 
9 to the second question is no, there Is no genuine 
10 Issue of material fact. 
11 Let's start with the -- what I believe 
12 are the undisputed facts that are relevant here. 
13 It's undisputed that Frank Tiegs entered Into 
14 negotiations to purchase the farm on behalf of 
15 Murphy Land. That he Informed the Hilllards that 
16 Murphy Land Company was Interested in purchasing 
17 the farm to farm It. They didn't want Jay Clark 
18 on there. They didn't want him as a tenant. 
19 It's undisputed that they signed a 
20 purchase and sale agreement on November 5th, 2010, 
21 that set the deadline for closing as 
22 December 28th. It's undisputed that an express 
!3 condition of that purchase and sale agreement was 
!4 that the lease with Jay Clark was to be 
is terminated; the Hilliards' existing lease with 
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1 Jay Clark was to be terminated. And this Is on 
2 the first page of the purchase and sale agreement, 
3 Exhibit B to the Tiegs' affidavit at page ML776. 
4 It's undisputed that as closing 
5 approached, it became apparent that Jay Clark was 
6 not going to be leaving the property, or did not 
7 Intend to leave the property quietly. And that 
8 the parties then extended the closing date a 
9 couple times, and then executed addendum No. 4, 
10 which is the particular contract language at Issue 
11 here before this court. 
12 It's undisputed that the purchase of 
13 the farm closed an December 30th, 2010, alter 
14 execution of addendum No. 4, and at that time the 
15 exceptions to tltle regarding Jay Clark's lease, 
16 purported lease, and John Clark's purported 
17 memorandum of ownership, remained as exceptions of 
18 title as of December 30th, 2010. 
19 It's undisputed that Jay Clark still 
20 retained possession of the farm, and -- on 
21 December 30th, and that he refused to vacate, 
22 despite multiple notices from Murphy Land, and 
23 also prior notices from the Hilliards as well. 
24 It's undisputed that Murphy land and 
25 the Hilliards both sued Jay Clark to remove him 
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1 from the farm. Murphy Land went through extensive 
2 efforts in this Court to get him off as quickly as 
3 possible, and continued on, finally moving for 
4 summary judgment, following hlm into bankruptcy, 
5 and moving for immediate relief from stay to come 
6 back to this Court to finally get a writ of 
7 possession, and that Jay Clark was finally removed 
8 by the Owyhee County sheriff on May 2nd, 2012. 
9 It's also undisputed that up until that 
10 time, May 2nd, 2012, Murphy Land was prevented 
11 from entering Crystal Springs Farm and farming it 
12 according to the plans that it had set forth when 
13 it purchased that property. 
14 Now, the legal standard on motions for 
15 summary judgment is, of course, well known by this 
16 Court. But there are four principles that I think 
17 are particularly relevant, a couple of which have 
18 already been mentioned by this Court In Its 
19 rulings on the motions to strike the affidavit. 
20 One that has not been mentioned that I 
21 think Is particularly relevant is that whereas 
22 here this action will be tried by the Court as the 
23 factfinder, Instead of by a jury, the trial court 
24 as the trier of fact ls entitled to arrive at the 
25 most probable Inferences based upon the 
0 1 1 t ,::; u 1 q l ; 4 3 : 5 2 PM Christy Davenport 20 '-4-5928 Page 22 
63 
1 evidence properly before it, and grant summary 
2 judgment, despite the possibility of conflicting 
3 inferences. Th is is from the Idaho Supreme Court 
4 Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP, 149 87 at 
5 90. 
6 l don't know that there are any 
7 conflicting inferences in thls case, Your Honor, 
8 but to the extent this Court finds any conflicting 
9 lnferences1 that does not constrain it from 
10 granting summary judgment In favor of Murphy Land. 
11 The second thing, the second principle 
12 that is particularly relevant, which was alluded 
13 to earlier by this Court, is that in order to 
14 survive summary judgment, a nonmoving party's case 
15 must be anchored in, quote, something more than 
16 speculation. And that's G&M Farms versus Funk 
17 Irrigation Company, 119 Idaho 514 at 517. 
18 The third principal is that a mere 
19 scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to 
20 the facts Is not sufficient to create a genuine 
21 issue for purposes of summary judgment. Again, 
22 this is the Idaho Supreme Court speaking, In 
23 Marchand, M-a-r-c-h-a-n-d, versus JEM Sportwear, 
24 143 Idaho 458 at 458, 459. 
25 And finally, conclusory assertions 
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1 unsupported by specific facts are insufficient to 
2 raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding 
3 summary judgment. This was the Idaho Supreme 
4 Court speaking last year in Kootenai County versus 
5 Harriman-Sayler, 293 P.3d, 637 at 641. 
6 With those prlnciples in mind, Your 
7 Honor, let's talk about the first issue. The 
8 first Issue Is the language of the addendum. 
9 Murphy Land submits that the language of the 
10 addendum means exactly what it says. It's not 
11 ambiguous, and there has been no reasonable 
12 conflicting Interpretation offered by the 
13 Hllliards here. 
14 The critical language of that addendum 
15 says, quote, upon completion of such litigation 
16 and appeals, these funds shall be avallable to the 
17 extent determined by a court of competent 
18 jurisdiction of the amount of purchaser's damage, 
19 if any, for loss or delay of possession of real 
l 20 estate purchased herein. 
1 
21 Now, the first clause of that has a 
I 22 contingency regarding the completion of litigation 
23 and appeals. Both sides agree that contingency 
24 has been waived when the Hilliards decided to flle 
25 a lawsuit in this Court. Both sides agree that 
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1 this is a court of competent jurisdiction. What's 
2 left for the Court to do is to decide what ls the 
3 amount of purchaser's damage, if any, for loss or 
4 delay of possession of Crystal Springs Farm. 
5 The language is clear. It's plain. 
6 It's unambiguous. It means what It says. 
7 In response, the Hilliards offer up a 
8 cursory response. They say that the language ls 
9 ambiguous -- and this is at pages 11 and 12, their 
10 response brief. They claim that the language of 
11 the addendum is ambiguous, because it does not use 
12 the terms indemnity. It doesn't speak of, quote, 
13 lost profits. So Mr. Hilliard says, I didn't 
14 understand that I was indemnifying Murphy Land for 
15 its lost profits. 
16 Two critical problems with this 
17 response. Number one, the Hilliards fail to 
18 articulate any conflicting interpretation of the 
19 language, let alone any conflicting interpretation 
20 that ls reasonable. And as a matter of law, an 
21 ambiguous contract ls one that is reasonably 
22 subject to conflicting interpretations. That's 
23 from the Idaho Supreme Court earlier this year In 
24 Boise Mode, LLC case at 294 P.3d, 1111 at page 
25 1120. 
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1 So thene has to be a reasonable 
2 conflicting Interpretation. The Hilllards have 
3 offered none, Your Honor, and I would submit that 
4 there is none. The language is very clear on 
s this. 
6 Second, as the -- as the Court alluded 
7 to in its rulings on the motions to strike, the 
8 Hllliards' subjective understanding of what the 
9 addendum means is irrelevant to a determination of 
10 whether or not the contract is ambiguous. 
11 Certainly If the Court determines that It's 
12 ambiguous, then we can look at Intent. But on 
13 this initial look, is the contract ambiguous or 
14 unambiguous, whether -- any subjective 
15 understanding offered up by the Hllllards is 
16 simply irrelevant to that. 
17 And the Idaho Supreme Court's very 
18 clear about this in Swanson versus Beco 
19 Construction Company, 145 Idaho 59 at 63. Quote, 
20 a contract ls not rendered ambiguous on Its face 
21 because one of the parties thought that the words 
22 used had some meaning that differed from the 
23 ordinary meanings of those words. So the 
24 Hilliards' response on the question of ambiguity 
25 is simply ineffectual, Your Honor, and the 
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language -- the Court can take a look at lt, and 
I'm sure it has, and determine that the language 
means what it says. 
Now we get to the second issue: What 
s is the amount of damages? Certainly that Is a 
6 question of fact. Certainly that is a question of 
' 7 material fact. But the question here at the 
8 summary judgment stage, is there -- is there any 
9 genuine dispute as to the amount of damages. And 
10 these are particularly the amount of damages for 
11 delay of possession. 
12 And there Is no genuine Issue as to the 
13 amount at all. The Hilliards have falled to 
14 create a genuine issue, to raise a genuine issue, 
15 and certainly they have failed to create -- or 
16 raise a genulne issue as to whether or not the 
17 damages exceeded the amount of the escrow funds, 
18 $3 million. And that's relevant, because what's 
19 being sought In this case is the release of those 
20 escrow funds. 
21 Murphy Land, of course, had the burden 
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1 established to a mathematical certitude. And this 
2 Is from the Idaho Supreme Court, Sells v. 
3 Robinson, 141 Idaho 767 at 774, where the Court 
4 said the amount of damages need only be 
5 established to a reasonable degree of certainty. 
5 Reasonable certainty does not require mathematical 
7 exactitude, but only that the damages be taken out 
8 of the realm of speculation. 
9 The Frank Tiegs affidavit and the 
10 documents, the extensive documents supporting that 
11 affidavit establish to a reasonable certainty that 
12 the damages to Murphy Land from being prevented 
13 from entering and farming Crystal Springs Farm in 
14 the manner that it wanted to until May 2nd, 
15 2007 -- excuse me, 2012, were approximately 
16 $4.3 mill!on, and certainly exceeded $3 million. 
17 Now, Mr. Tiegs is a long-time farmer 
18 and businessman, as he sets forth In his -- his 
19 summary of his background attached as Exhibit A to 
20 his affidavit. And of particular relevance, he 
21 says in there that he farms over 100,000 acres a 
22 to put forth evidence of what those damage -- of 22 year in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, and this --
23 what those damages were. And Murphy Land has done 23 much of the supporting data that -- the data that 
24 that. They've established to a reasonable 24 supports Mr. Tiegs• affidavit, of course, comes 
25 certainty that it suffered well In excess of 25 from farms in proximity to the Crystal Springs 
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1 $3 million in damages. The best estimate Is 
2 approximately $4.3 million, as set forth In the 
3 memorandum and in the affidavit of Frank Tiegs. 
4 Now, this Is done based on two legal 
5 principles. The first one is -- and this is from 
6 the Wing v. Hulet case, talking about damages for 
7 crop loss. And it doesn't exactly apply In this 
8 context, Your Honor, because that situation's 
9 where crops are harmed or damaged, and that's not 
10 the claim here. But what the Wing v. Hulet case 
11 says is a measure for damages for crop loss Is the 
12 difference between the value of the crops actually 
13 raised and the value of the crops that would have 
14 been raised under normal conditions. That's at 
15 106 Idaho 919. 
16 In this case, Murphy Land says, we 
17 would have raised X, Y, and Z crops, but for the 
18 fact that we were prevented from entering and 
19 farming the land according to our plan. So 
20 it's ~- I think the measure for damages is still 
21 calculated the same way, even though it's speaking 
22 about crop loss in a different context than we 
23 have here. 
24 The second legal principal is that the 
i 25 amount of damages here does not need to be 
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1 Farm here In southern Idaho. 
2 Mr. Tiegs sets forth projections for 
3 each of his farm plans for the years 2011 and 
4 2012. And those projections are based on his 
5 experience and on data from comparable farms. 
6 Let's start with 2011, Your Honor. In 
7 2011, there's no dispute that Murphy Land Company 
8 was kept off of Crystal Springs Farm for the 
9 entirety of 2011, with the exception, which I'll 
10 discuss, that Owyhee Farming Company, LLC, sister 
11 company of Murphy Land Company, was able to 
12 release certain property on the farm and grow 
13 potatoes there. 
14 Mr. Tiegs sets forth his plan for how 
15 he would have farmed Crystal Springs Farm. This 
16 Is -- the summary is Exhibit El to his affidavit 
17 at page ML326. And it shows that he estimated 
18 that he would have made just north of $3 million, 
19 had he been able to farm the farm how he wanted 
20 to. The details of that are on Exhibit El at 
21 Murphy Land -- or I'm sorry, ML328-331, attached 
22 to Mr. Tiegs' affidavit. 
23 Those numbers are supported by actual 
24 numbers from comparable farms in 2011. In fact, 
25 the actual numbers from comparable farms show 
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1 if anything, Mr. Tiegs' estimate was 1 
2 conservative. When you use the actual numbers 2 
3 from comparable farms In southern Idaho, you see 3 
4 that and apply those to Mr. negs' fann plan, 4 
5 the actual loss estimate is dose -- is about 5 
6 mllfion. And this is summarized at paragraph 6 
7 19E Mr. Tiegs' affidavit. 7 
8 And I won't -- I won't take the Court 8 
9 through each one of those crops, unless the Court 9 
10 would like me to. But just to give an example, 10 
11 the first crop that Mr. negs discusses Is the 11 
12 Norkotah potatoes. And if you look at his 12 
13 estimate and then the actual numbers for Norkotah 13 
14 potatoes grown at the B. Wolf circles, just on the 14 
15 other side of C.J. Strike Reservoir from Crystal 15 
16 Springs Farm, you see that using those numbers 16 
17 from the B. Wolf farm results in a higher loss of 17 
18 about $360,000 more than Mr. Tiegs' estimate. 18 
19 Mr. negs estimated 20 tons per acre, 19 
20 and a sale price of $320 per ton. This is in his 20 
21 plan, Exhibit El at page 328. Estimated about 21 
22 $1.6 million net revenue from growing those 22 
23 potatoes. 23 
24 The data from the B. Wolf circles shows 24 
25 that during 2011, Owyhee Farming Company, which 25 
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1 was farming over at B. Wolf circles, got a yield 1 
2 or 20.828 tons per acre, so slightly more than 2 
3 Mr. Tiegs estimated for Crystal Springs Farm, and 3 
4 sold those for $308.05 cents per ton, slightly 4 
5 less than Mr. Tiegs estimated for Crystal Springs 5 
6 Farm. And if you apply the actual -- those 6 
7 numbers with actual cost numbers from the B. Wolf 7 
B circles, to Mr. Tiegs' plan for Crystal Springs 8 
9 Farm, you show net revenue from Norkotah potatoes 9 
10 in 2011 of close to $2 million. 10 
11 And Mr. Tiegs goes through the same 11 
12 thing with each of the other crops that he 12 
13 Intended to farm, or that Murphy Land intended to 13 
14 farm at Crystal Springs Farm in 2011: The DNS 14 
15 wheat, the corn, the alfalfa. These are in 15 
16 paragraphs 198, 19C, and 190 of Mr. Tiegs' 16 
17 affidavit, and supported by data in Exhibits G, H, 17 
18 and J. 18 
19 Now, as I mentioned before, Owyhee 19 
20 Farming Company was able to lease approximately 20 
21 450 acres of land at Crystal Springs Farm in 2011 21 
22 from Mr. Clark. Actually, the lease was with 22 
23 Clark's Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC. As set forth 23 
24 in Mr. Tiegs' affidavit, Owyhee Farming Company 24 
25 netted approximately $800,000 from farming those 25 
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potatoes. 
That amount, the $800,000, has been 
deducted From the loss calculation that Mr. Tiegs 
does for Murphy recognizing that even though 
Owyhee Farming and Murphy Land Company are 
separate entities, because owned the 
same people, it seems equitable that the profits 
made by Owyhee Farming on that -- on that property 
should be deducted from the claimed loss profits 
of Murphy Land. So that's been done, Your Honor, 
In the calculations, and that's discussed at 
paragraph 19 and paragraph 19E of Mr. Tiegs' 
affidavit. 
2012, it's undisputed that -- that 
Murphy Land was not able to enter and take 
possession, full possession of the farm until 
May 2nd of that year. And because of that delayed 
possession, not surprisingly, they were not able 
to grow the crops that they wanted to, according 
to the plans, according to their plan for that 
year. Exhibit E2 is the actual plan for that 
year, and the actual farming data from 2012 is in 
Exhibit E. 
Paragraph 20 of Mr. Tiegs' affidavit 
details the calculation of loss for 2012, and it's 
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supported by Exhibits I and K through P. 
In 2012, Mr. Tiegs estimated a 600 --
approximately $684,000 loss. If you use actual 
numbers, it's slightly less in 2012, about 
$632,000. 
Using the actual numbers from 
comparable farms In 2011 and 2012, based on 
Mr. negs' affidavit and the supporting data, the 
total loss to Murphy Land, ln terms of its loss 
profits for those two years, Is approximately 
$4.3 million. 
Even if we use the date of March 28th, 
2012, instead of May 2nd, 2012, because that 
correlates with the date that the exceptions were 
removed, that date, I don't believe, Is 
particularly relevant. The question Is when was 
Murphy Land's delay in possession, when did that 
end. But even if you use that date, the numbers 
still far exceed $3 mrllion. Indeed, they exceed 
$3 million Just 1n 2011 alone. 
Now, the Hilliards' response to 
Mr. negs' damage calculations is set forth at 
pages 15 to 18 of Its memorandum. As has been 
discussed already by the Court in ruling on the 
motions to strike, those are -- it relies on the 
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1 affidavit of Jay Clark, and in particular, the 
2 statements that it relies upon, that -- r'm sorry, 
3 that Hilliards rely upon. Those are conclusory 
4 assertions, and based on statements that this 
5 Court now found to be inadmissible. 
6 Even If they had -- even If the Court 
7 had found them to be admissible, they've simply 
s failed to raise genuine issues of material fact as 
9 to the amount of damages at all, and secondly, as 
10 to whether the amount of damages exceeds 
11 $3 million. 
12 Now, the Hilliards have already 
13 admitted that they have no personal knowledge to 
14 dispute Frank Tiegs' damages calculations. And 
15 you can see this in Exhibit J to the first 
16 affidavit of Matthew Gordon, the response to 
17 request for admission No. 8 and No. 9. 
18 And instead, the response here relies 
19 entirely upon the affidavit of Jay Clark. For the 
20 reasons already discussed by this court, those 
21 particular statements are inadmisslble. Even if 
22 they were considered, they are nothing more than 
23 condusory assertions unsupported by specific 
24 facts. Under the law, they are insufficient to 
25 raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding 
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1 summary adjustment. That's, again, from the 
2 Kootenai County case, 293 P.3d at 641. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Gordon, I'm going to 
4 interrupt you just for a minute, so I'm dear. 
5 MR. GORDON: Please, sure. 
6 THE COURT: Is your client seeking the 
7 $4.3 million, or simply a release of the 
a $3 mlllion In escrow? 
9 MR. GORDON: In this -- In this case, Your 
Page 25 
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1 they've thrown out a number of arguments in reply, 
2 or In response, many of which are inconsistent 
3 with the posltion that the Hllliards previously 
4 took in this case, and all of which are 
S unsupported by law or fact. 
6 So they begin with several -- asserting 
7 various unappl!ed affirmative defenses: The 
8 failure of consideration, mutual mistake, failure 
9 to mitigate. None of these, In addition -- In 
10 addition to being not pied, none of these is 
11 adequately supported. And let's be very clear. 
12 It is the Hilliards' burden at this stage to 
13 adequately support any affirmative defenses they 
14 raise. And this is Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 
15 765 at 771. 
16 They first -- the Hilllards first taik 
17 about the failure of consideration and mutual 
18 mistake. And they seek a rescission of the 
19 addendum, Your Honor. I don't know that this 
20 quite rises to the level of judicial estoppel, 
21 because the Court has not entered any ruling based 
22 on the prior position that the Hilliards took, but 
23 it's certainly inconsistent with the Hilliards' 
24 action in filing a complaint with this Court to 
25 enforce the addendum. 
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1 Nowhere in that complaint does the --
2 does the Hilliards hint at anything that the --
3 that the addendum might be unenforceable, or that 
4 it should be rescinded. And let's keep in mind, 
5 we are now approaching almost three years since 
6 that addendum was executed. Almost three years 
7 since the Hilliards put the $3 million Into 
8 escrow. And now for the first time In a response 
9 to motion for summary judgment for which they are 
10 Honor, my client is seeking a release of the 10 unable to raise any genuine issue of material 
11 $3 million in escrow, plus, of course, any 11 fact, they raise these issues about, well, that 
12 Interest that's accrued during the time that it 12 should be rescinded. 
13 was In escrow, which I'm not aware of. But no, in 13 But even setting that aside, Your 
14 this declaratory judgment action, seeking the 14 Honor, neither one of these arguments has any 
15 release of the $3 million in escrow. 15 merit. Even if consideration was required for 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 16 this addendum -- and I don't think that the 
17 MR. GORDON: In sum, on the question of 17 Hilliards have met their burden to establish that 
18 damages, Your Honor, Murphy land's established the 18 it was required, because If you look at the 
19 amount of damages to a reasonable certainty, based 19 language of the addendum and you look at the 
20 on specific facts supported by data, supported by 20 language of the agreement, and you see that It's 
21 Mr. Tiegs' affidavit, and the Hllliards have done 
22 nothing to create, raise a genuine Issue of 
23 material fact as to that amount. Instead, what 
24 the Hilliards have done, Your Honor, is they've 
25 taken basically a kitchen sink approach. And 
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22 But even if separate consideratlon was 
23 required for this addendum, there was more than 
24 adequate consideration given here. Murphy land 
25 was not obligated to go forward with the terms of 
21 of 35 sheets 
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1 the purchase and sale agreement on December 30th, 
2 2010, because an express condition of that 
3 purchase and sale agreement had not been met. 
4 That express condition was Jay Clark's lease to 
5 terminated. 
6 So the consideration -- and in addition 
7 to that, the title was not clear, because Mr. --
8 Mr. Jay Clark and Mr. John Clark's exceptions --
9 recorded instruments were -- showed up as 
10 exceptions to title. 
11 The consideration that Murphy Land gave 
12 for this addendum was they said, okay, we will go 
13 ahead and purchase the property. In exchange for 
14 you -- notwithstanding that we don't have, 
15 notwithstanding that we would be in violation of 
16 the purchase and sale agreement if we walked away 
17 at this point, in exchange for the $3 million In 
18 escrow to protect us from damages. 
19 As to the mutual mistake of fact, Your 
20 Honor, there's -- I don't think there's even an 
21 allegation, a genuine allegation in the response 
22 that there was a mutual mistake of fact. What the 
23 response talks about is a mistake, an alleged 
24 mistake of understanding by Mr. Hilliard. That's 
25 not -- that's not sufficient for rescission. 
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1 Rescission happens on a mutual mistake of fact. 
2 There's no evidence whatsoever of any mutual 
3 mistake of fact. 
4 As to the mitigation defense, Your 
5 Honor, this Idaho Supreme Court is clear that this 
6 is an affirmative defense that requires more than 
7 a, quote, mere suggestion. This is from the 
8 McCormick Internation USA, Inc. case, 152 Idaho 
9 920 at 924, just last year from the Idaho Supreme 
10 Court. 
11 Now, this Court has already noted that 
12 it's -- that It's unclear that there's any 
13 affirmative obligation on a party such as Murphy 
14 Land to try and rent out ground from somebody who 
15 is trespassing on its property. And certainly I 
16 would agree that the Hilliards have not 
17 established -- and again, it's their burden --
18 they have not supported their defense with 
19 anything indicating that Murphy Land would have 
20 had an obligation to do that. 
21 And here there Is, even setting that 
22 aside, there is only the mere suggestion that the 
23 McCormick International court talked about, and 
24 that's in Jay Clark's affidavit, stating that he 
25 was willing and able to rent the rest of Crystal 
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1 Springs Farm to Murphy land. That's what the 
2 Hilliards based their mitigation defense on. 
3 Of course, there's nothing specific in 
4 Mr. Clark's affidavit. Nothing about the terms on 
5 which he would have rented it Nothing indicating 
6 that had he so rented it, it would have resulted 
7 in less damages to Murphy Land. There is not a 
8 single specific fact In there about what lt would 
9 have cost Murphy Land to rent that iand from him, 
10 if, In fact, he actually had been willing to rent 
11 to it. 
12 And as this Court earlier noted, this 
13 is contrary to sworn statements by Mr. Clark that 
14 he has previously made to this Court that were 
15 provided as attachments to the second affidavit of 
16 Matthew Gordon in which he talked about all the 
17 crops that he had already planted, all the monies 
18 he had put into those crops, and that it wouldn't 
19 be workable to share those -- to share the farm 
20 with somebody else, and that, contrary to his 
21 statement, that Murphy Land could have grown 
22 anything they wanted, anywhere they wanted, at any 
23 time they wanted. He wasn't agreeable to that. 
24 He wanted to closely monitor anything that was 
25 grown on -- from that farm. 
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1 Finally, the Hilliards talk about 
2 this -- they raise an argument about indemnity, 
3 and they raise an argument about lost profits. 
4 Neither of these has merits, Your Honor. The 
5 Hilliards mischaracterized the nature of this 
6 dispute. 
7 This is not a suit for a breach of 
a indemnity agreement. This ls not a suit for a 
9 breach of contract seeking consequential damages. 
10 This ls a suit that says look at the addendum. 
11 The addendum says these monies are to be made 
12 available in the amount of damages suffered by 
13 Murphy Land for delay of possession. 
14 What are those damages? The addendum 
15 is clear. Murphy land is a business. Its damages 
16 in this case are lost profits. Murphy Land has 
17 put forth adequate evidence to meet its burden to 
18 establish to a reasonable certainty what those 
1
19 damages are. The Hllliards have done nothing in 
20 response to raise a genuine Issue. 
21 For that reason, Your Honor, summary 
22 judgment should enter in favor of Murphy Land 
23 Company and a declaration ordering that the escrow 
24 funds be released to Murphy Land Company. If this 
25 Court has any questions, I'd be happy to stand for 
22 of 35 sheets 
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1 those. 
2 THE COURT: I do not. 
3 MR. GORDON. Thank you, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Shurtliff, we've been 
5 going for a solid two hours and 15 minutes. At 
6 some we're going to have to take a break, 
7 because I talk fast, and my poor court reporter Is 
8 doing her level best to keep up. You can choose. 
9 If you'd like to have a break now, we'll take a 
10 ten-minute recess, or I can do it after you have 
11 completed your argument. It's up to you, sir. 
12 MR. SHURTLIFF: I would just as soon go 
13 ahead, but --
14 THE COURT; Then that's perfectly fine. 
15 MR. SHURTLIFF: If Madam Reporter's all 
16 right -- she can do it. 
17 THE COURT: She can do rt. She can do it, 
18 so you go ahead. 
19 MR. SHURTLIFF: She nodded her head saying 
20 she can do it. 
21 It's not an indemnity case. It's not a 
22 contract case. It's a case that just $3 million 
23 laying there, and we want It. What's the 
24 predicate for us wanting lt? Not a contract. Not 
25 an indemnity. Not a tort. We're not suing 
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1 because somebody committed a crime. What's the 
2 predicate? Told us what it Isn't. What Is it? 
3 It springs from -- and I concede this, 
4 Your Honor -- addendum 4. Addendum 4 -- and, you 
5 know, Your Honor, Mr. Gordon said a lot of 
6 undisputed things. And there's cursory and all 
7 this. But undisputed -- it's undisputed that 
8 addendum 4 was before the closing of the farm. 
9 Where in this record is that undisputed? I don't 
10 know that it's terribly important. 
11 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this: Are 
12 the Hllliards disputing that addendum 4 was 
13 executed -- let me ask you this: What ls your 
14 client's position about whether or not the 
15 addendum was executed before or after closing? 
16 MR. SHURTLIFF: Our position is, Your Honor, 
17 with some effort, we've been unable to determine 
18 that. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. SHURTLIFF: We can't even find the 
21 author of addendum 4, who drafted it, when and 
22 where. It's -- just seems to have sprung from no 
23 place on or about the 30th of December 2010, or 
24 some ear!ler iterations of it. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. SHURTLIFF: So Your Honor, I don't know 
2 what it is, if it isn't a contract or an indemnity 
3 or a breach or a tort or something. I'm just old 
4 fashioned. I like to know why we're here. It's a 
S given that we're here, according to Murphy, 
e because the language says unambiguously, the money 
7 will be here. Well, I suggest, Your Honor, that 
8 addendum 4 is not quite as unambiguous as one 
9 would think it Is and one would assert that it is. 
10 Addendum 4 is not the most artfully 
11 drafted piece of work that has been done. The 
12 paragraph -- the first paragraph of it is quite 
13 unrelated than the second paragraph of It, the 
14 paragraph that gets us here and gets Murphy 
15 wanting the money. 
16 They talk about -- first paragraph 
17 talks about the leading exceptions, 32 and 33. 
18 And it goes on at length about the requirement to 
19 do so. And that's where the money was deposited. 
20 Deposited In there. And then they talk about some 
21 more rent monies and get those. 
22 These funds shall be held in trust 
23 pending issuance of an endorsement to the buyer's 
24 policy of a title Insurance, deleting exceptions 
25 32 and 33, currently shown on the commitment for 
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1 title Insurance. Period. Disbursements of such 
2 portions of such deposited funds may be made in 
3 the following manner, with the written direction 
4 to both the seller and the buyer. In exchange for 
5 such documentation as the title company deems 
6 sufficient, or In the event of any deposited funds 
7 remain with guaranteed title after exhaustion of 
8 all of seller's remedies and defenses, and of all 
9 appeals therefrom, with respect to the removal of 
10 the title matters, the company shall have the 
11 option to lnterpiead such funds Into a judicial 
12 court proceeding. 
13 THE COURT: Are you --
14 MR. SHURTLIFF: New paragraph. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. I'm with you. I was just 
18 tracking where you were at. Go ahead. 
17 MR. SHURTLIFF: That's the first paragraph. 
18 And, you know, I don't know If we put a lot of 
19 value on more words than less, but there are a 
20 whole lot more words in paragraph 1 than there are 
21 in 2. 
22 Upon completion of such litigation and 
23 appeals. Well, obviously that refers to the 
above, or I would -- shouldn't say obviously. I 
like obviously. Or -- I don't !Ike a lot of 
3/7/2014 1:48:03 PM i5 Davenport 208 -5928 Page 28 
87 
1 words. But it would seem to me that it refers to 
2 the lltlgat!on and appeals concerning the removal 
3 of the title exceptions. 
4 The funds shall be available to the 
5 extent determined by a court of competent 
6 risdiction -- which this one we think -- of 
7 the amount of purchaser's damage, if any, for loss 
8 or delay of possession. Well, that paragraph 
9 doesn't say lost profits. Doesn't say loss of 
10 farming opportunity, loss of bad guy holding over. 
11 It says damages, if any. 
12 Now, if the word damages were self 
13 defining, this Court, lawyers and everybody else, 
14 would have a whole lot less work to do. And 
15 insurance policies would be a whole lot shorter 
16 than they are. The word damages in addendum 4 
17 must mean something. But what? It doesn't say. 
18 Damages, lost profit? Damages Including 
19 attorney's fees for abortive attempts to get a bad 
20 guy off the farm? Damages for the cost of driving 
21 to and from Murphy? What is damages? Didn't say. 
22 They took all this time, spent all this effort, 
23 and didn't define it. 
24 If any. If any. Obvlously at the time 
25 that the addendum 4 was entered into, there was a 
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1 question whether there would be damages. 
2 Otherwise, why do we put "if any" in the 
3 provision? If any. 
4 In this case we're here, and 
5 Mr. Gordon, Mr. Schossberger, and Murphy assert 
6 that the damage issue Is crystal clear as to --
7 because we're a business, It's Jost profit. Well, 
8 there's many ways of determining what damages are. 
9 Damages are of many kind and variety. Like 
10 potatoes, I think. So we need to define it with a 
11 little more precision than what was defined in 
12 addendum 4. 
13 What does such litigation mean? And I 
14 appreciate -- I know the Court's going through the 
15 affidavits of everybody. And the Court's 
16 suggestion as to Mr. Hilliard's affidavit, that 
17 what he thought addendum 4 was is not controlling. 
18 I accept that notion, the Court's view In that 
19 regard. But it was undisputed, his notion of what 
20 It was. That is, to take care of the title 
21 deficiency problems. 
22 Was he suggesting that he would be --
23 what if -- what if the -- because remember, Judge, 
24 at the time, December 30th, 2010, Mr. Clark was on 
25 the Mr. Clark had not indicated any 
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1 prodivity to leave. The farm, the sale was 
2 coming down, whether we want to track it to a need 
3 to fulfill a 1031 or not, it was coming down to 
4 December 30th on that deadline. 
5 So ordinarily buyers assume a piece of 
6 property subject to the lease that's on that 
7 property. But here, Mr. Hilliard had indicated, 
8 In his buy/sell agreement, that he would take care 
9 of those issues. Couldn't, by December 30th, so 
10 we need to do something. 
11 Did Mr. HIiiiard and Mrs. Hilliard, by 
12 signing addendum 4, agree to pay damages to Murphy 
13 Land for ten years if Mr. Clark's ten-year lease 
14 had been upheld? What reasonable person would do 
15 that? 
16 And in that regard, Your Honor, 
17 reasonableness. Reasonableness. And I applaud 
18 the work of Mr. Schossberger and Mr. Gordon in 
19 getting this today. They're doing good work. 
20 They've made significant progress In getting to a 
21 position where Mr. Tiegs wlll never have to stand 
22 cross examination on his "if I had had the farm." 
23 "I estimate that." "Based on this." "Based on 
24 that." "I would have made." "I could have made." 
25 Conclusory? It's all conclusory. 
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1 Another word I worry about sometimes, because most 
2 of what we do Is conclusory. 
3 Mr. Tiegs has an affidavit f!Hed 
4 with -- replete with all kinds of small print from 
5 other places, other farms, other entities. But 
6 you read his affidavit, and it's I estimate, I 
7 prepared, if I had. If that's not speculation, I 
8 don't know what the word speculation means. "If 
9 I'd had." "If I'd had." "I estimate." There's 
10 nothing concrete about that. 
11 Your Honor, addendum 4 is not -- I 
12 don't know that it's ambiguous. That's why we 
13 have judges. I think that we can't read ft 
14 without reading the whole of it. We can't read 
15 just that paragraph upon completion of such 
16 litigation. We need to kind of think about what 
17 such litigation means and the context of the whole 
18 of the addendum 4. 
19 What are damages? And what is, In the 
20 context of this case, these facts, these parties, 
21 what is delay In possession? On December 30th, 
22 2010, they dosed the deal. They knew there was 
23 going to be a delay in possession, because 
24 Jay Clark was on the farm. Thereafter 
Land came down here to 
3/7 2014 1:48:43 PM hris Davenport 208 4-·5928 Page 29 
91 
1 and filed a lawsuit trying to get Jay Clark off 
2 the farm -- didn't succeed -- In the year 2011. 
J Mr. Hilliard and Mrs. Hilliard flied a 
4 lawsuit against Mr. Clark, and It took a while. 
5 And this Court determined that Mr. 
6 be there, and that his lease was no 
7 and he should leave. And ultimately the 
8 Court entered an order tefling him to get off, and 
9 he finally got off. 
10 But Your Honor, those are all facts 
11 that ought to be fleshed out In trial. This is --
12 and you know1 I appreciate -- I appreciate that we 
13 go through affidavits and strike this and strike 
14 that, and we should have done this, and we should 
15 have done that. But the essence of all that we 
16 do, the essence of our purpose, is to achieve a 
17 just result in the context of the facts of the 
18 case, and in the context of what Is and what 
19 isn't. 
20 And in this case, Your Honor, you're 
being asked -- you're being asked to decide 21 
22 summarily a $3 million case, without any 
23 opportunity for exposition of all the Issues, 
24 without any opportunity for examination of 
25 Mr. Tiegs, which might take a minute, given the --
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1 given the quality of his small print. His "I 
2 estimates" and "if I'd had. 11 He needs to be 
3 examined as to the bona fides of his contentions. 
4 That's what a trial would do, and that's what we 
5 ought to have, Your Honor. We ought to have a 
6 fulf exposition, given the limitations this 
7 Court's Imposed. And that's -- that's as It 
s should be. 
9 But Your Honor, it's not clear. It's 
10 not ipso facto. There are issues. What Mr. Tiegs 
11 and Mr. Funk, Murphy Land Company, through the 
12 good offlces of Mr. Re -- or Mr. Schossberger and 
13 Mr. Gordon -- are trying to do Is avoid that full 
14 exposition of Issues. Because what they want you 
15 to do, Your Honor, Is to do something that every 
16 farmer In this state knows, Mr. Tiegs knows 
17 without saying, anybody knows: You don't buy a 
18 farm for nine-and-a-half million dollars and pay 
19 for It in two years. You don't suffer a 
20 40 percent net profit on your Investment. And 
21 that's what his damages would suggest. 
22 That's -- if we just look at the 
23 number -- that number alone, nine-and-a-half 
24 million dollars for a farm. One would have to 
25 assume, although it's not in the record, that 
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1 was an arm's length transaction arrived at by a 
2 willlng buyer and a willing seller negotiating a 
J fair for a piece of property, 
4 nine-and-a-half million dollars. And Mr. Tiegs 
5 wants to us, tell you, and they want you to 
a tell Mr. HIiiiard and Mrs. Hilliard, that, oh, he 
7 would have made $4.3 million profit lf he'd had 
8 possession of the farm In 2011? Two years plus to 
9 pay for the farm? It don't happen. It's not 
10 reasonable. It's speculative. 
11 It's -- it's -- on its face, Your 
12 Honor, I don't -- I apologize for the quality of 
13 our affidavits In response, but on its face It's 
14 untenable. You don't do that. There ain't a 
15 farmer in Owyhee County that would tell you I can 
16 pay for my farm in two-and-a-half years. It 
17 don't -- It don't happen. 
18 And I don't care how well done it Is, 
19 Mr. Tiegs' affidavit is, and I don't care whether 
20 he grows 100,000 acres or 100 acres. The validity 
21 of his argument that, oh, If I'd had the farm --
22 if I had had the farm ln 2011, I had a crop plan. 
23 Wefl, when did he have the crop plan, 
24 Your Honor? Let's be reasonable here. Did he 
25 have the crop plan before he bought the farm, 
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1 December the 30th, 2010? Hardly. When did he 
2 develop this crop plan that becomes the predicate 
3 and basis for his affidavit? I'd like to ask him. 
4 They're telling me I shouldn't have that 
5 opportunity. 
6 If I'd had the farm, I would have grown 
7 400-plus acres of the best potato that you could 
8 grow at the highest price and a great yield. And 
9 you -- we can strike all we want about 
10 countervalllng arguments in regard to price and 
11 numbers, but his price and numbers are good. 
12 400-plus acres. 
13 At the same tlme, Mr. Funk, his partner 
14 In Murphy Land, had leased 458 acres from 
15 Mr. Clark for 2011, and was growing Shepody 
16 potatoes, a lesser valued potato. Why? I don't 
17 know. Never been able to ask anybody. 
18 He had a 3,000, more or less, acre 
19 farm. You can't grow potatoes every year on every 
20 acre. All the farmers know that. So where were 
21 those 900 acres that would have been devoted to 
22 farm ff I'd had to farm? He doesn't say which 
23 field. 
24 And this farm is laid out In fields, 
and different areas1 
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different pivots and different kinds of irrigation 
systems. So where were those 900 acres? They're 
not identified. Were there 900 acres capable of 
growing Shepody and Norkotah potatoes in 2011, if 
I'd had the farm? Speculation. Is it reasonable. 
What they -- what the -- the legal 
arguments and all I appreciate. The bottom line 
Your Honor, is addendum 4 so absolutely clear, 
notwithstanding the -- according to the 
Defendants, counter-claimants that It's not a 
contract, complaint, dispute, or an indemnity 
contract -· is it so clear that there's no 
argument as to its intent, purpose, and how it 
ought to be Interpreted? 
And secondarily, whether it's so clear, 
based on an unexamined, un-critiqued, conclusory 
affidavit of a very successful farmer that he 
would have suffered damages in an amount that Is 
unreasonable and untenable on their faces. Just 
because he couched it in good language and maybe 
met a better -- the better test of what he based 
it on, doesn't make it valid. What makes it valid 
is the reality of the underlying proofs. And that 
we ought to examine at a trial, Your Honor. 
And the suggestion that this is, oh, 
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Just an open and shut case, that the Murphy --
that the Hilllards' argument are all untoward and 
cursory, no dispute, they're flimsy, without 
merit -- that lost profits, because we're a 
business, is what was meant by addendum 4 when lt 
used the word damages? Where is that stated? Why 
didn't it say so? Why isn't it articulated? They 
use one page for addendum 4. They have two or 
three pages for signature pages. Why didn't they 
flesh it out? 
It's not -- it's not a -- the 
language -- addendum 4 is not a paragon of good 
writing, I would submit, Your Honor, and it's not 
quite as easy as we're having suggested here 
today. There's more to it than that. And the 
more to It ought to be examined at a trial where 
the people get to explain what it was, what it is, 
and what it Isn't. If It ain't a contract, it's 
not a breach of contract case, what Is it? A case 
over found money? It's not found money. It's 
$3 million that belongs to somebody that's been in 
escrow. 
And Your Honor, I appreciate that we're 
here today in December, and that motions for 
i summary judgment giving the counter-claimants the 
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1 relief they request would avoid us coming back in 
2 February. But is that what we're about, avoiding 
3 the full exposition of the Issues, giving 
4 everybody the opportunity to fully and -- step up 
5 and support their positions? If we get to ask 
6 about the Ifs and the estimates and the 
7 speculation and the reasonableness of Mr. Tiegs' 
8 affidavit supporting his damage claim? 
9 1 would suggest that the purpose of 
10 Rule 56 is to cut through things. And some things 
11 don't need to be cut through. Some things need to 
12 be explored, and I would suggest that this is one 
13 of them, especially the issue of damages, Your 
14 Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shurtliff. 
16 We're going to take -- we'll come back 
17 at quarter till, however many minutes that is. 
18 Seven. So we will be back, and court will be in 
19 recess for seven minutes. 
20 (A recess was taken from 3:38 p.m. to 3:45 p.m.) 
21 THE COURT: Back on the record, Owyhee 
22 County Case 2013-03004, James and Barbara Hilliard 
23 versus Murphy Land. 
24 Mr. Gordon, any response? 
25 MR. GORDON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. 
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1 I'll keep it brief. 
2 What we've heard from counsel for the 
3 Hilliards is argument. Argument, speculation. 
4 Notably devoid from anything that counsel for 
5 Mr. -- for the Hilllards said was any citation to 
6 anything in the record that would create a genuine 
7 issue of material fact as to the amount of damages 
8 here. 
9 Instead, what we got was an argument 
10 from counsel basically against summary judgment as 
11 a tool that this Court can use to get to the heart 
12 of the matter and to cut down on things that don't 
13 need to go to trial. Counsel's entitled to 
14 express his opinions about summary judgment, I 
15 suppose, but it's not relevant, Your Honor, and 
16 there was nothing in there that says here is the 
17 genuine issue of material fact. 
18 Counsel didn't even mention any of the 
19 affirmative defenses that were raised or any of 
20 the other arguments. Instead, counsel basically 
1 21 said: I don't like summary judgmenti we need to 
22 go to triaL Wei!, summary judgment serves a 
23 purpose. 
24 Summary judgment's purpose, as counsel 
25 admitted, is to cut through things, so that 1ly 
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1 cases where there is a genuine Issue of disputed 
2 material fact actually go to trial. And that's 
3 not this case, Your Honor. And counsel has 
4 to nothing indicating otherwise. 
S Counsel talked about the addendum. And 
6 counsel says that Murphy Land claims that this ls 
? not a contract case, that the addendum is not a 
8 contract. That is not accurate. Of course it's a 
9 contract. We're talking about -- we cite 
10 authority talking about interpreting contracts and 
11 how to deal with contracts. The addendum is a 
12 contract. It's part of the purchase and sale 
13 agreement. 
14 Of course this is a dispute about a 
15 contract. The point was that this ls not a suit 
16 for a breach of contract, where we talk about 
17 things like consequential damages. This ls a 
18 dispute to enforce a contract and to determine 
19 what does the contract say and what are the amount 
20 of the damages that the contract causes. 
21 Counsel says what does damages mean? 
22 Damages means damages, Your Honor. There's --
23 there's no limitation on what the damages are. 
24 And counsel seems to suggest that damages needs to 
25 specify exactly what damages are going to be 
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1 considered In determining the amount of damages 
2 suffered by delay of possession. 
3 There's no requirement for that. The 
4 contract, the addendum means what it says. It 
5 says damages. Murphy Land has put on competent 
6 evidence of the amount of the damages, and despite 
7 counsel's grand statements about summary judgment 
8 and about Mr. Tiegs, and his attack on Mr. negs' 
9 credibility and his reasonableness, and his 
10 suggestions that Mr. Tiegs ls being somehow less 
11 than forthright, counsel pointed to not a single 
12 thing In Mr. Tiegs' affidavit that he could attack 
13 wlth any specificity. Nothing saying that this 
14 specific fact is unsupported or unsubstantiated. 
15 Because it rs, Your Honor. It is. 
16 And counsel says, well, Mr. Tiegs says 
17 if I'd been able to farm the farm. And he says 
18 It's speculation, because he says "If." Well, of 
19 course he says If I'd been able to farm the farm, 
20 according to the -- to my farm plans. That's what 
21 you do ln a situation where somebody's prevented 
22 from doing something. You have to talk about what 
23 would have happened otherwise. But that doesn't 
24 mean the calculation of damages Is speculation. 
25 As discussed earlier, damages needs to 
Page 99 to 102 of 128 
101 
1 be established to a reasonable certainty. That 
2 does not require mathematical exactitude. It 
3 that it be taken out of the realm of 
4 speculation. 
5 Mr. Tiegs' affidavit is based upon 
6 numbers supported by comparable, actuai 
7 numbers from the same crops grown at comparable 
8 farms. And those numbers actually show that, If 
9 anything, Mr. Tiegs underestimated the amount of 
10 profit he would have made. 
11 Counsel says, well, we need to go to 
12 trial. We need to examine Mr. Tiegs. I didn't 
13 have a chance to -- to get to dispute any of these 
14 things. 
15 That's what depositions are for, Your 
16 Honor. Counsel had the opportunity to depose 
17 Mr. Tiegs. He chose not to. Counsel deposed 
18 Mr. Funk. There was not a single reference to 
19 Mr. Funk's deposition in the papers opposing 
20 summary judgment. Counsel's had that opportunity. 
21 Your Honor, counsel's statements were 
22 unsupported by the record. They mentioned many 
23 things that were not in front of this Court. 
24 Counsel's statements speculated about many, many 
25 other things, but they didn't address the heart of 
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1 the issue: Is the contract, is the addendum No. 4 
2 ambiguous? 
3 Counsel himself says I don't know, I 
4 don't know that it's not ambiguous. But he never 
5 offered a reasonable conflicting interpretation as 
6 to what damages might mean. He's talked about 
7 what does such litigation mean? Your Honor, the 
8 Hllllards have admitted that they've waived that 
9 such litigation contingency. And this was 
10 mentioned In our initial moving papers, and It's 
11 In the affidavit of Matthew Gordon, Exhibit J, 
12 response to request for admission No. 11. They 
13 waived that by fillng this lawsuit. 
14 Counsel didn't give any confllctlng 
15 interpretation of what the addendum means. 
16 Counsel didn't give any specific facts that raise 
17 a genuine Issue as to the amount of damages. 
18 There's nothing preventing summary judgment from 
19 entering In favor of Murphy Land and a declaration 
20 ordering the release of the escrow funds to Murphy 
21 Land Company. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gordon. One more 
23 question. 
24 MR. GORDON: Yes, Your Honor? 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Shurtliff did say it was -~ 
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1 it was not -- it was disputed whether or not 
2 addendum 4 was executed prior to the closing of 
3 the company. Could you point me to those 
4 documents in the record, please? 
5 MR. GORDON: Yes. Thank you for -- I meant 
6 to address that, and I simply forgot, so I 
7 the Court that to my 
8 attention. 
9 First of all, this has never been an 
10 issue raised In this litigation. I'm not sure --
11 certainly the Hilliards haven't raised this. I 
12 was surprised by Mr. Shurtliff's assertion. 
13 Number two, I'm not sure that -- I don't 
14 understand the relevance of that. 
15 But paragraph 20 of Mr. Hilliard's 
16 affidavit I believe addresses this, 
17 Mr. Shurtliff's own claim. This is at page 5 of 
18 his affidavit. It says -- Mr. HIiiiard says: My 
19 wife and I provided our son, James W. Hilliard, 
20 with a power of attorney to sign RE11, addendum 
21 No. 4. That document was executed on 
22 December 30th, 2010. 
23 It's also addressed in Mr. Tiegs' 
24 affidavit at paragraph 7, discussing the addendum 
25 No. 4. In paragraph 8 it's discussed where the 
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1 warranty deed that conveyed title was on 
2 December 30, 2010, as well. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
4 MR. GORDON: You're welcome. Any further 
5 questions, Your Honor? 
6 THE COURT: No. 
7 
8 
MR. GORDON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: So it tells me that the -- I'm 
9 looking at Mr. Hilliard's affidavit. Does --
10 maybe I'm not understanding. It appears that both 
11 the addendum 4 that was -- I don't think there's 
12 any dispute that was executed on December 30th, 
13 2010. But didn't the closing also take place on 
14 2010 -- r mean, December 30th? 
15 MR. GORDON: That's my understanding, Your 
1 of that calls into question the timing of this, of 
2 this addendum. Like I said, Mr. Shurtliff's 
3 representation about this was the first that 
4 Mr. Shurtliff or his clients have ever said 
5 anything about disputing the timing of the 
6 addendum. 
1 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Well, additionally we 
8 know, Your Honor, because the $3 million was 
9 piaced Into escrow by the Hilliards at the time of 
10 closing. That's undisputed, the $3 million 
11 remains with Guaranty Title Company. So it had to 
12 be pursuant to addendum No. 4 given to the title 
13 company. 
14 THE COURT: And --
15 MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, that doesn't answer 
16 the question -- and I don't know that it's a big 
17 question, but Your Honor, as a matter of fact, I 
18 think the recorder's records would Indicate the 
19 power of attorney was filed after the warranty 
20 here In Owyhee County on the 30th of December 
21 2010. Now, I don't know what that -- but the 
22 power to sign addendum 4 was given to the son. 
23 And so I don't -- you know, I don't know who 
24 slgned what when. 
25 THE COURT: Well, it's clear that --
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1 MR. SHURTLIFF: And I'm not going to 
2 represent to the Court that I do know. 
3 THE COURT: rt does say that -- I mean, it's 
4 clear that addendum 4 was executed on 
5 December 30th, regardless of when the power of 
6 attorney was filed. l mean, I think it's clear 
7 that the power of attorney was executed prior to 
8 the signing by the son, or I imagine we would have 
9 that as an Issue ln the case. The Hllliards, are 
10 they disputing, Mr. Shurtliff, that the $3 million 
11 was placed in the escrow fund at closing? 
12 MR. SHURTLIFF: I think not, Your Honor. It 
13 was -- the money -- the funds were transferred for 
14 the purchase of the property, and this was just 
16 Honor, correct. 16 
15 withheld from -- part of it went to pay a first 
mortgage and some other things, and so I think it 
was Just part of the parceling out by the title 17 THE COURT: And so how do we know which one 17 
18 was first? We just know they were both executed 
19 the same day? 
MR. GORDON: They were executed the same 
1
20 
21 day. My understanding is that they were 
22 executed -- that it wouldn't have -- that the 
23 dosing was not going to occur without the 
24 execution of addendum No. 4. But this -- this 
25 is -- there's nothing In the record that I'm aware 
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18 company. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think the 
20 standards for summary judgment are well known by 
21 the parties. f'ii put them on the record just in 
22 case. Under Rule 56(c), if the pleadings and 
23 depositions and admissions, including any 
24 affidavits, show there's no genuine issue of 
25 material fact, then the moving party is entitled 
28 of 
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1 to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
2 If there is conflicting information, 
3 there generally Is not granted a motion for 
4 summary judgment, unless the Court is the trier of 
5 and then the Court can resolve issues of 
6 credibility. We don't have to take all claims 
1 favor of the nonmov!ng party. I 8 The opposing party can't merely rest on 
! 9 speculation or a scintilla of evidence. Once the 
110 moving party establishes that there is not a 
1
11 genuine issue of material fact, the burden shi~s 
1 
12 to the nonmovlng party to establish the genuine 
13 issue of material fact. 
14 If the Plaintiff fails to submit 
15 evidence sufficient to establish that element of 
16 the claim, or to establish the genuine issue of 
1 addendum No. 4. The reason the Court is finding 
2 that that was executed prior to closing is that as 
3 a term and condition of the dosing, the 
4 $3 m!lllon was placed into escrow. Wouldn't go 
5 into escrow unless that had been a term and 
6 condition of the closing 
7 After executing the addendum, the sale 
8 of the farm closed and the Hilliards transferred 
9 fee simple to Murphy Land on December 30th, 
10 2013 -- 2010, excuse me. At that time, Mr. Clark 
11 indicated he would not vacate unless he would 
12 pay -- was paid $2 mlllion, and his father was 
13 paid $950,000. As a result of a lawsuit, 
14 Mr. Clark was ultimately evicted in May 2012. 
15 The issue in this case ls the second 
16 paragraph of addendum 4. It says: Upon 
17 material fact, then summary judgment is to be 17 completion of such litigation and appeals, these 
18 granted. The party against whom summary judgment 18 funds, referencing the $3 million, shall be 
19 is sought cannot rest on allegations. They have 
20 to come forward and produce evidence by way of 
21 affidavit or deposition to contradict the 
22 assertions of the moving party. 
23 The facts the Court is finding is as 
24 follows: That in 2010, Tiegs and Funk began 
25 negotiating with the Hllliards to buy a farm that 
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1 was owned by the HilHards that Jay Clark was 
2 leasing. It is also clear that either Tiegs in 
3 his 1ndivldual capacity or as a representative of 
4 the farm made it very clear to the Hilliards that, 
5 as part of that sale, they did not want Mr. Clark 
6 on the property, that they wanted Mr. Clark off 
7 the property, that they intended to farm It 
8 themselves, and they did not wish Mr. Clark to be 
9 that farmer for them. It's also clear that the 
10 Hilliarcls Indicated that they would make sure 
11 Mr. Clark was off the property. 
12 November 5th, 2010, Murphy and 
13 Hilliards execute a purchase and sale agreement. 
14 One of the express terms was that the seller's 
15 existing lease with Jay Clark be terminated. And 
16 it was understood that that lease would be 
17 terminated prior to closing. 
18 Closing would be on or before 
19 December 28th, 2010. As It got closer to 
20 December 28th, it was clear that Mr. Clark was not 
21 going to vacate, and so the closing date was 
22 extended from December 28th to December 29th. 
23 It appears that sometime either the 
24 29th or the 30th, 1 -- it's not entirely clear --
25 sometime prior to closing, the parties executed 
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19 available, to the extent determined by a court of 
20 competent jurisdiction, of the amount of 
21 purchaser's damage, If any, for loss or delay of 
22 possession of real estate purchased herein. 
23 The Court will also note that this 
24 lawsuit was initiated by the Hilliards seeking to 
25 enforce addendum 4. There was no claim by the 
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1 Hflllards that that addendum was unclear. In 
2 fact, their claim is that the language of 
3 addendum 4 is clear, and that the funds should be 
4 disbursed to them, pursuant to addendum 4, under 
5 the language -- the clear language of the 
6 addendum. 
7 The Hllliards now argue that the term 
8 Is ambiguous. They have various arguments, one of 
9 which is that they believed It only would apply to 
10 their obligation to pass clear title. We also 
11 heard today that It perhaps is ambiguous because 
12 it Isn't clear what the damage Is. 
13 The Court finds that the language of 
14 that is clear and unambiguous. There has been no 
15 legitimate dispute by the Hilliards that It's not 
16 clear. I think they are particularly bound by 
17 their complaint In this case, where they ask that 
18 the monies be disbursed to -- pursuant to that 
19 addendum. But nonetheless, even if that were not 
20 the case, they have not articulated any basis upon 
21 which the Court could find that that language is 
22 ambiguous. 
23 There is no ambiguity to the phrase, 
24 the amount of purchasers damage, if any, for loss 
25 or delay of possession of real estate purchased 
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1 herein. If there's any dispute, the Hi!liards 
2 have only advanced a dispute over the term damage, 
3 not for the loss or delay of possession of the 
4 real estate herein. 
5 As noted by Mr. Shurtllff, It was clear 
6 at the time of closing that Mr. Clark was not 
7 going to vacate the property, and it ls equally 
a clear that the purchasers wished to have some 
9 protection for his refusal to vacate, and to 
10 protect or to provide reimbursement for 3ny 
11 damages they suffered as a result for the loss or 
12 the delay of possession of the real property. 
13 The Court further finds that the 
14 Hilliards' subjective Interpretation of that 
15 phrase does not render the contract ambiguous. 
16 The Court will cite to Belk versus Martin, 136 
17 Idaho 652. The Court wlll also cite to Swanson 
18 versus Beco Construction, 145 Idaho 59: The 
19 party's failure to determine the ordinary meaning 
20 of the words used in the contract does not make it 
21 ambiguous. 
22 It was clear that the Hilliards 
23 believed that this would apply to some kind of 
24 damage. The damage they anticipated perhaps was 
25 that of clear title, but certainly the parties 
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1 were contemplating there would be some damages 
2 Incurred here. The fact that they were unclear 
3 about what those damages would be does not render 
4 the word damage ambiguous, nor is there any 
5 question about the clarity of the phrase loss or 
6 delay of possession of the real property 
7 purchased. 
8 It's also, to this Court's way of 
9 thinking, that Murphy Land made It dear that they 
10 wanted to farm the property. They wanted to 
11 engage in a business. That profits from that 
12 business would be clearly foreseeable as damages. 
13 And It makes no sense that the Hililards would now 
14 argue that the inability to use the property for 
15 the purpose that it was purchased for would not be 
16 a damage. If you look at the common law 
17 meaning -- the common meaning of the word damage, 
18 it includes rendering something valueless or 
19 unable to be used for its intended purpose. 
20 The Court finds that this is not an 
21 lndemnity contract. There's not required to be 
22 the terms hold harmless or indemnity. And as the 
23 word damages clearly contemplates lost profits, 
24 the Court is going to find there Is no genuine 
25 issue of material fact about the clarity of the 
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1 term in the second paragraph in addendum 4. And 
2 therefore, as a matter of law, Defendants are 
3 entitled to summary judgment about the plain and 
4 unambiguous ianguage, and that the funds will be 
5 used to determine the amount of damage, if any, 
6 for loss of possession. 
7 Now, the Hilliards argue that there is 
8 no consideration given for the addendum. The 
9 Court finds that that is incorrect for two 
10 reasons. The first ls that this addendum is 
11 Incorporated into the purchase and sale agreement, 
12 so the consideration that was sufficient for the 
13 purchase and sale agreement is also sufficient 
14 consideration for the addendum. 
15 Similarly, to the extent there needs to 
16 be separate consideration, that separate 
17 consideration was going forward with the contract. 
18 On December 30th, the sell -- the sellers could 
19 not fulfill condition precedent, which was the 
20 removal of Mr. Clark. The consideration by the 
21 buyers, then, was to go forward with this 
22 contract, in light of the seller's failure to meet 
23 the conditions precedent. So there was both 
24 independent consideration, but because this was 
25 part of the initial contract, purchase and sale 
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1 agreement, there does not need to be a separate 
2 consideration. 
3 The Hilllards also argue there is 
4 mutual mistake, because there was no meeting of 
5 the minds about the Interpretation of what that 
6 clause or that paragraph of this agreement meant. 
7 If there are two different interpretations, for 
8 example, each party Interprets this language 
9 differently, we do not have a mutual mistake. 
10 What we have then are two unilateral mistakes. A 
11 mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the 
12 time of contracting, share a misconception about 
13 an assurnptlon or vital fact upon which they base 
14 the bargain. 
15 There is no common misconception about 
16 a fact. For example, they both didn't 
17 misunderstand the property they were buying. In 
18 this case, there Is a disagreement about the legal 
19 interpretation of a clause. There lsn't even a 
20 factual dispute at issue here. And therefore, 
21 mutual mistake is not a ground upon which there Is 
22 sufficient evidence to defeat the motion far 
23 summary judgment. 
24 Now, the question of damages, then, 
25 typically is one for which there is a genuine 
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1 issue of material fact. However, in this case, 
2 the Court is finding that profits were a 
3 reasonably foreseeable damage. There ls no 
4 issue that that would not be -- there is 
5 no reading of this contract, and none has been 
6 proffered by the Plaintiffs in this case, that 
7 lost would not have been a damage under 
8 this contract. 
9 I simply find there Js no way this 
10 contract could be read, that phrase could be read, 
11 in light of the very clear language by Murphy, 
12 that they intended to farm this and they wanted to 
13 farm it themselves, that the amount -- the 
14 foreseeability of profits as damages raises a 
15 genuine issue of material fact. 
16 In this case, the Hilliards were on 
17 notice, and they agreed that they would be liable 
18 for any damages. Now, it is unfortunate that 
19 perhaps they didn't read this more carefully. It 
20 is perhaps unfortunate that the language Is as 
1 Issues and disputes between the parties. 
2 He recognize -- he argued that there 
3 would be disputes over water allocation, there 
4 would be disputes over who had to repair what. 
5 There would be issues with his abrlity to effect 
s crop rotation and his ability to choose the crops. 
1 Damage issues by reasons of Plaintiff's use of the 
8 farm. Putting litigants who do not get along on 
9 property will Increase the likelihood of further 
10 problems. 
11 So it does not appear, in fact, that 
12 Mr. Clark was ready, willing, and able to rent 
13 that property, and there has been no genuine issue 
14 of material fact that tnat would have sufficiently 
15 mitigated the damages. So the Plaintiffs have not 
16 established that there was that particular duty to 
17 mitigate, nor have they established by affidavits 
18 the amount of mitigation that would have been 
19 done. 
20 In terms of the amount of damages, 
21 broad as it is. But the Hilliards' failure to 21 initially there Is a question of fact about those 
22 determine the common meaning of the word damages 22 amount of damages, but Plaintiffs have failed to 
23 does not mean they are then not liable for the 23 sufflciently refute the amount of damages alleged. 
24 enforcement of that clause under the contract. 24 Because based on the lack of factual support for 
25 The Court has found no authority, none 25 the affidavits, there simply is nothing that 
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1 has been proffered by the Plaintiffs in this case, 
2 that ln terms of mitigation, one, that Mr. Tiegs' 
3 facts are unsupported. I certainly understand the 
4 disagreement that this case should be resolved 
5 through trial, rather than through summary 
6 judgment. But in order to defeat the motion for 
7 summary judgment, the Hilliards had to allege 
8 specific facts that would raise a genuine issue of 
9 material fact about the factual basis and the 
10 conclusions of Mr. Tiegs about damages. 
11 There would be -- there -- the Court 
12 has had no authority given to it that in order to 
13 mitigate those damages, Murphy Land would be 
14 required to rent that property it already owned 
15 from an individual who was trespassing. 
16 The Court also would note in the 
17 affidavit filed by Mr. Clark in this case, 
18 although he indicates he was ready, willing, and 
19 able to rent any portion of the property for any 
20 purpose, I would note that the affidavit dated 
21 March 11th, 2011, Indicates -- and I will read !t: 
22 The idea of splitting Crystal Springs Farm Into 
23 various parcels to be shared by the parties is an 
24 extremely poor idea without an agreement between 
25 the parties to do so, and will create numerous 
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1 disputes the conclusions that Mr. Tiegs has come 
2 to. 
3 The fact that some of the parties 
4 believed those conclusions to be speculative, or 
5 believed to be inaccurate, is not sufficient 
6 factual foundation, nor is ft admissible evidence 
7 that would defeat the motion for summary judgment. 
8 Therefore, the Court finds that there 
9 Is no genuine issue of material fact ln this case. 
10 As a matter of law, the Defendants are entitled to 
11 summary judgment. The Court ls going to issue an 
12 order for summary judgment. The Court is going to 
13 order that the funds that are currently held In 
14 escrow be disbursed to the Defendants. The Court 
15 ls going to require the Defendants to draft those 
16 orders, as well as orders that reflect the Court's 
17 earlier rulings on the motions to strike 
18 affidavits. 
19 Do you have any questions, Mr. Gordon? 
20 
I 21 
22 
23 you. 
MR. GORDON: No. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Schossberger? 
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: No, Your Honor. Thank 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Shurtliff? 
25 MR. SHURTLIFF: I don't have any questions, 
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1 Your Honor. I have a comment. I think it's --
2 you know, I -- I can understand English. I 
J understand the Court's ruling. 
4 But I stress again my failure to 
5 understand the process by which we get here 
6 That Ignoring rule of civil procedure 7(b), 
7 to read It in parity with 56 in some 
8 time constraints that were artificially set forth. 
9 They're not set forth by rule; they were set forth 
10 by the scheduling of this summary judgment 
11 proceeding. 
12 I think we were prejudiced by the 
13 decision to go forward with a motion to strike 
14 those affidavits, which the Court heard, 
15 determined, and has now utilized as a basis --
16 part of the basis for its decision ln this case. 
17 I further take exception to some of the 
18 other parts of the decision, but I -- I strongly 
19 take exception to the notion that you can reach 
20 into a file by an affidavit, attaching an 
21 affidavit from an earlier case, when the Rule 56 
22 doesn't provide for reply affidavits that suggest 
23 reply briefs. 
24 That was a reply affidavit, not a reply 
25 brief, that brings us to Mr. Clark's earlier 
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1 affidavits upon which the Court significantly 
2 relies to find that his testimony in this case is 
3 untoward and of limited -- and of no value, 
4 because it was significantly conflicted, in the 
5 Court's opinion, by a reading of the earlier 
6 affidavit. I think that's highly prejudicial to 
7 the Plaintiffs In this case, and significantly at 
8 odds with the rules of procedure that don't allow 
9 for reply affidavits. 
10 And secondly, that it's re -- going 
11 back to another case. Without notice or 
12 opportunity to examine all of the issues 
13 surrounding that, I think it's highly prejudicial. 
14 And in any event, I respect the Court's opinion 
15 and decision, and I appreciate the Court's time. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Shurtliff, I think those are 
17 legitimate points. I understand your need to make 
18 a record. I think we will further clarify the 
19 record. The Court struck the affidavits on 
20 alternative grounds. You, Mr. Shurtliff, had the 
21 opportunity to participate in the stipulation for 
22 scheduling the deadline for motions In this case. 
23 You were sent a copy of the order. You were sent 
24 a copy of the stipulation. There was no response 
25 to that stipulation, so the Court entered an order 
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1 indicating deadlines of which you received a copy. 
2 Those expert affidavits were not 
3 disclosed In accordance with those deadlines. 
4 Those deadlines are in place so that we can have 
5 an orderly process by which, when cases get set 
6 for a trial, both sides, both of the parties, as 
7 well as the Court, can rely on those dates, in 
B terms of preparation. It is unfair to one side to 
9 require them to be held to those deadlines, and 
10 yet allow another party to disregard those 
11 deadlines, but receive the benefit of disregarding 
12 those deadlines by providing information at a 
13 later date. 
14 In terms of reading Rule 7 in 
15 conformity with Rule 56, the Court has read those, 
16 to the extent they can, in parity. It doesn't 
17 seem appropriate that one rule would completely 
18 annihilate or render meaningless the rule for 
19 summary judgment. If Rule 7 controls, then we 
20 will never be able to schedule summary judgment 
21 motions under the timelines that are scheduled In 
22 that summary Judgment rule under Rule 56. The 
23 Court is going with Rule 56 and finding that those 
24 motions to strike, as part of the summary 
25 judgment, are subject to the summary judgment 
122 
1 rules under 56, and not under Rule 7. 
2 I also want to make clear that the 
3 Court is not ruling on this motion in summary 
4 judgment simply because it wishes to avoid a trlal 
s in February. This Court Is available. This Court 
6 is happy to do trials on any regularly scheduled 
7 date. The Court tries to put in sufficient 
8 preparation in advance of every motion hearing so 
9 that when the parties come to court, they have a 
10 court that is familiar with the issues and are not 
11 wasting their time when they come to court. That 
12 being the case, the expectation of this Court is 
13 that the parties come equally prepared for the 
14 issues that they wish to argue. 
15 The Court does not make the law as It 
16 relates to the requirements for affidavits for 
17 summary judgment purposes. The Court does not 
18 make the law as it relates to what the standards 
19 for summary judgment is. I can certainly 
20 understand the desire of Mr. and Mrs. Hilliard to 
21 have an opportunity to take this case to trial. 
22 But I would note It was Mr. and Mrs. Hiliiard that 
23 initiated this case by asking for enforcement of 
24 that addendum to the contract. 
25 As l previously said, while there may 
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have been knowledge for the affidavits, the 
affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment, in this Court's opinion, were inadequate 
to defeat the motion. If this case Is appealed 
and a court tells me differently, the Court will 
hear this again, and somebody will have told me 
that did something wrong, and they'll tell me 
how to do It correctly, and 1'11 do my best to do 
it correctly the next time I have it, if I have 
it. 
But this Court is not making this 
motion simply to avoid a trial, It's not the way 
of this Court's practice. Nor Is this Court 
14 making this ruling because it believes any of the 
15 parties involved here are bad individuals. The 
16 fact that the Hilliards are prejudiced by the 
17 conflicting affidavits of Mr. Clark, the Court 
18 thought about that, and noted that at trial --
19 because this Is a court trial, this Court would be 
20 required to assess the credibility of Mr. Clark. 
21 MR. SHURTLIFF: After examination, Your 
22 Honor. 
23 THE COURT: After examination. 
24 
25 
MR. SHURTLIFF: Which there hasn't been. 
THE COURT: Well, there has been -- there 
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1 has been testimony rendered by Mr. Clark, pursuant 
2 to those affidavits. And the Court is entitled to 
3 view that testimony in the fashion that It has 
4 been given. The Court finds that there is simply 
5 conflicting testimony about Mr. Clark's 
6 willingness to allow these individuals on the 
7 land, and that Is evidenced as -- as indicated In 
8 the affidavit 
9 It Is also evidenced and indicated by 
10 all of the parties to this, who all acknowledge 
11 that he would not remove himself from the property 
12 until ordered by the Court In May 2012, which 
13 evidences an unwillingness to work with the 
14 parties, as requested by both the Hilliards and 
15 Murphy. I'm certainly not holding the Hilllards 
16 necessarily -- I mean, they did what they could, 
17 as far as this Court Is aware, based on the record 
18 In this case. 
19 But the Court is allowed to assess 
20 credibility, and the Court simply finds that based 
21 on those two affidavits, as to that very narrow 
22 factual Issue, the Court did not find Mr. Clark to 
23 be credible without his willingness to allow other 
24 individuals to enter the farm and/or to take 
25 possession of the farm to engage in farming 
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1 that -- the purpose for which the farm was 
2 purchased. 
3 And so the Court has made its 
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4 The Court will await those orders. The Court 
5 understands you need to make a record, 
6 Mr. Shurtliff. I certainly do not hold that 
1 against you. 
8 MR. SHURTLIFF: I appreciate that. And fn 
9 that regard, Your Honor, I would take some 
10 exception to the -- any reliance on a scheduling 
11 order. That scheduling order, If the Court wlll 
12 recall, was set out In anticipation of a 
13 December 2nd, 2013, trial. That scheduling order 
14 wasn't changed at all after the trial date was 
15 moved. 
16 One would anticipate It -- some notion 
17 of changing the scheduling order to conform with 
18 new opportunities. So the suggestion that, oh, 
19 yeah, we could have taken depositions and so 
20 forth, apparently everybody thinks we were bound 
21 by the old scheduling order and not a new one, and 
22 so --
23 THE COURT: The parties were bound by the 
24 scheduling order, and none of the parties moved 
25 to, as I see in other cases, stipulate to change 
126 
1 those deadlines. There was no motion to be 
2 relieved from those deadlines, and so the Court 
3 can only conclude that the parties understood 
4 those deadlines and were prepared to be bound by 
5 those deadlines. 
6 And so that Is correct. There was not 
7 a new scheduling order given, based on your 
s client's request that this trial be moved to 
9 February. 
10 MR. SHURTLIFF: No, it wasn't my request. 
11 THE COURT: Perhaps l have that incorrect. 
12 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: No, Your Honor, But 
13 Murphy Land did move to amend the Court's 
14 scheduling order specifically to bring the summary 
15 judgment motion --
16 MR. SHURTLIFF: Exactly right, so we could 
17 get here today. 
18 MR. SCHOSSBERGER: So Your Honor --
19 MR. SHURTLIFF: Without depositions or 
20 anything else. 
21 MR, SCHOSSBER.GER: -- we did acknowledge the 
22 scheduling order, and knew we were bound by it, 
23 and asked forthat relief. So thank you, Your 
24 Honor. 
25 THE COURT: So the Court has 
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:nr1sty Davenport 
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The Court will be in recess. 
proceedings concluded at 4:23 p.m.) 
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IN ~ DISTRJCT COURT OF THIRD JUDICIAL DIS TRI T 
OF THE STArE OF IDAHO, fN ANb FOR THE COUNTY OF O YHEE 
' ' 
' JAMES & BARBARA IILLIARD, ) 
) 
) 
) 
VS. I ) 
I ) 
MURPHY LAND COMfANY, LLC, ) 
An Idaho Limited Liabi11ty Company, ) 
Case No. CV 13 03004 
MEMORANDUM IN RE PONSE TO 
MOTION TO ISSUE NDED ORDER 
Defet~t i 
The Defendant s9eks to have this Court~ this case award it $3,000,000 00 that is 
I : 
deposited with the Clerk \of the Court in another ease (CV-20 l 4-06) under the 
judge of this District. In iddition to ignoring and :asking the Court to ignore the iceties of which 
case has authority over 4e $3,000,000.00 the 0ef end~t wishes as will for the ourt to ignore 
I 
the rather plain fact that ·s Court's decision of pecember 17, 2013 is not a fi al order and that 
until and unless there is final order awarding Defendant the S3,000,000.00 t 
I 
I 
directing payment by the Clerk of the Court of nipds deposited in another case Defendant 
would be simply premattjre and more importantl; beyond the authority of this 
MEMORANDUM IN R~SPONSE TO MOTIO; TO ISSUE AMENDED O R -1 
, I I I 
I 
I 
--------·---·---------r---------··-
I 
funds are not deptsited this case 
I 
! 
has authority over those ~ds is misplaced. 
The motion shoJd be denied. 
i 
; I 
~AIED This ~day of /(LC~ 
--' 2014. 
I 
M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
Attcirney for Plaintiffs 
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MEMORANDCM IN TO MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORD R -2 
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Steven F. Schossberger, ISB No. 5358 
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: 208.344.6000 
Facsimile: 208.954.5260 
Email: sschossberger@hawleytroxell.com 
mgordon@hawleytroxell .com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
__ F}~~-M 
MAR O 7 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
I. 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and 
through its undersigned attorneys of record, hereby submits the following Opposition to the 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Motion to Alter") filed by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
James and Barbara Hilliard ("Hilliards") on January 2, 2014. 
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numerous 
procedurally problematic, and all are substantive! y unconvincing, if not meritless. On a Rule 
59(e) motion such as this, the rnovant must demonstrate that the Court committed errors of fact 
or law. But the Hilliards have shown neither. 
The Hilliards' primary argument is that this Court erred by hearing Murphy Land's 
objections to the affidavits they submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 
But that argument is foreclosed by Idaho Supreme Court precedent establishing that objections to 
summary judgment affidavits need not be raised prior to hearing at all, and, whenever raised, 
must be addressed prior to ruling on the merits of the underlying motion for summary judgment. 
The Hilliards also make two new arguments regarding supposed genuine issues of material fact 
It is too late, however, for such arguments. And, in any event, neither has merit. Finally, the 
Hilliards raise a litany of challenges to the Court's evidentiary rulings. But the Hilliards do not 
demonstrate any error of fact or law in the Court's thorough and well-reasoned analysis of the 
challenged testimony. Moreover, even if correct, their arguments are of no legal consequence 
because this Court made alternative evidentiary rulings, and the Hilliards fail to address those. 
As a result, even if this Court agreed with the Hilliards' evidentiary arguments, the result --
summary judgment in favor of Murphy Land -- would be the same. 
II. 
BACKGROUND 
On November 15, 2013, Murphy Land moved for summary judgment on grounds that: 
(1) the Addendum executed by the parties unambiguously provided that the three million dollars 
placed into escrow with Guaranty Title, Inc. (the "Escrow Funds") were to be made available to 
compensate Murphy Land for damages suffered by loss or delay of possession of Crysta! Springs 
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and (2) there was no genuine material fact that amount such damages 
exceeded the amount of the Escrow Funds. Murphy Land supported its motion for summary 
judgment with, among other things, the Affidavit of Frank Tiegs, which established that Murphy 
Land had been damaged in excess of three million dollars and set forth the basis for Murphy 
Land's damages calculations. 
On November 29, 2013, the Hilliards filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Murphy 
Land's Motion for Summary Judgment, together with affidavits of Robert F. Bennett, Ken 
Edmunds, James C. Hilliard, and Jay Clark (collectively, "Plaintiffs' Affidavits"). 
On December 5, 2013, Murphy Land filed its (1) Motion to Strike and Exclude the 
Affidavit of Ken Edmunds and Portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark and its (2) Objections to 
Evidence and Motion to Strike and Disregard Affidavit Testimony of Ken Edmunds, Jay Clark, 
Robert F. Bennett and James C. Hilliard (collectively, the "Evidentiary Objections"). That same 
day, Murphy Land also filed Memoranda in Support of its Evidentiary Objections, together with 
a Notice of Hearing noticing a hearing on the Evidentiary Objections for December 13, 2013, at 
1:00 p.m., the same time as the hearing on Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for the Hil!iards made no objection to the Notice of Hearing regarding the Evidentiary 
Objections prior to the time of the hearing. See Affidavit of Matthew Gordon filed concurrently 
herewith (''Gordon Aff."), <JI3, Exh. 1 (Hearing Transcript, hereinafter "HT"), at 10:2-13. 
On December 13, 2013, this Court heard argument on Murphy Land's Evidentiary 
Objections and its Motion for Summary Judgment. At that hearing, counsel for the Hilliards 
objected, for the first time, to the Court entertaining the Evidentiary Objections, on grounds that 
such motions had not been served upon the Hilliards fourteen days prior to the date of the 
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hearing. This Comt argument on issue, Rules 7 and 56, and concluded that, 
because of the time requirements established in Rule 56, it would be illogical to impose Rule Ts 
14-day requirement on a motion to strike evidence submitted 14 days prior to hearing. HT at 
11 :22--14 :9. The Court then proceeded to rule on the Evidentiary Objections and struck portions 
of Plaintiffs' Affidavits. See id. at 14:7--59: 11. After so ruling, the Court heard argument on 
and granted Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment. See id. at 59: 19--118: 14. 
On December 19, 2013, this Court entered: (1) an Order granting, in pait, Murphy Land's 
Evidentiary Objections ("Evidentiary Order"); (2) an Order granting Murphy Land's motion for 
summary judgment ("Summary Judgment Order"); (3) a Judgment awarding the Escrow Funds 
to Murphy Land ("Judgment"); and (4) an Order directing the release and disbursement of the 
Escrow Funds to Murphy Land ("Disbursement Order"). On January 2, 2014, the Hilliards filed 
their Motion to Alter pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e). On January 14, 2014, the Hilliards filed their 
Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Alter ("Memo"). 
Meanwhile, the Hilliards have actively sought to prevent the release of the Escrow Funds 
to Murphy Land, notwithstanding the Judgment and Disbursement Order from this Court 
directing that such monies be so disbursed. Among other things, the Hilliards threatened to sue 
Guaranty Title if it followed the direction of this Court's Release Order, causing Guaranty Title 
filed an interpleader action with this Court seeking to deposit the Escrow Funds into the Court. 
See Affidavit of Matthew Gordon in Support of Murphy Land Company, LLC's Motion to 
Consolidate, filed January 31, 2014, Tl[3-4, Exhs. 1-2. On February 28, 2014, this Court 
(Honorable Judge Nye) granted Guaranty Title's Motion to Deposit the Escrow Funds with the 
Clerk of the Court. See Gordon Aff. at 1[4. 
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III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Rule 59(e) Standards. 
The purpose of a Rule 59(e) Motion is "to allow the trial court ... to conect en-ors both 
of fact and law that had occurred in its proceedings." City of Pocatello v. State (In re SRBA Case 
No. 39576), 152 Idaho 830,837,275 P.3d 845 (2012) (quoting First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. 
Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 266, 805 P.2d 468,472 (1991)). "Consideration of I.R.C.P. 59(e) 
motions must be directed to the status of the case as it existed when the court rendered the 
decision upon which the judgment is based." Id. As a result, a Rule 59( e) motion "may not be 
used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have 
been raised earlier in the litigation." Id. (quoting Kona Enters, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 
877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). Nor can it be used "to present new information that the trial court did 
not have before it rendered its judgment." Id. (citing Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867,870, 749 
P.2d 486,489 (1988)). In short, a Rule 59(e) motion "cannot be used to raise issues and offer 
evidence that, in hindsight, the litigant wishes it would have presented prior to the entry of a final 
judgment." 
B. Most of the Hilliards' Arguments are Procedurally Improper as Directed at this 
Court's Orders Rather than its Judgment. 
As an initial matter, the Hilliards' Motion is procedurally improper insofar as it seeks to 
alter or amend not only the Judgment entered by this Court but also the various Orders entered in 
connection with the Judgment. Rule 59(e) provides for motions to alter or amend a judgment, 
not an order. It is Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) - not Rule 59 -- that permits a challenge to an interlocutory 
order, under the guise of a Motion to Reconsider. Nevertheless, the Hilliards' Motion seeks to 
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or amend the Evidentiary Order, Summary Judgment and Disbursement Order, 
addition to the Judgment See Memo at 2. As a result, it is procedurally improper. In any 
event, for the reasons discussed infra, the Motion is also substantively infirm. 
C. This Court Did not Err by Hearing Murphy Land's Evidentiary Objections Because 
an Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence can be Made at any time Prior to or 
During Hearing. 
The Hilliards' first -- and primary -- argument is that this Court erred by addressing 
Murphy Land's Evidentiary Objections at hearing less than 14 days after those Motions were 
filed. The Hilliards contend that because LR.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) states that written motions shall be 
filed and served no later than 14 days before hearing, Murphy Land committed a "patent 
violation of the Rule" by filing its Evidentiary Objections on December 5, 2013, and that such 
filing prejudiced the Billiards. Memo at 4-8. The Hilliards' argument is contrary to common 
sense and to the law. 
As this Comt recognized, there is tension between Rule 7(b)(3)(A)'s requirement for 
filing motions 14 days prior to hearing and the tirnelines set forth in Rule 56(c), and it would be 
illogical to strictly apply the former in summary judgment proceedings. Indeed, if the 14-day 
requirement of Rule 7 strictly applied in summary judgment proceedings, and the nonrnoving 
party timely filed its supporting affidavits, any motion to strike would necessarily be less than 14 
days prior to the hearing, and strict compliance with Rule 7(b)(3)(A) would require a vacation 
and re-scheduling of the hearing. This Court acknowledged this problem, and it recognized that 
a district court must rule on the admissibility of affidavits submitted in support of or opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment prior to reaching the merits. See HT at 11 :22--14:9. See, 
e.g., Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266 (2012) ("trial courts must 
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the admissibility evidence as a 'threshold question' to be answered before 
addressing the merits of motions for summary judgment") (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery, 
147 Idaho 1, 6, 205 P.3d 650, 655 (2009)). In light of that rule, the Court detennined to go ahead 
with the hearing. See HT at 13:16--14:9. 
The Comt's decision was correct, not only for the reasons stated on the record, but also 
because the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that objections to affidavits submitted in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment need not be submitted prior to the summary 
judgment hearing at all, let alone 14 days prior. Indeed, "Idaho law permits a party to wait until 
a summary judgment hearing to object to the affidavits of the opposing party." Gem State Ins. 
Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172 (2007) (citing Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-
Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
And there is "no authority in this state that requires a motion to strike." Gem State, 145 Idaho at 
15, 175 P.3d 172 (quoting Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 782-83, 839 P.2d at 1196-97). Given that 
it would have been permissible under Idaho law for Murphy Land to wait until the time of 
hearing to raise its objections to the Plaintiffs' Affidavits, the filing of such objections eight days 
prior to the hearing did not create grounds for refusing to hear such objections. 
The Hilliards' protestations about the alleged prejudice to them from not having a full 
two weeks to respond to the Evidentiary Objections are of no legal consequence, even if 
accepted at face value. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that even though a party may 
be disadvantaged by a last-minute objection to summary judgment evidence, such an objection 
must still be addressed by the district court. The Gem State court recognized the potential 
imbalance created by a rule permitting objections to be raised for the first time at hearing, but it 
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nonetheless affirmed that rule. Id. objections at oral argument reward the 
objecting party by depriving the party opposing the objection of the opportunity to provide a 
meaningful response. While the party making the objection has had the opportunity to research 
the issue and construct an argument, the party opposing the objection must immediately respond 
without opportunity for meaningful reflection.") In doing so, that court has already rejected the 
foundation of the argument about prejudice made by the Hilliards. And that analysis applies 
with even greater force here, given that Murphy Land did not raise Evidentiary Objections for 
the first time during oral argument but rather lodged them several days before the hearing. 
Moreover, the thrust of the Hilliards' arguments is that they needed extra time to "fix" the 
problems with the Plaintiffs' Affidavits. See Motion at 7-8. But a party is obligated to present 
affidavits with admissible evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment. See I.R.C.P. 
56(e). And if a party truly needs more time to prepare affidavits or take depositions. it may 
move for additional time under Rule 56(f). The Hilliards made no such motion. Nor, despite 
their repeated lamentations at hearing and in their Memo about being unable to examine Frank 
Tiegs regarding the content of his affidavit, did they move under Rule 56(e) or 56(f) for the 
opportunity to depose him, despite the fact that Murphy Land provided the Hilliards with a report 
regarding Mr. Tiegs's expected testimony, together with supporting data, on October 25, 2013, 
and the Hilliards were on notice of Murphy Land's intent to move for summary judgment by 
October 22, 2013. See Murphy Land's Disclosure of Expert Witness for Trial filed on October 
25, 2013~ Murphy Land's Motion to Re-Set Trial and Adjust Scheduling Date filed on October 
22, 2013. Despite their complaints, the reality is that the Hilliards could have -- but, for 
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reason, not to -- seek the provided for rules if they truly needed 
more time. 
For these reasons, the Court's decision to go forward with the hearing on Murphy Land's 
Evidentiary Objections and its Motion for Summary Judgment was logically and legally sound. 
Even if the Hilliards were actually disadvantaged by having less than two weeks to respond to 
the Evidentiary Objections, the law is clear that any such disadvantage is of no legal 
consequence. 
D. This Court did not Err by Determining that Murphy Land had Suffered in Excess 
of Three Million Dollars in Damages From Delayed Possession. 
The Hil!iards next argue that this Court erred in determining that there was no genuine 
dispute that the delay in possessing Crystal Springs Farm had damaged Murphy Land in excess 
of three million dollars. See Memo at 8-11. The Hilliards' arguments are procedurally deficient 
as either improperly directed at the Disbursement Order, raised for the first time in support of 
their Rule 59 Motion, or both. In any event, their arguments lack substantive merit. 
The Hilliards challenge this Court's Disbursement Order as "ultra fines mandati" because 
it was directed at Guaranty Title, a non-party to this case, and further argue that the language of 
Addendum No. 4 "anticipates and means" that the Hi11iards "are to be provided from the three 
million dollars the amount of their costs in having the exceptions removed from the title policy." 
Memo. At 9-11. The Hilliards have waived these arguments, however, because they raised them 
for the first time in their Motion to Alter. See City of Pocatello, 152 Idaho at 837 (a Rule 59(e) 
motion "cannot be used to raise issues and offer evidence that, in hindsight, the litigant wishes it 
would have presented prior to the entry of a final judgment"). Moreover, the Hilliards' "ultra 
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argument is improperly directed at the Disbursement 
of a Rule 59(e) motion, the Judgment. 
rather than the proper 
In any event, neither of the Hilliards' arguments has merit. First, the Disbursement Order 
was not, as the Hilliards suggest, an order against Guaranty Title, nor was it intended to "bind" 
Guaranty Title. Indeed, as evidenced by its Interpleader Action, Guaranty Title claimed no 
interest in the Escrow Funds and merely desired to be relieved of liability in connection with 
such funds. As a result, the authority cited by the Hilliards is inapposite. See Memo at 10. 
Moreover, any argument about the ineffectiveness of the Disbursement Order is for the party 
who is the subject of the order to make (here, Guaranty Title), not the Hilliards. In any event, the 
issue regarding the Disbursement Order is -- or will soon be -- moot because the Escrow Funds 
will be deposited with the Clerk of this Court in short order, and Murphy Land has already 
moved for an Amended Order directing the Clerk to disburse those funds to Murphy Land. 
Second, the Hilliards' argument that they are entitled to their costs pursuant to the 
language of Addendum No. 4, see Memo at 10-11, lacks any textual, legal, or logical support. 
Nothing in the second sentence of the second paragraph of Addendum No. 4 "anticipates or 
means" that the Escrow Funds are to be used to compensate the Hilliards for their fees and costs. 
To the contrary, as this Court correctly concluded, Addendum No. 4 unambiguously provides 
that the Escrow Funds are to be used to compensate Murphy Land for damages from loss of or 
delay in possessing the farm. See HT at 110: 13--113:6. To read into Addendum No. 4 an intent 
to compensate the Hilliards for their expenses would be antithetical to the unambiguous language 
and purpose of that agreement. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 10 
45522.0004.636015 l, 
In the final analysis, although the Hilliards contend there was a genuine 
issue of fact as to the entitlement to, and availability of, the three million dollars," see Memo at 
11, they again fail to identify what, specifically, is the purported "genuine issue of fact." The 
Hilliards had every opportunity to identify a genuine issue of material fact in their response to 
Murphy Land's motion for summary judgment and at oral argument. But they were unable to 
demonstrate the existence of any such issue then, and, in their Motion to Alter, they are similarly 
unable to point to anything specific that raises a genuine issue of material fact. The Court did 
not elT in granting summary judgment to Murphy Land. 
E. The Court Correctly Struck Portions of the Plaintiffs' Affidavits. 
The Hilliards' remaining arguments concern the Court's decision to strike portions of the 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits (Memo at 11-22). Again, these arguments are procedurally improper 
because they are directed at the Court's interlocutory Evidentiary Order rather than at the 
Judgment. As such, they ought to have been raised, if at all, in connection with a Rule 
1 l(a)(2)(B) motion rather than a Rule 59(e) motion. In any event, each of the arguments lacks 
substantive merit. Contrary to the Hilliards' assertion, the Court properly exercised its discretion 
by striking inadmissible portions of the Plaintiffs' Affidavits. Moreover, even if the Hilliards' 
arguments concerning the Evidentiary Order were coITect, they would be of no consequence 
because they either fail to address the Court's alternative rulings or concern statements in the 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits that, even if considered, would fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
1. Legal Standards Regarding Summary Judgment Evidence. 
"When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment, a court can only consider material which would be admissible at trial." Taft 
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Foods, Inc., -- Idaho---, 314 193, l (201 (quoting Gem State 145 
Idaho at 14, 175 P.3d at 176). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) "requires that 'supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affinnatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925,930,719 P.2d 1185 (1986) (quoting 
I.R.C.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original). As a result, "an affidavit that is conclusory, based on 
hearsay, or not supported by personal knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of LR.C.P. 
56(e)." Taft, 314 P.3d at 197 (quoting State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 
267,271, 899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995)). And evidence that does not satisfy either the requirement 
of admissibility or competency should be excluded and disregarded in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. Gardner, 110 Idaho at 130. See Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 
P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1992) ("if the evidence would be inadmissible at trial, the court should not 
consider the evidence in ruling on the motion for summary judgment"). Notably, "mere 
conjecture and opinion, without any foundation laid," is inadmissible. Gardner, 110 Idaho at 
932. Although a court is not to assess a witness's credibility at the summary judgment stage, "a 
sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be disregarded on a summary 
judgment motion." Keeven v. Estate of Keeven (in Re Estate of Keeven), 126 Idaho 290,298, 
882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994). 
For affidavit testimony from a putative expert to be admissible, "the party offering the 
evidence must show that the expert is a qualified expert in the field, the evidence will be of 
assistance to the trier of fact, experts in the particular field would reasonably rely upon the same 
type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion, and the probative value of the 
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is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Ryan, 123 Idaho at 
45, 844 P.2d 24. "In determining whether these foundational requirements have been satisfied 
the trial court must make various factual determinations; i.e., whether the expert is qualified, 
whether the evidence will be of assistance to the fact finder, whether the facts upon which the 
expert's opinion is based are of the type other experts in the field would reasonably rely on, and 
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Id. "Expert 
opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no 
assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." Id. at 46-47; 
Id. R. Evid. 702. Also inadmissible is expert opinion that "merely suggests possibilities, not 
probabilities," because such an opinion "would only invite conjecture." Slack v. Keller, 140 
Idaho 916,023, 104 P.3d 958, 965 (2004)). 
A trial court's detennination of the admissibility of testimony offered in connection with 
a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 
Idaho 237,241,280 P.3d 740, 744 (2012). "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (l) 
correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies 
the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." Id. 
( quoting O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)). 
2. The Court Correctly Excluded Inadmissible Portions of Jay Clark's Affidavit. 
The Hilliards claim that Mr. Clark's Affidavit raised "at least" two genuine issues of 
material fact, regarding damages and regarding mitigation. Memo at 14-15. They are incorrect 
on both counts. 
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an initial matter, the Hilliards confuse and conflate the rulings regarding the 
Clark Affidavit. The Hilliards devote the bulk of their Jay Clark-related argument to the 
contention that the Court erred in considering Mr. Clark's prior affidavits from a related case and 
in assessing Mr. Clark's credibility. But, to be clear, the Court considered Mr. Clark's prior 
testimony and commented on his lack of credibility only with regard to Mr. Clark's testimony 
regarding his alleged willingness to rent the entire farrn to Murphy Land, which testimony is 
relevant only to the issue of mitigation. 
a) The Court Correctly Struck Portions of the Clark Affidavit that 
Purported to Address the Damages Suffered by Murphy Land. 
As to the issue of damages, the Court struck portions of Mr. Clark's testimony regarding 
damages on grounds that: (1) to the extent it was expert testimony, Mr. Clark had not been 
disclosed as an expert; and (2) Mr. Clark's statements lacked foundation or support and were 
conclusory. See HT at 36:9--51:8. In so ruling, the Court properly recognized its role at the 
summary judgment stage and ruled accordingly: 
rm limited to looking at the affidavits that I have in front of me 
and determining, in and of themselves, whether those affidavits 
would constitute admissible evidence at trial. Without appropriate 
foundation, that statement would not be admissible at trial, and the 
Court is therefore going to strike it from the affidavit. 
HT at 49:22--50:4. See HT at 51:6-8 ("The affidavit simply doesn't provide sufficient support 
for the conclusions that it is making."). The Court's analysis is entirely consistent with 
controlling law. See, e.g., Gardner, 110 Idaho at 932 ("mere conjecture and opinion, without 
any foundation laid," is inadmissible); Taft, 314 P.3d at 197 ("an affidavit that is conclusory, 
based on hearsay, or not supported by personal knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of 
LR.C.P. 56(e).)" 
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Hilliards no serious argument to the contrary. Indeed, counsel admitted during 
argument that Mr. Clark's statements were "conclusory." HT at 50:9-10. And the Hilliards 
raise no challenge to the Court's exclusion of Mr. Clark's statements as purported expert 
testimony. Instead of addressing the Court's actual rulings regarding the Clark Affidavit, the 
Hilliards instead argue, without any support, that the Court "totally discounted" Jay Clark's 
testimony regarding damages "apparently on its view that he lacked credibility .... " Memo at 14-
15. That is simply incorrect. As the transcript of the hearing demonstrates, the Court's decision 
to strike portions of Jay Clark's Affidavit that purported to raise an issue regarding Murphy 
Land's damages (paragraphs 6-9) was based upon the lack of foundation or the irrelevancy of the 
testimony, not upon assessments of Jay Clark's credibility. See HT at 36:9--51 :8. It was only 
later, when issuing its ruling on the motion for summary judgment and discussing the Hilliards' 
mitigation defense and the testimony in the second paragraph No. 9 in Jay Clark's Affidavit, lthat 
the Court addressed the inconsistency among Mr. Clark's various affidavits and expressed 
concerns about his credibility with respect to that "very narrow factual issue." See HT at 116:16-
117:15; 123:25--125:2. 
b) The Court Correctly Ruled that the Hilliards Failed to Raise a 
Genuine Issue of Material Fact Regarding Their Mitigation Defense. 
As to the issue of mitigation, the Court correctly ruled that the Hilliards failed to raise 
any genuine issue of fact regarding any duty to mitigate its damages. As a result, any error in 
1 Jay Clark's Affidavit erroneously had two consecutive paragraphs numbered "9." The first of 
these discussed Mr. Clark's alleged "hard costs" in preparing the fann in 2012, while the 
second addressed Mr. Clark's alleged willingness to rent the farm to Murphy Land. 
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Mr. s regarding willingness to rent the farm to Murphy Land was 
harmless because the Court ruled on alternative grounds. 
In fact, the Court first held that no authority established that Murphy Land had a duty to 
mitigate by attempting to rent property it already owned from a trespasser. HT at 115:25--
116: 15. Only after making that legal conclusion, the Court also noted the contradiction among 
Mr. Clark's various affidavits and concluded that, in light of Mr. Clark's earlier testimony, it did 
not appear that he was actually willing to rent the entire fann to Murphy Land. Id. at 116: 16-
117:13. The Court further noted that, even if Murphy Land had rented the entire farm, there was 
no genuine issue of material fact that renting would have sufficiently mitigated its damages. Id. 
at 117: 15. The Court conciuded that the Hilliards failed to establish either that there was a 
particular duty to mitigate by attempting to rent from Mr. Clark or "the amount of mitigation that 
would have been done." Id. at 117:1.5-19. 
The Hilliards had argued that Murphy Land failed to mitigate its damages because it did 
not seek to rent the entirety of Crystal Springs Farm from the trespasser on the farm, Jay Clark. 
In support, the Hilliards pointed to the second paragraph No. 9 in the Clark Affidavit, in which 
he stated that he wouid have been willing to rent Crystal Springs Farm to Murphy Land. The 
Court acted within its discretion in recognizing that the second paragraph No. 9 directly 
contradicted Mr. Clark's prior testimony. See Keeven, 126 Idaho at 298,882 P.2d at 465. But 
even if the Court had not assessed Jay Clark's credibility on that limited issue, the result would 
not have changed because the Court correctly concluded, irrespective of Mr. Clark's testimony 
regarding renting the farm, that the Hilliards' mitigation argument was legally unsupported, and 
that Mr. Clark's testimony did not contain enough specific facts about renting the farm to raise a 
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about mitigation. Moreover, although Court not the 
issue, it could also have ruled in Murphy Land's favor regarding mitigation based simply on the 
fact that mitigation is an affirmative defense that the Hilliard never pled. See McCormick Int'l 
USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920,924,277 P.3d 367,371 (2012). As a result, any eITor in 
assessing Jay Clark's credibility was harmless. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 92 Idaho 533, 537, 
447 P.2d 10, 14 (1968). 
This Court held, as a matter of Jaw, that Murphy Land was not obligated to attempt to 
rent back from a trespasser land that it owned in fee simple. Indeed, the Hilliards correctly note 
that the Court's determination that Murphy Land had no such obligation was "a conclusion of 
law ... " Memo at 14. But the Hilliards cite no authority to the contrary. As a result, they have 
failed to establish any basis for the Court to alter its Judgment in that regard. 
Moreover, even if a landowner in Murphy Land's position was obligated to attempt to 
rent back land it owned from a trespasser, and even if the Clark Affidavit was considered in its 
entirety as credible, admissible, evidence, it still failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding mitigation because it contains nothing indicating that, had Murphy Land rented all of 
Crystal Springs Farm from Jay Clark, it would have reduced its damages. In particular, the Clark 
Affidavit contains no information about the terms on which he would have been willing to rent 
the farm and nothing about the amount he would have charged for rent. It can be presumed that, 
if Jay Clark had actually been willing to rent the entire farm to Murphy Land, it would not have 
come cheaply, given Mr. Clark's testimony about how much he had already invested in the farm 
for the 2011 growing season and how much he expected to make from growing the crops 
himself. 
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Presumptions there is the record before this Court indicating that 
Murphy Land's damages would have been any less had they been able to rent the entire farm 
from Jay Clark. Mr. Clark's testimony is a "mere suggestion" rather than the specific facts 
necessary to satisfy the Hilliards' burden of creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
mitigation. See McCormick, 152 Idaho at 924, 277 P.3d 367 (the party who raises the issue of 
mitigation "bears the burden of proving that the proposed means of mitigation were reasonable 
under the circumstances, could be accomplished at a reasonable cost, and were within the 
plaintiffs ability. Proof of the latter of these three requires more than a mere suggestion that a 
means of mitigation exists.") (emphasis added); Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 
P.3d 485 (2009) ("a nonmoving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative 
defense on a motion for summary judgment"). 
3. The Court Correctly Excluded and Struck Portions of Ken Edmunds's Affidavit. 
The Hilliards' arguments regarding this Court's decision to exclude and strike portions of 
the affidavit of Ken Edmunds suffer from similar infirmities. The Hilliards again ignore the 
alternative rulings made by the Court, and, as a result, their arguments fail even on their own 
terms. Moreover, the arguments themselves lack substantive merit 
As an initial matter, the Hilliards completely ignore the threshold ruling by the Court to 
exclude the summary attached to the Edmunds Affidavit. The Court ordered the summary 
excluded on the basis that the Hilliards had failed to comply with the Court's scheduling order by 
failing to timely provide Mr. Edmunds's opinion and report. HT at 29:12-17. It was undisputed 
that the Hilliards did not make such disclosures, nor that they failed to supplement their 
interrogatory responses as required, see HT at 18:5-11, and the Court acted well within the 
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~~u,,~u of its discretion in making such a ruling. E.g., McKim Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 
149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006) ("Upon motion or on its own initiative, the district court may impose 
sanctions for failure to obey a scheduling or pre-trial order"; sanctions may include exclusion of 
evidence under Rule 37). For that reason, the Hilliards' arguments about the Edmunds Affidavit 
are of no consequence -- even if they were correct that the Court had eITed in its alternative 
rulings regarding the Edmunds Affidavit, any such error would be harmless. 
In any event, the Hilliards' arguments lack merit. The Hilliards contend that the Court 
erred when it struck portions of the Edmunds Affidavit based on lack of foundation, and that the 
Court tested the admissibility of the statements in that affidavit on a "summary unquestioned 
view of the proffered testimony" rather than based on "thoughtful analysis." Memo at 15-16. 
Contrary to the Hilliards' contention, the Court engaged in an extensive, thorough, and 
thoughtful analysis of the challenged portions of the Edmunds Affidavit, striking certain portions 
as hearsay or lacking in foundation and refusing to strike others. HT at 29: 18--35: 19. As a 
result, not only is the Hilliards' attack on the Court's analysis unwarranted, it is also completely 
contrary to the record. And the Hilliards fail to explain any error in the Court's conclusion that 
certain of Mr. Edmunds's statements iacked foundation. Instead, the Hilliards confuse and 
conflate the issue of "foundation." See Memo at 15-16. The law is well-settled that a statement 
in an affidavit that lacks sufficient foundation is inadmissible and is properly excluded on that 
basis. See Gardner, 110 Idaho at 932; Gerdon, 153 Idaho at 245, 280 P.3d at 748 (affirming 
district court's exclusion of affidavit testimony that was "conclusory and lacks foundation"). 
The Hilliards also appear to contend that this Court eITed by "apparently determin[ing] 
that Mr. Edmunds was not an expert. ... " See Memo at 16-17. But while the Court did express 
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Mr. had relevant expertise -- skepticism that 
was presumably not ameliorated by counsel's response, namely that Mr. Edmunds was not an 
expert in farming but rather "in numbers, and in dealing with numbers, and in getting to source 
of numbers and those sorts of things," see HT at 21 :23--22:2 -- and the Court would have acted 
well within its discretion if it had ruled that Mr. Edmunds did not qualify as an expert, the 
Court's basis for excluding the attachment to the Edmunds Affidavit was the failure to comply 
with the scheduling order, not any conclusion about Mr. Edmunds's qualifications. See HT at 
29:12-17. 
4. The Court Correctly Excluded Portions of the Affidavit of Robert R. Bennett. 
The Hilliards next argue that the Court erred in determining that portions of the Bennett 
Affidavit were hearsay and/or lacked foundation "without granting Plaintiff the opportunity to 
lay a foundation." See Memo at 17-19. While not entirely clear, it appears that such argument is 
based upon a contention that, if only the Billiards had been afforded more time, they could have 
fixed the lack of foundation by supplying more information. See id. But, as discussed above, the 
Billiards could have filed a motion for a continuance. In any event, the Hilliards' argument is 
essentially a rehash of their contention that they were prejudiced because Murphy Land filed its 
Evidentiary Objections less than 14 prior to the hearing. For the reasons discussed supra in 
Section C, that argument fails in light of Idaho Supreme Court precedent establishing that an 
evidentiary objection to affidavits submitted in support of or opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment can be made even at the time of hearing. 
As with its analysis of the other Plaintiffs' Affidavits, the Court's analysis of the 
challenged portions of the Bennett Affidavit was through, logical, and well within the bounds of 
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See at 51 :2 14. The Court struck some portions as hearsay or lacking in 
foundation and let others stand. The Hilliards have provided no cogent argument why any of the 
Court's rulings was en-oneous. Other than complaining that they were not afforded ample 
opportunity to provide more foundation, the Hilliards only argument is their utterly unsupported 
-- and unsupportable -- contention that the hearsay attributions to Sheryl Reyment in paragraph 
13 should not have been stricken because Ms. Reyment, the escrow agent, was "representing 
both buyer and seller" and she was thus a party opponent. See Memo at 18-19. 
5. The Court Correctly Excluded Portions of the Affidavit of James C. Hilliard. 
The Hilliards raise six particular issues with respect to the Court's decision to strike 
portions of the Hilliard Affidavit. See Memo at 19-22. None has merit. 
As a preliminary matter, the Hilliards fail to establish how any of the alleged e1Tors in 
striking portions of the Hilliard Affidavit ( or the Bennett Affidavit) are of any consequence. 
Even if considered, none of those statements created an issue regarding the material fact at issue 
in this case -- the amount of damages incurred by Murphy Land from the extensive delay in 
possession of Crystal Springs Farm. As a result, even if the Court had erred in striking those 
statements -- and it did not -- any such error would have been harmless because it wouid not 
have affected the Court's ultimate decision on Murphy Lands' motion for summary judgment. 
In any event, the Hilliards' arguments are unsupported by fact or law. 
Indeed, many of the Hilliards' arguments about the Hilliards Affidavit are premised upon 
an apparent fundamental misunderstanding of contract law and a court's role at the summary 
judgment stage. The Hilliards appear to fail to understand that the Court ruled, as a matter of 
law, that Addendum No. 4 was unambiguous, a ruling the Court is unquestionably permitted to 
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at summary judgment stage, and that, in light the parties' 
understandings of the meaning of the Addendum are irrelevant. See, e.g., Boise Mode, LLC v. 
Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, -- Idaho---, 294 P.3d 1111, 1120 (2013) ("When interpreting a 
written contract, this Comt begins with the language of the contract itself. If a contract's 
language is unambiguous, then its meaning and legal effect must be determined from its 
words .... Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law[.]"); Swanson v. Beco 
Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748 (2007) ("[a] contract is not rendered ambiguous on 
its face because one of the parties thought that the words used had some meaning that differed 
from the ordinary meaning of those words"). This error infects and vitiates nearly all of the 
Hil!iards' arguments regarding the Hilliard Affidavit. 
The Hill iards first argue that the Court somehow erred in stating that the statement in 
paragraph 17 was "'unclear' as a concept of what Addendum 4 was." Memo at 19. But the 
Court did not strike that paragraph. It merely stated that it would not allow Mr. Hilliard's 
subjective understanding "as a legal interpretation." HT at 55:25--56:13. The Court was correct 
because a party's subjective understanding of contract language is irrelevant and inadmissible 
when the contract is unambiguous. See Swanson, 145 Idaho at 63. 
The Hilliards next argue that paragraph 18 is not hearsay because it was offered "as to the 
state of the mind as to the issue of going forward with the sale ... " Memo at 19-20. The Court 
con-ectly ruled that paragraph 18 was two levels of hearsay. See HT at 56: 14-19. The statement 
was clearly being offered for the truth of its assertion about Murphy Land's alleged 
unwillingness to accept a refund of the earnest money and alleged desire to close the sale before 
year end. And even if the Hilliards' argument about state of mind was correct, that would still 
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a hearsay exception for only one of hearsay 
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 574, n. 9, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995) 
("Hearsay within hearsay is not admissible unless each part of the combined hearsay statements 
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rules.") (citing LR.E. 805). 
The Hilliards' challenges to the Court's decision to strike a portion of paragraphs 20 and 
22, see Memo at 20-21, are misguided because they again ignore the fact that the Court ruled, as 
a matter of law, that Addendum No. 4 was unambiguous, and, as a result, Mr. Hilliard's view of 
the meaning of Addendum No. 4 was irrelevant. The Hilliards' contention that the Court "could 
only reach" the conclusion that Addendum No. 4 was unambiguous "by weighing the evidence" 
is again completely contrary to well-settled law and to the facts. See Boise Mode, LLC, 294 P.3d 
at 1120. 
The Court also properly struck Mr. Hilliard's conclusory statement regarding 
consideration. The Hilliards' argument to the contrary, see Memo at 21-22, e1Toneously 
contends that Mr. Hilliards' conclusory opinion about a matter of law is sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. It is not. Taft, 314 P.3d at 197 ("an affidavit that is conclusory, 
based on hearsay, or not supported by personal knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 56(e)"). 
The Hilliards' final argument again raises the issue of the Court's ruling that Addendum 
No. 4 is unambiguous. See Memo at 22. The Hilliards reveal the depth of their 
misunderstanding by claiming that "the Court's conclusion that Addendum 4 is unambiguous is a 
finding of fact or a conclusion of law outside the parameters of summary judgment." Id. 
(emphasis added). To the contrary, it is well-settled that, on a motion for summary judgment 
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a dispute over the meaning a contract, a court must 
contract is unambiguous as a matter of iaw. See Boise Mode, 
determine whether 
294 P.3d at 1120. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the Hilliards' Motion to Alter. This 
Court did not err in excluding certain evidence, in granting Murphy Land's motion for summary 
judgment, or in ordering the disbursement of the Escrow Funds to Murphy Land. 
DATED THIS 1"' ~y of March, 2014. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
~~ BY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
ISSUE AMENDED ORDER 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and 
through its undersigned attorneys of record, submits the following reply in support of its Motion 
to Issue an Amended Order filed February 28, 2014 ("Motion") and in response to the 
Opposition to the same filed by Plaintiffs James & Barbara Hilliard on March 7, 2014 
("Opposition"). 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER - 1 
45522.0004.6458521. 
1 a11uny M 1.1.1 er 
its Motion, Murphy Land seeks an the 
Court to release the $3,000,000 deposited with the Clerk by Guaranty Title, Inc_ In its 
Opposition, the Hilliards raise two objections, neither of which is supported by authority or 
logical argument. 
Page 3 
First, the Billiards claim that the Court's decision of December 17, 2013 "is not a final 
order" and that until there is a final order, any order directing the Clerk of this Court to disburse 
the $3,000,000 would be "simply premature." This argument echoes the statements and threats 
made by the Billiards to Guaranty Title, Inc., in connection with the Order that this Court 
previously issued regarding the disbursement of the funds. See Affidavit of Matthew Gordon in 
Support of Mmphy Land Company, LLC's Motion to Consolidate, filed January 31, 2014, <j[<[3-4, 
Exhs. 1-2. Contrary to the Hilliards' contentions to Guaranty Title and in its Opposition, this 
Court entered a final Judgment in this case on December 19, 2013. See I.R.C.P. 54(a). The 
Billiards subsequently moved this Court, pursuant to Rule 59(e), to alter or amend that 
Judgment. Hearing on the Billiards' motion is scheduled for March 14, 2014, and hearing on 
Murphy Land's instant Motion is set to follow thereafter. If this Court denies the Billiards' Rule 
59( e) Motion, the Judgment entered December 19, 2013 will again be a final Judgment, and 
proceedings to enforce the Judgment "may issue immediately." I.R.C.P. 62(a). In the interest of 
avoiding further delay, Murphy Land filed this Motion so that it could be heard directly after this 
Court rules on the Billiards' Rule 59(e) Motion. In short, if this Court denies the Hilliards' Rule 
59(e) Motion, the Order requested by Murphy Land will not be premature but will be consistent 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's prior rulings and orders. 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER - 2 
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the assert that no to 
to disburse the $3,000,000 because tliose funds "are not deposited in this case." But the 
Hilliards cite nothing in support of their contention. And the funds are -- or soon will be --
deposited with the Clerk of this Court. Moreover, this Court has, in this case, already determined 
that Murphy Land is entitled to such funds. The Interpleader Action filed by Guaranty Title, Inc. 
was for the purposes of depositing the $3,000,000 with the Clerk of the Court. The issue of 
which pruty is entitled to that money is the subject of this case, and it has been already 
determined that Murphy Land is so entitled. As a result, unless this Court rules differently in 
response to the Hilliards' Rule 59(e) Motion, this Court should, consistent with its prior 
determination that the funds belong to Murphy Land and its previous Order directing the release 
of those funds to Murphy Land, issue an Amended Order directing the Clerk of this Court to 
disburse the funds to Murphy Land. 
DATED THIS 12th day of March, 2014. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
BY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
17 Alvemo Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
Jay R. Friedly 
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD 
340 East 2nd North 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
[Attorneys for PlaintijfJ 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
DE-mail 
ErTelecopy: 208-343-3282 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com 
B-Telecopy: 650-298-8097 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D E-mail: jay@hfwlaw.com 
B"Telecopy: 208.587.3144 
Matthew Gordon 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-13-03004 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
The Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants James 
and Barbara Hilliard (the "Hilliards") came on for hearing before this Court on March 14, 2014. 
M. Karl Shurtliff appeared and argued for the Hilliards. Matthew Gordon of Hawley Troxell 
Ennis & Hawley LLP appeared and argued for Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land 
Company, LLC ("Murphy Land"). Having considered the filings and arguments of the parties, 
and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and in accordance with the Court's oral 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT-! 
45522.()004.6463699. I 
201 are incorporated herein by 
Court rules as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Hilliards' Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment is denied. 
SO ORDERED THIS fr day of March, 2014. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT-2 
45522,()004.6463699 I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I ~,{1,:i, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14 .,,day of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
17 Alverno Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
Steven F. Schossberger 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Ovo/night Mail 
~¥mil 
tf'lelecopy: 208-343-3282 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Ove ight Mail 
D ail: weldon@weldonwoo<l.com 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 } 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Over 1ght Mail 
P.O. Box 1617 DE 1ail 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 elecopy: 208-954-5260 
ANGELA BARKELL 
Clerk of the Court 
sy {gS11,vw., (1wl1-V 
Deputy Clerk 
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JUDGMENT-3 
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A~. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho) 
limited liability company, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
) 
Case No. CV -13-03004 
ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF 
COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED 
FUNDS 
Pursuant to: (1) the Order granting Defendam/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company. 
LLC's ("Murphy Land"} Motion for Summary Judgment entered on December 19, 2013; (2) the 
Order Denying Plaintiffs/Counterclaimants James and Barbara Hilliard's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment entered on March 14, 2014~ and (3) Murphy Land's Motion to Issue Amended 
Order, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and in accordance with the Court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law announced orally at hearing on December 13, 2013 and 
March 14, 2014, 
ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED 
FUNDS- 1 
45522 ()()(l4.643'.l8I5 l 
IT IS HEREBY ~~n~~ that the Clerk Court shall disburse to Murphy Land 
Company the $3,000,000 previously deposited with the Clerk of Court by Guaranty Title, Inc., 
together with any accrued interest. The disbursemenl shall be payable to "Murphy Land, LLC" 
and shall be sent to Murphy Land's counsel, Steven F. Schossberger of Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP, at 877 Main Street, Suite 1000, Boise, Idaho, 83701. 
SO ORDERED THIS r::::t_ day of March, 2014. 
ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED 
FUNDS-2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Jtlrt'day of March, 2014, I caused to he served a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE 
DEPOSITED FUNDS THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED FUNDS by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
[Attorney for Plaintiffs] 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
17 Alverno Court 
Redwood City, CA 94061 
Steven F. Schossberger 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D E;lf{ail 
DTelecopy: 208-343-3282 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D ~ail: weldon@weldonwood.com 
~Telecopy: 650-298-8097 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 } 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1617 D~ail 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 JJ'Telecopy: 208-954-5260 
ANGELA BARKELL 
Clerk of the Court 
A 
By &/lruVL a1rutt----
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED 
FUNDS-3 
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Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES and BARBARA HILLIARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an 
Idaho Limited Liability company, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CVB-3004 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is 
entered in favor of Defend.ant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC and against 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants James and Barbara Hilliard on all claims and counterclaims 
in the amount of three million dollars ($3.()00,000). The Hilliards' claims are dismissed 
with prejudice in their entirety. 
Dated this 4 day of March, 2014. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
OF SERVICE 
undersigned certifies that on of March, 20 l 4, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT on the following 
individuals in the manner described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
AITORNEY AT LAW 
PO Box 1652 
Boise, ID 83701 rri~: Jt/3,, 3:J.f'd/ 
• upon counsel for defendants: 
Steven F. Schossberger 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 W Main St, Ste 1000 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 ~#,£. 1l/Z/.-§:%:v 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with 
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
ANGELA BARKELL, 
Clerk of the Court 
JutL(l~ 
By:------------
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES and BARBARA HILLIARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURPHY LAND COMP ANY, LLC, an 
Idaho Limited Liability company, 
No. Date and Time Destination 
001 03/20/2014 14:12 3433282 
002 03/20/201414:14 9545260 
Defendants. 
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M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
PO Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
Telephone (208) 343-2900 
Facsimile (208) 343-3282 
WELDON S. WOOD 
Attorney at law 
Idaho State Bar Number 1015 
17 Alvemo Court 
Redwood City, California 94061 
Telephone: (650) 743-1079 
Fax: (650) 298-8097 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
_F}~~·Pt P.M. 
2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLIARD, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
vs. 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, 
Defendant/Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 13 03004 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT MURPHY LAND COMPANY 
LLC AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY STEVENS. SCHOSSBERGER, HAWLEY 
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, 877 MAIN ST., SUITE 1000, BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN 
THAT: 
1. The above named Plaintiffs/ Appellants James and Barbara Hilliard appeal against the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - l 
above-named Defendant/Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment 
granting Defendant/Respondent's Counterclaim and Claim in the amount of three million dollars 
($3,000,000.00) and dismissing Plaintiffs/Appellant's claims with prejudice and filed March 20, 
2014. The basis for the right to appeal in Rule 11 ( a )(1) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, Honorable 
Judge Molly J. Huskey presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and 
orders described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1 ). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal: the appeal is taken as to matters of law and fact including 
whether the District Court (a) applied the proper legal/factual standard in determining whether a 
grant of Summary Judgment was in accord with said standards and in accord with the record as 
adduced on the Motion for Summary Judgment (b) properly heard on December 13, 2013 a 
motion by Defendant/Respondent to exclude witness testimony and motion to strike and 
disregard affidavit evidence notwithstanding the failure of movants to comply with Rule 7(b )(3) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (time limits); (c) whether the court properly determined to 
exclude and strike certain testimony from Plaintiffs/ Appellant's affidavits; ( d) whether the 
court's judgment awarding three million dollars ($3,000,000,00) to Defendant/Respondents was 
properly based on the evidence produced and supported by fact and law; ( e) grant of summary 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
judgment is supported by fact and law and (f) whether the court properly complied with the 
proper legal standard in considering the motion for summary judgment; i.e. and e.g. did the Court 
indulge in weighing evidence to reach its decision to grant summary judgment. 
4. (a) ls a reporter's transcript requested? Yes; a standard transcript; both hard copy and 
electronic. 
5. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
(agency's) record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R.: affidavits 
filed by the parties in support of and opposition to motion for summary judgment. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
( c) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the Clerk's record. 
( d) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED This _i__ day of be:----?- , 2014. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -11__ day of µ 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to: 
Steven F. Schossberger 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
, 2014, I served a true 
In the Supreme Court of the State~{r~o 
JA1v1ES HILLIARD and BARBARA 
HILLIARD, 
Plaintiffs-Cross Defendants-Appellants, 
V. 
MURPHY LAND COMP ANY, LLC, 
Defendant-Cross Respondent-
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--iA.M. P.M. 
MAY 12 20flt 
ORDER 
~~ BARKE,L.L, CLERK 
. ~QA J puty"tierk 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42093-2014 
Owyhee County No. 2013-3004 
The Notice of Appeal filed April 24, 2014 in District Court and April 28, 2014 with 
this Court is not in compliance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17 in that it does not list by date(s) the 
hearings requested, neither the Notice of Appeal nor the Certificate of Service shows service on the 
reporter of whom a transcript is requested and the email address of both Karl M. Shurtliff and 
Weldon S. Wood; therefore, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is SUSPENDED in order 
for Appellant to file an AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL in compliance with Idaho Appellate 
Rule 17. The Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed in the District Court within fourteen (14) 
days from the date of this Order or this appeal will be DISMISSED. 
cc: 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal is SUSPENDED until further notice. 
DATED this Li!!_ day of April, 2014. 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Judge 
ORDER TITLE- Docket No. 42093-2014 
II 
Trina Aman 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Attachments: 
Trina Aman 
Monday, May 2014 11:10 AM 
Linda Steude (secls@canyonco.org); whitinglaural@yahoo.com 
FW: Hillard vs. Murphy land CV-13-3004 
doc20140512110220.pdf 
Order/on Appeal to Supreme Court 
1 
M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
Attorney at Law 
816 West Bannock, Suite 200 
PO Box 1652 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652 
karlshurtlift@gmail.com 
Telephone (208) 343-2900 
Facsimile (208) 343-3282 
WELDON S. WOOD 
Attorney at law 
Idaho State Bar Number 1015 
17 Alverno Court 
Redwood City, California 94061 
weldon@weldonwood.com 
Telephone: (650) 743-1079 
Fax: (650) 298-8097 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
FILED 
A.M~P.M. 
MAY 19 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLIARD, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
vs. 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, 
Defendant/Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 13 03004 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT MURPHY LAND COMPANY 
LLC AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY STEVENS. SCHOSSBERGER, HAWLEY 
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, 877 MAIN ST., SUITE 1000, BOISE, IDAHO 83701, 
sschossberger@hwalevtroxell.com, TELEPHONE 208-388-4975 AND THE CLERK OF THE 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Plaintiffs/ Appellants James and Barbara Hilliard appeal against the 
above-named Defendant/Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment 
granting Defendant/Respondent's Counterclaim and Claim in the amount of three million dollars 
($3,000,000.00) and dismissing Plaintiffs/Appellant's claims with prejudice and filed March 20, 
2014. The basis for the right to appeal in Rule 1 l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, Honorable 
Judge Molly J. Huskey presiding. The changes highlighted herein are in response to the Order of 
April 12, 2014. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and 
orders described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal: the appeal is taken as to matters of law and fact including 
whether the District Court (a) applied the proper legal/factual standard in determining whether a 
grant of Summary Judgment was in accord with said standards and in accord with the record as 
adduced on the Motion for Summary Judgment (b) properly heard on December 13, 2013 a 
motion by Defendant/Respondent to exclude witness testimony and motion to strike and 
disregard affidavit evidence notwithstanding the failure of movants to comply with Rule 7(b )(3) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (time limits); ( c) whether the court properly determined to 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
exclude and strike certain testimony from Plaintiffs/Appellant's affidavits; (d) whether the 
court's judgment awarding three million dollars ($3,000,000,00) to Defendant/Respondents was 
properly based on the evidence produced and supported by fact and law; ( e) grant of summary 
judgment is supported by fact and law and (f) whether the court properly complied with the 
proper legal standard in considering the motion for summary judgment; i.e. and e.g. did the Court 
indulge in weighing evidence to reach its decision to grant summary judgment. 
4. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes; a standard transcript; both hard copy and 
electronic. Hearings of December 13, 2014 and March 4, 2014. 
5. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
(agency's) record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: affidavits 
filed by the parties in support of and opposition to motion for summary judgment. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; Laura 
Whiting, c/o Judge Husky, Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho. 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
( c) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the Clerk's record. 
( d) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid. 
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( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED This Jl day of f/':--:::ar= , 2014. 
M'. KARL SHURTLIFF 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the n day of ~ 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to: 
Steven F. Schossberger 
, 2014, I served a true 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP { . ~ f J-v1. 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 '7_ " ,l ( ~ 1-\f 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
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FILED 
~.M. P.M. 
JUN O 4 2014 
l ep lerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLARD 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV13-3004 
ORDER ON COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES 
The Defendant, Murphy Land Company, LLC (Murphy Land), seeks attorney fees in this 
matter pursuant to LC. §§12-120 and 12-121, and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), 54(d)(5), 54(e)(l), and 
54(e)(3). 
This case arose out of a contract for the sale of farm land in Owyhee County between the 
Hilliards, Plaintiffs, as seller, and Murphy Land, Defendant. as buyer. The Hilliards used the 
property for commercial farming purposes, and Murphy Land likewise purchased the property 
for commercial farming purposes. Addendtun No. 4 to the land sale contract provided that the 
Plaintiffs would place three million dollars ($3,000,000) of the purchase price to be held in trust 
by Guaranty Title, Inc., pending deletion of Exception Nos. 32 and 33 on the commitment for 
title insurance. Specifically, these funds were intended to cover damages that resulted from the 
inability of Murphy Land to take possession of the land at the time of the sale. 
Upon what the Hilliards understood to be the completion of all conditions necessary to 
effectuate the removal of Exception Nos. 32 and 33, they filed this action seeking declaratory 
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disbursal the funds to them. Murphy Land filed a motion surrunary judginent 
asserting that its losses were to or greater than $3,000,000, and 
it was entitled to the funds being held by Guaranty Title, lnc. in their entirety. The Plaintiffs 
objected. challenging the method(s) by which Murphy Land's losses were calculated. After a 
hearing, the Court granted Murphy Land's motion and ordered the finds be disbursed to it. 
Prevailing Party 
In order to be entitled to an award of attorney fees, the party requesting those fees must 
be determined to be the prevailing party. The issue of the prevailing party is committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). ln determining whether or which party 
to an action is a prevailing party, ... the trial court shall ... consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch. LLC v. 
Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc~, 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005)(citing Agri-
Lines Corp .. 106 Idaho 687,682 P.2d 640 (Ct.App.1984)). 
The Plaintiffs concede that Murphy Land was the prevailing party in this case, as it 
received the relief requested - disbursement of the $3,000,000 to Murphy Land. Therefore, 
based upon the course of proceedings in this case1, the Court finds that Murphy Land is the 
prevailing party. 
Attorney Fees Pursuant to I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P .. 54(e)(l) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(l )(B ), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
1 The Court notes that there several other cases involving these parties, as well as related third 
parties~ however, for purposes of determining the prevailing party for attorney fees in this case, 
only the course of litigation in this case is being considered. 
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awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. 
Idaho Code §12-121 further provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which othenvise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The 
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association. private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Thus, attorney fees under LC. §l2-12I and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) are limited to those 
situations in which the court finds that the action was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation!' Id The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
determination of such is within the broad and sound discretion of the trial court. Anderson v. 
Good/if.le, 140 Idaho 446, 450, 95 P.3d 64, 68 (2004). It is clear, however, that the Court must 
consider the entire course of litigation and, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney 
fees may not be awarded to the prevailing party even though the losing party has asserted factual 
or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian 
Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 524-25, 20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (2001). 
See also McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). Even where 
summary judgment has been entered, where there was an issue or defense that was fairly 
debatable, then such case or defense cannot be said to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation. See Camp v. Jiminez, 107 ldaho 878,884,693 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Here, although Murphy Land ultimately prevailed, there was a fairly debatable issue with 
respect to the amount of loss incurred by Murphy Land and who was entitled to what portion of 
the funds. Thus, despite the fact that some of the Hilliards arguments could be considered 
frivolous, the case as a whole was not. As such, Murphy Land is not entitled to attorney fees 
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pursuant to §1 and 54(e)(1 ). 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, biH, negotiable 
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by 
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person, 
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
[An] award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is 
remotely connected with a case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises 
the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless 
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party 
is attempting to recover. Brower v. E.l. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 
P.2d 345, 349 (1990). 
In Buku Properties. LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 291 P.3d 1027 (2012), reh'g denied 
(Jan. 23, 2013), the Court held that contracts between the parties were commercial transactions 
because neither party entered into the transaction for personal or household purposes. Buku 
explicitly sought the land for commercial development. Similarly, the sale of the land by the 
Clarks and Petersons was not performed for a personal or household purpose, considering the 
large acreage sold and the fact that both parcels of land were historically used for commercial 
fanning purposes. Furthermore, the commercial transaction between Buku and the 
Clarks/Petersons was integral to Buku's claim because it was the sole basis upon which recovery 
was sought by Buku in its Complaint. The Court further found that the commercial transaction 
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was the actual basis for Buku's suit and constitmed the grnvamen Buku's claims where Buku 
on the contract terms. the transactions at 
issue in that case were commercial transactions and satisfied the Court's two-part test to invoke 
LC. § 12-120(3), making the district court's award of attorney fees proper. Buku Properties, LLC 
v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 836-37, 291 P.3d 1027, 1035-36 (2012), reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2013). 
Pursuant to Buku, the contract in the case at hand was a commercial transaction because 
neither party entered into it for personal or household purposes: both the historical and future use 
of the property was commercial farming. In addition, the terms of the contract relating to money 
held in trust pursuant to the purchase and sale contract was the sole basis of recovery. Thus, as in 
Buku, Id, the two-part test to invoke LC. §12-120(3) is satisfied, and Murphy Land, as the 
prevailing party, is entitled to attorney fees thereW1der. 
Amount of Attorney Fees 
The calculation of the amount of attorney tees is committed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 987 P.2d 314 
( 1999). In making its determination, the Court considered the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) as follows: 
(A) The time and labor re.quired. This litigation was commenced in 20i3. A great deal of 
time was expended due to numerous motions filed by the Plaintiffs after the Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment was granted. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. The underlying issues in this case were not 
particularly novel or complex. 
(C) The skill requisite to perfonn the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the 
attornev in the particular field of law. Though the issues in this case were not particularly complex, the 
attorneys handling this case are both experienced in this area of law. 
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(D) The prevailing charges for like work. The hourly rate charged Plaintiff's counsel is 
comparable to that charged by similarly experienced counsel in the area for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. The fees charged were hourly. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. There were no 
such limitations in this case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. Defendants sought and obtained the full 
amount of three million dollars ($3,000,000) held in trust. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. This case was not an undesirable one. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. Defense counsel has 
represented Murphy Land for years prior to the commencement of this action. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. The Court is unaware of specific amounts awarded in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research. None has been requested. 
Objections 
Plaintiffs first object to an award of costs and fees because the Defendant failed to 
request fees at the summary judgment hearing and, therefore, Plaintiffs assert, the issue of fees 
and costs is waived. Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5), the Defendant had until 14 days 
after entry of the judgment to file a memorandum of costs seeking costs and fees. Final judgment 
was entered in this matter on March 20, 2014. The memorandum of costs was filed on April 2, 
2014, thirteen days later. As such, the issue of attorney fees was not waived, and the request was 
timely made. 
Plaintiff next objects to the lack of specificity in the billing detail, paying for multiple 
attorneys when they confer, and the lack of efficiency is delegating assignments among 
attorneys. 
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As to the lack specificity, the finds that the billing itemization was sufficiently 
specific to determine whether time was on case and what manner it was being spent. 
As to specific items, the Court finds that there was some duplication and therefore the Court 
declines to award $8,517.50 in attorney fees, more specifically set forth as follows: 
7/23/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 1.3 ($260) to .6 ($120)-reduction of $140 
8/2/13 
8/2/13 
8/16/13 
8/29/13 
9/30/13 
Richard Goodson .5 $132.50 eliminated 
Matthew Gordon reduced from 3.8 ($760) to 3.3 ($660) reduction of $100 
Matthew Gordon reduced from .2 ($40) to .I ($20) reduction of $20 
Matthew Gordon .3 $60 eliminated 
Richard Goodson 1.0 $265 eliminated 
10/16/13 Matthew Gordon .9 $180 eliminated 
10/31 /13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 5 .1 ($1,020) to 3 .6 ($720) reduction of $300 
11/1/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 4.9 ($980) to 2.5 ($500) reduction of $480 
12/2/13 Matthew Gordon 3.0 $600 eliminated 
12/3/13 Matthew Gordon 2.6 $520 eliminated 
12/4/13 Matthew Gordon 6.2 $1,240 eliminated 
12/6/13 Matthew Gordon 2.9 $180 eliminated 
12/12/13 Matthew Gordon 2.8 $560 eliminated 
12/13/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 9.4 ($1,880) to 7.9($1,580) reduction of$300 
12/16/13 Matthew Gordon 2.9 $580 eliminated 
12/3/13 Matthew Gordon 1 . l $220 eliminated 
12/23/13 Matthew Gordon .4 $80 eliminated 
12/3/13 Matthew Gordon 2.2 $40 eliminated 
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I /6/14 Matthew Gordon l eliminated 
1/16/14 Matthew Gordon $525 eliminated 
1/20/14 Matthew Gordon .5 ($105) reduced to .3 ($63) reduction of $42 
1/27/14 Matthew Gordon 1.7 $357 eliminated 
3/7/14 Matthew Gordon 5.9 $1,239 eliminated 
In 2013, the billing rate for Matthew Gordon was $200/hr. In 2014. that increased to 
$210/hr. The total amount of attorney fees requested shall be reduced by $8,517.50 
After review of the paralegal fees, it appears that the work performed was clerical in 
nature. The question of whether to award fees for clerical work is discretionary with the Court. 
See P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 239, 159 P.3d 870, 
876 (2007). This Court finds that such costs are part of the cost of doing business and the Court 
therefore declines to award such fees in the total amount of $1,075.00, which are more 
specifically set out as follows: 
11/1/13 Christian Wamhoff 2.8 $280 
11/4/13 Christian Wamhoff 3.6 $360 
1 I/5/13 Christian Wamhoff .6 $60 
l l /5/13 Kyle Millard .3 $30 
11/14/13 Kyle Millard 3.3 $330 
1/15/14 Denise Heller .1 $15 
Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that there should have been greater efficiency in the use of 
attorney time and delegation, using as an example that a Hawley Troxell attorney from the 
Pocatello office should have been used 10 handle the deposition that took place in Pocatello. The 
difficulties with doing that in this case are two-fold: first, there is the additional time that would 
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1 
need to be expended by the new attorney educating him- or herself on the potential issues this 
case, especially in light of the contentious nature of this litigation, and second, the deposition 
was of Lance Funk, one of the principals of Murphy Land and, in effect, one of the parties. 
Given these circumstances, the Court does not find it unreasonable that Mr. Schossberger 
handled the deposition himself Similarly, the Court finds that defense counsel's trip to Pasco 
was reasonable given that it is the location of Murphy Land's corporate office and there was a 
need to meet with company officials regarding discovery and to assist in the collection of 
documents in this case. 
After carefully considering the factors set forth above and the objections of the 
Defendants, the Court awards attorney fees to the City in the amount of $65,115.50 
The following costs are awarded as a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(C): 
Filing Fee: 
Deposition of Lance Funk 
$69 
$223.24 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to a total of $292.24 
in costs and fees. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff is awarded a total of $65.407. 74 in costs 
and attorney fees. 
Dated this 2 C{ day of May, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ilt/J attZL 
The undersigned certifies that on _~_1 _ day o~, 2014, s/he served a true and correct copy of 
the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the manner described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
ATI'ORNEY AT LAW 
PO Box 1652 
Boise, ID 83701 
• upon counsel for defendants: 
Steven F. Schossberger 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 W Main St, Ste l 000 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient 
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
ANGELA BARK.ELL, Clerk of the Court 
By: _,_J-"12_0_1il1_; .,_fl_t_r1J2_1 ~u_' __ 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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ANffE1t@ BARKELL, CLERK )':f!r1k~ 
Lr 6iputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLARD 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CVB-3004 
AMENDED ORDER ON COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The Defendant, Murphy Land Company, LLC (Murphy Land), seeks attorney fees in this 
matter pursuant to I.C. §§12-120 and 12-121, and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), 54(d)(5), 54(e)(l), and 
54(e)(3). 
This case arose out of a contract for the sale of farm land in Owyhee County between the 
Billiards, Plaintiffs, as seller, and Murphy Land, Defendant, as buyer. The Hilliards used the 
property for commercial farming purposes, and Murphy Land like\\tise purchased the property 
for commercial fa.rming purposes. Addendum No. 4 to the land sale contract provided that the 
Plaintiffs would place three million dollars ($3,000,000) of the purchase price to be held in trust 
by Guaranty Title, Inc., pending deletion of Exception Nos. 32 and 33 on the commitment for 
title insurance. Specifically, these funds were intended to cover damages that resulted from the 
inability of Murphy Land to take possession of the land at the time of the sale. 
Upon what the Hilliards understood to be the completion of all conditions necessary to 
effectuate the removal of Exception Nos. 32 and 33, they filed this action seeking declaratory 
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and disbursal funds to them. Murphy Land filed a motion for summary judgment 
$3,000,000, and sought a determination 
it was entitled to the funds being held by Guaranty Title, Inc. in their entirety. The Plaintiffs 
objected, challenging the method(s) by which Murphy Land's losses were calculated. After a 
hearing, the Court granted Murphy Land's motion and ordered the finds be disbursed to it 
Prevailing Party 
In order to be entitled to an award of attorney fees, the party requesting those fees must 
be determined to be the prevailing party. The issue of the prevailing party is committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court by LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). In determining whether or which party 
to an action is a prevailing party, ... the trial court shall ... consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch. LLC v. 
Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc:.., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005)(citing Agri-
Lines Corp., I 06 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d 640 (Ct.App.1984)). 
The Plaintiffs concede that Murphy Land was the prevailing party in this case, as it 
received the relief requested - disbursement of the $3,000,000 to Murphy Land. Therefore, 
based upon the course of proceedings in this case1, the Court finds that Murphy Land is the 
prevailing party. 
Attorney Fees Pursuant to LC. §12-121 and I.R.C.P .. 54(e)(l) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54( d)( 1 )(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
1 The Court notes that there several other cases involving these parties, as well as related third 
parties; however, for purposes of determining the prevailing party for attorney fees in this case, 
only the course of litigation in this case is being considered. 
AMENDED ORDER ON COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES PAGE-2 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 further provides: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The 
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Thus, attorney fees under LC. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) are limited to those 
situations in which the court finds that the action was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Id The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
determination of such is within the broad and sound discretion of the trial court. Anderson v. 
Goodlijfe, 140 Idaho 446, 450, 95 P.3d 64, 68 (2004). It is clear, however, that the Court must 
consider the entire course of litigation and, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney 
fees may not be awarded to the prevailing party even though the losing party has asserted factual 
or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian 
Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 524-25, 20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (2001). 
See also McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). Even where 
summary judgment has been entered, where there was an issue or defense that was fairly 
debatable, then such case or defense cannot be said to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation. See Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,884,693 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Here, although Murphy Land ultimately prevailed, there was a fairly debatable issue with 
respect to the amount of loss incurred by Murphy Land and who was entitled to what portion of 
the funds. Thus, despite the fact that some of the Hilliards arguments could be considered 
frivolous, the case as a whole was not. As such, Murphy Land is not entitled to attorney fees 
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pursuant to LC. § 1 1 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l ). 
Attorney Fees Pursuant to LC. §12-120(3) 
Idaho Code §12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable 
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by 
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the 
court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person, 
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
[An] award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is 
remotely connected with a case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises 
the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under LC. § 12-120(3) unless 
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party 
is attempting to recover. Brower v. E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 
P.2d 345, 349 ( 1990). 
In Buku Properties, LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 291 P.3d 1027 (2012), reh'g denied 
(Jan. 23, 2013), the Court held that contracts between the parties were commercial transactions 
because neither party entered into the transaction for personal or household purposes. Buku 
explicitly sought the land for commercial development. Similarly, the sale of the land by the 
Clarks and Petersons was not performed for a personal or household purpose, considering the 
large acreage sold and the fact that both parcels of land were historically used for commercial 
farming purposes. Furthermore, the commercial transaction between Buku and the 
Clarks/Petersons was integral to Buku's claim because it was the sole basis upon which recovery 
was sought by Buku in its Complaint. The Court further found that the commercial transaction 
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was actual basis for Buku's suit and constituted the gravamen of Buku's claims where Buku 
its earnest money returned on the contract terms. at 
issue in that case were commercial transactions and satisfied the Court's two-part test to invoke 
I.C. § 12-120(3 ), making the district court's award of attorney fees proper. Buku Properties, LLC 
v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 836-37, 291 P.3d 1027, 1035-36 (2012), reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2013). 
Pursuant to Buku, the contract in the case at hand was a commercial transaction because 
neither party entered into it for personal or household purposes: both the historical and future use 
of the property was commercial farming. In addition, the terms of the contract relating to money 
held in trust pursuant to the purchase and sale contract was the sole basis of recovery. Thus, as in 
Buku, Id, the two-part test to invoke I. C. § 12-120(3) is satisfied, and Murphy Land, as the 
prevailing party, is entitled to attorney fees thereunder. 
Amount of Attorney Fees 
The calculation of the amount of attorney fees is committed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 987 P.2d 314 
(1999). In making its determination, the Court considered the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) as follows: 
(A) The time and labor required. This litigation was commenced in 20 i 3. A great deal of 
time was expended due to numerous motions filed by the Plaintiffs after the Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment was granted. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. The underlying issues in this case were not 
particularly novel or complex. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform t]1e legal service properly and the experience and ability of the 
attorney in the particular field of law. Though the issues in this case were not particularly complex.. the 
attorneys handling this case are both experienced in this area ofiaw. 
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(D) The prevailing charges for li_ke work. The hourly rate charged Plaintiff's counsel is 
comparable to that charged by similarly experienced counsel in the area for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or con~jngent. The fees charged were hourly. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. There were no 
such limitations in this case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. Defendants sought and obtained the full 
amount of three million dollars ($3,000,000) held in trust. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. This case was not an undesirable one. 
(() The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. Defense counsel has 
represented Murphy Land for years prior to the commencement of this action. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. The Court is unaware of specific amounts awarded in similar cases. 
( K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research. None has been requested. 
Objections 
Plaintiffs first object to an award of costs and fees because the Defendant failed to 
request fees at the summary judgment hearing and, therefore, Plaintiffs assert, the issue of fees 
and costs is waived. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5), the Defendant had until 14 days 
after entry of the judgment to file a memorandum of costs seeking costs and foes. Final judgment 
was entered in this matter on March 20, 2014. The memorandum of costs was filed on April 2, 
20 I 4, thirteen days later. As such, the issue of attorney fees was not waived, and the request was 
timely made. 
Plaintiff next objects to the lack of specificity in the billing detail, paying for multiple 
attorneys when they confer, and the lack of efficiency is delegating assignments among 
attorneys. 
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As to the lack of specificity, the Court finds that the billing itemization was sufficiently 
specific to determine whether time was spent on this case and in what manner it was being spent 
As to specific items, the Court finds that there was some duplication and therefore the Court 
declines to award $8,517.50 in attorney fees, more specifically set forth as follows: 
7/23/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 1.3 ($260) to .6 ($120)-reduction of $140 
8/2/13 Richard Goodson .5 $132.50 eliminated 
8/2/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 3.8 ($760) to 3.3 ($660) reduction of$100 
8/16/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from .2 ($40) to . I ($20) reduction of $20 
8/29/13 Matthew Gordon .3 $60 eliminated 
9/30/13 Richard Goodson 1.0 $265 eliminated 
10/16/13 Matthew Gordon .9 $180 eliminated 
10/31/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 5.1 ($1,020) to 3.6 ($720) reduction of $300 
11 /l/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 4.9 ($980) to 2.5 ($500) reduction of $480 
12/2/13 
12/3/13 
12/4/13 
12/6/13 
Matthew Gordon 3.0 $600 eliminated 
Matthew Gordon 2.6 $520 eliminated 
Matthew Gordon 6.2 $1,240 eliminated 
Matthew Gordon 2.9 $180 eliminated 
12/12/13 Matthew Gordon 2.8 $560 eliminated 
12/13/13 Matthew Gordon reduced from 9.4 ($1,880) to 7.9($1,580) reduction of$300 
12/16/13 Matthew Gordon 2.9 $580 eliminated 
12/3/13 Matthew Gordon 1.1 $220 eliminated 
12/23/13 Matthew Gordon .4 $80 eliminated 
12/3/13 Matthew Gordon 2.2 $40 eliminated 
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Matthew Gordon 1. 7 eliminated 
4 Matthew Gordon $525 eliminated 
1 /20/14 Matthew Gordon .5 ($105) reduced to .3 ($63) reduction of $42 
1/27/14 Matthew Gordon 1.7 $357 eliminated 
3/7/14 Matthew Gordon 5.9 $1,239 eliminated 
In 2013, the billing rate for Matthew Gordon was $200/hr. In 2014, that increased to 
$2 l 0/hr. The total amount of attorney fees requested shall be reduced by $8,517.50 
After review of the paralegal fees, it appears that the work performed was clerical in 
nature. The question of whether to award fees for clerical work is discretionary with the Court. 
See P.O. Ventures. Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 239, 159 P.3d 870, 
876 (2007). This Court finds that such costs are part of the cost of doing business and the Court 
therefore declines to award such foes in the total amount of $1,075.00. which are more 
specifically set out as follows: 
11/1/13 Christian Wamhoff 2.8 $280 
11/4/13 Christian Wamhoff 3.6 $360 
11/5/13 Christian Wamhoff .6 $60 
11/5/13 Kyle Millard .3 $30 
I 1/14/13 Kyle Millard 3.3 $330 
l /15/14 Denise Heller .1 $15 
Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that there should have been greater efficiency in the use of 
attorney time and delegation, using as an example that a Hawley Troxell attorney from the 
Pocatello office should have been used to handle the deposition that took place in Pocatello. The 
difficulties with doing that in this case are two-fold: first, there is the additional time that would 
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need to be expended by the new attorney educating him- or herself on the potential issues in this 
case, especially in light the contentious nature of this litigation, and second, the deposition 
was of Lance Funk, one of the principals of Murphy Land and, in effect, one of the parties. 
Given these circwnstances, the Court does not find it unreasonable that Mr. Schossberger 
handled the deposition himself. Similarly, the Court finds that defense counsel's trip to Pasco 
was reasonable given that it is the location of Murphy Land's corporate office and there was a 
need to meet with company officials regarding discovery and to assist in the collection of 
documents in this case. 
After carefully considering the factors set forth above and the objections of the Plaintiffs, 
the Court awards attorney fees to the City in the amount of $65,115.50 
The following costs are awarded as a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(C): 
Filing Fee: 
Deposition of Lance Funk 
$69 
$223.24 
Based on the foregoing, the Coun finds that the Defendant is entitled to a total of $292.24 
in costs and fees. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant is awarded a total of $65,407.74 in costs 
and attorney fees . 
. --r- ~~ 
Dated this _6..,..._ __ day of.Mtty, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on w4! day of May, 2014, s/he served a true and correct copy of 
the original of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER on the following individuals in the manner 
described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff: 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO Box 1652 
Boise, ID 83701 
• upon counsel for defendants: 
Steven F. Schossberger 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP 
877 W Main St, Ste I 000 
PO Box 16 I 7 , I ( ri 0 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 f {\'{. ~ q6tr"' 00'(; 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient 
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the Court 
By: ~ flM'.;, (J171,,---
-~---~-----
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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